This book advances a new interpretation of Hart’s penal philosophy. Positioning itself in opposition to current interpretations, the book argues that Hart does not defend a mixed theory of punishment, nor a rule utilitarian theory of punishment, nor a liberal form of utilitarianism, nor a goal/constraint approach. Rather, it is argued, his penal philosophy is based on his moral pluralism, which comprises two aspects: value pluralism and pluralism with respect to forms of moral reason. It is held that this means, on the one hand, that criminal law has an irreducible complexity due to the compromises it makes to accommodate competing values, and on the other hand, that there need not be one single justification of punishment. This original interpretation is not based only on Hart’s key volume on the subject Punishment and Responsibility, but on a careful reading of his complete works. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers interested in Hart’s philosophy, the philosophy of law and criminal law.

"This book advances a new interpretation of H.L.A. Hart's penal philosophy. Positioning itself in opposition to current interpretations, the book argues that Hart does not defend a mixed theory of punishment, nor a rule utilitarian theory of punishment, nor a liberal form of utilitarianism, nor a goal/constraint approach. Rather, his penal philosophy is based on his moral pluralism, which comprises two aspects: value pluralism and pluralism with respect to forms of moral reason. It is held that this means, on the one hand, that criminal law has an irreducible complexity due to the compromises it makes to accommodate competing values, and on the other hand, that there need not be one single justification of punishment. This interpretation is based on Hart's 'Punishment and responsibility' and on a careful reading of his complete works"--Publisher's description.

This book systematically defends an account of the institution of legal punishment that draws on both retributive and crime-prevention thinking. The work argues that legal punishment censures convicted offenders and thus morally communicates with them, any victims, and the broader community, while also serving to reduce future crime. The expressive or retributive element is assigned the lead role in this mixed account because it better captures the notion that members of society are to be held morally accountable for their failures to abide by defensible criminal prohibitions of various kinds. Despite this, it is conceded that the reduction of crime plays a vital role in justifying the institution of legal punishment and the book contains extended discussion of how and why this is so. Beyond its explication of the aims of legal punishment and their respective roles within a mixed theory, the study devotes separate chapters to sentencing, criminal procedure, and the imposition of fees and collateral legal consequences on individuals who have been convicted of crimes and fully served their sentences. In these ways, the work moves beyond discussion of the abstract aims of legal punishment to details of the institution’s internal structure and operations. The many historical deficiencies and failures of the institution are duly noted and the challenges they pose for punishment theorizing are examined. The book closes with discussion of the limited success of punishment institutions in apprehending, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law, including many who do so in serious ways. Alternatives to reliance on legal punishment institutions are briefly examined. In the end, retention of such institutions is urged although it is suggested that we ought to have modest expectations about their ultimate success. The work will be of interest to those working in the areas of Legal Philosophy and Criminology.

This book assesses the relationship between cosmopolitanism and sovereignty. Often considered to be incompatible, it is argued here that the two concepts are in many ways interrelated and to some extent rely on one another. By introducing a novel theory, the work presents a detailed philosophical analysis to illustrate how these notions might theoretically and practically work together. This theoretical inquiry is balanced with detailed empirical discussion highlighting how the concepts are related in practice and to expose the weaknesses of stricter interpretations of sovereignty which present it as exclusionary. Finally, the book looks at territorial disputes to explore how sovereignty and cosmopolitanism can successfully operate together to deal with global issues. The work will be of interest to academics and researchers in the areas of Legal Philosophy, Legal Theory and Jurisprudence, Public International Law, International Relations and Political Science.

This book offers an innovative perspective on the critical distinction between acts and omissions in criminal law, a distinction that runs like a defining thread through all types of criminal offenses. While any act that positively causes a prohibited harm is sufficient for a conviction, an omission that causes the very same harm warrants a conviction only when there is a legal duty to act. This fundamental distinction between acts and omissions is not just relevant to criminal law, but it is also deeply rooted in our moral thinking. Thus, it is commonly argued that the difference between acts and omissions is also applicable to the intuitive moral distinction between active euthanasia, forbidden in most countries, and passive euthanasia, permitted in many countries under certain circumstances. Hence, the significance of this book is threefold: First, it offers a comprehensive, coherent, and systematic discussion of the intersections between the philosophical-moral and the legal-criminal aspects of this fundamental topic. Second, it offers a novel rationale for the distinction between acts and omissions, based on the principle of autonomy. Finally, it demonstrates the influences of the theoretical discussion, on the most significant practical questions. This book will be of interest to researchers, academics and policy-makers working in the areas of criminal law, moral philosophy, and bioethics.

This volume explores how national and international human rights courts interpret and apply human dignity. The book tracks the increasing deployment of the concept of human dignity within national and international courts in recent decades. It identifies how human-dignity-based arguments have expanded to cover larger sets of cases: from the right to life or to integrity or anti-discrimination, the concept has surfaced in disputes about political and social rights and rule of law requirements, such as equality or legal certainty. The core message of the book is that judges understand, interpret, and apply human dignity differently. An inflation in the judicial recourse to human dignity can saturate the legal environment, depriving the concepts as well as human-rights-based narratives of salience, and threaten the predictability of court decisions. The book will appeal to philosophers of law, constitutional theorists and lawyers, legal comparativists, and internal law specialists. Whilst being dedicated specifically to human dignity jurisprudence, the book touches on many aspects of judiciary and as such will also be of interest to researchers studying legal reasoning, interpretation and application of the law and courts, as well as social philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists of law, politics, and religion.

Sport, Law and Philosophy: The Jurisprudence of Sport discusses the intersection of law and sport and highlights its usefulness to both legal scholars and philosophers of sport. There is a general recognition that law and sports bear strong similarities. Both can be understood as systems of rules, with a judge/referee who has the power to adjudicate and to issue punishments/penalties. Divided into two parts, this volume presents an exploration of central philosophical issues arising from the intersections of law and sport and makes reference to current events and controversies. Experts from across the globe discuss a range of issues such as sports as legal systems, the game as a social contract, the role of the referee, including VAR, rule breaking, equality in women’s sport, justice on the sports field and in the court room, and issues surrounding the application of law to sports. The book will be a valuable resource to Undergraduates, Postgraduates and for those working in the areas of legal philosophy, sports law, and philosophy of sport.

Mary Midgley argues in her powerful new book that far from being the opposite of science, myth is a central part of it. In brilliant prose, she claims that myths are neither lies nor mere stories but a network of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways of interpreting the world.

Compact yet comprehensive entries on theological terms as understood from a Reformed perspective are contained in this book. With pieces written by esteemed Reformed scholars, this book gives easy access to a wealth of theological information and summarizes the most significant aspects of Reformed theology.

Rejecting traditional alternatives, Leo Zaibert offers an original and refreshing approach to the age-old problem of the justification of punishment.