The beginning of all this difficult business was a little speech which Mrs. Thresk fell into a habit of making to her son. She spoke it the first time on the spur of the moment without thought or intention. But she saw that it hurt. So she used it again-to keep Henry in his proper place. "You have no right to talk, Henry," she would say in the hard practical voice which so completed her self-sufficiency. "You are not earning your living. You are still dependent upon us;" and she would add with a note of triumph: "Remember, if anything were to happen to your dear father you would have to shift for yourself, for everything has been left to me."

Reprint of the final edition. Although the title leads one to expect a basic procedural manual, this book goes well beyond its stated purpose to offer a great deal of historical and jurisprudential information. Davis [1847-1914] examines the authority and sources of military law and its relation to civilian law. He also pays close attention to its debt to English military law and custom, some of it dating back to the middle ages. Davis [1847-1914] was Judge-Advocate General of the U.S. Army and Professor of Law at West Point.

Requirements for the defendant to actively participate in the English criminal process have been increasing in recent years such that the defendant can now be penalised for their non-cooperation. This book explores the changes to the defendant’s role as a participant in the criminal process and the ramifications of penalising a defendant’s non-cooperation, particularly its effect on the adversarial system. The book develops a normative theory which proposes that the criminal process should operate as a mechanism for calling the state to account for its accusations and request for official condemnation and punishment of the accused. It goes on to examine the limitations placed on the privilege against self-incrimination, the curtailment of the right to silence, and the defendant’s duty to disclose the details of his or her case prior to trial. The book shows that, by placing participatory requirements on defendants and penalising them for their non-cooperation, a system of obligatory participation has developed. This development is the consequence of pursuing efficient fact-finding with little regard for principles of fairness or the rights of the defendant.