This title contains 17 original essays by leading thinkers in the field and covers the field's major topics including limits to criminalization, obscenity and hate speech, blackmail, the law of rape, attempts, accomplice liability, causation responsibility, justification and excuse, duress, and more.

Providing scholars with a comprehensive international resource, a common point of entry into cutting edge contemporary research and a snapshot of the state and scope of the field, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law takes a broad approach to its subject matter - disciplinarily, geographically, and systematically.

The adage 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' is significantly inaccurate. Ignorance and mistake of law do, under certain circumstances, exclude responsibility both in national and international criminal law. This monograph updates the existing reviews of law and practice on the topic, aiming to go a step further: it takes the analysis of mistake of law as a starting point for systematic observations about international criminal law in general. First, the volume defines the contours of the defence of mistake of law in general theory of criminal law, distinguishing it from cognate defences and highlighting, most notably, its connection with superior orders. Secondly, it gives an overview of the possible approaches to the defence, offering examples from national law as terms of reference for the subsequent analysis of international criminal law. Thirdly, it surveys the relevant law and practice of international criminal tribunals, with a focus on the International Criminal Court, and it contemplates offences for which a defence of mistake of law may potentially succeed. Finally, the author tries to interpret what the rules on mistake of law applicable before international criminal tribunals imply about the purpose of punishing individuals and to the legitimacy of such punishment. Whilst the discourse on international criminal law is more and more concerned with global politics, The Defence of Mistake of Law in International Criminal Law brings back the focus on the appropriateness of imposing a guilty verdict on the individual defendant, a human being constituting the basic unit of each society.

Jonathan Herring's unique and bestselling approach of separating out the doctrinal and theoretical aspects of the law, alongside expertly selected extracts, makes this book enduringly popular with students and teachers.

This volume considers the way in which the focus on individual rights may constitute an obstacle to ensuring fairness in criminal proceedings. The increasingly cosmopolitan nature of criminal justice, forcing legal systems with different institutional forms and practices to interact with each other as they attempt to combat crime beyond national borders, has accentuated the need for systems to seek legitimacy beyond their domestic traditions. Fairness, expressed in terms of the right to a fair trial in provisions such as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has emerged across Europe as the principal means of guaranteeing the legitimacy of criminal proceedings. The consequence of this is that criminal procedure doctrines are framed overwhelmingly in 'constitutional' terms – the protection of defence rights is necessary to restrict and legitimate the state's mandate to prosecute crime. Yet there are various problems with relying solely or predominantly on defence rights as a means of ensuring that proceedings are 'fair' or legitimate and these issues are rarely discussed in the academic literature. In this volume, scholars from the disciplines of law, philosophy and sociology challenge various normative assumptions underpinning our understanding of fairness in criminal proceedings.

Criminal law has struggled to keep pace with developments in psychiatry, both in substantive and procedural terms, and it is widely recognised that increased inter-disciplinary discussion of mental condition defences is required in order to address this gap between the law and psychiatry. This edited collection comes at a time of review of this sensitive area of criminal law. The Law Commission for England and Wales recently placed its evaluation of insanity, automatism and intoxication on hold, while it considers the law on unfitness to plead. These reviews are set against the backdrop of earlier Law Commission reports on partial defences to murder which informed significant changes that were made to the law in this area under sections 52–56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Recent developments in case law in this substantive area illustrate not only the importance of the role of the medical expert, but also that reform in this area is informed by ongoing inter-disciplinary research. This collection brings together medical and legal conceptions of mental disorder in order to appraise the operation of mental condition defences. In this respect, it provides invaluable and original insights into mental condition defences and criminal law.

The Philosophy of Criminal Law: An Introduction explores the central concepts of criminal law, such as intention, complicity and duress, and how they work, both within criminal law practice and in our everyday lives, from legal and philosophical perspectives. At the heart of the book is the central philosophical concept of responsibility: what does it mean to be responsible for an act, to hold someone responsible for an act, or to give an excuse in order to avoid responsibility for an act? Offering talking points to enrich an ongoing conversation, this unique textbook addresses all of these questions in an accessible way for law and non-law students alike. Real cases are examined in detail and a critical approach to the criminal law is adopted throughout. The focus will be mainly on the criminal law of England and Wales, with occasional cases from other jurisdictions, and occasional examples from other areas of law. This text will be ideal reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of law, philosophy and criminology, as well as political science and sociology.

A general introduction to key issues in the philosophy of education. The chapters are accessible to readers with no prior exposure to philosophy of education, and provide both surveys of the general domain they address, and advance the discussion in those domains.

There is no more vivid example of a state’s power over its citizens than the criminal law. By criminalizing various behaviours, the state sets boundaries on what we can and cannot do. And the criminal law is in many ways unique in the harshness of its sanctions. But traditional criminal law theory has for too long focussed on the questions, “what is a crime?” and “what is the justification of punishment?” The significance of the criminal law extends beyond these questions; indeed, critical philosophical questions underlie all aspects of the criminal justice system. The criminal law engages us not just as offenders or potential offenders, but also as victims, suspects, judges and jurors, prosecutors and defenders—and as citizens. The authors in this volume go beyond traditional questions to challenge our conventional understandings of the criminal law. In doing so, they draw from a number of disciplines including philosophy, history, and social science.

The book examines how and according to which principles the enactment of European criminal legislation is legitimate. The approach adopted here focuses on the constitutionalization of criminal law (i.e., the growing importance of constitutional elements of the EU legal order and the ECHR regime within criminal law). Further, it shows how and why criminal law has a unique nature, and why it should not be equated with other fields of EU law.The book explains the basic research questions and methodologies, before turning to the nature of criminal law at the level of national law, and addressing the different levels of justification for criminal law. Further, it examines the most prominent features of European criminal law and the difference between general EU law and EU criminal law, as well as the theoretical ideals for European constitutional structures and criminal law. Examples of how the law in practice might not always be in keeping with these normative ideals serve to round out the coverage.