TEN YEARS HAVE PASSED since the shocking attacks on the World Trade Center, and after seven years of conflict, the last U.S. combat troops left Iraq—only to move into Afghanistan, where the ten-year-old fight continues: the war on terror rages with no clear end in sight. In The Longest War Peter Bergen offers a comprehensive history of this war and its evolution, from the strategies devised in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to the fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond. Unlike any other book on this subject, here Bergen tells the story of this shifting war’s failures and successes from the perspectives of both the United States and al-Qaeda and its allies. He goes into the homes of al-Qaeda members, rooting into the source of their devotion to terrorist causes, and spends time in the offices of the major players shaping the U.S. strategic efforts in the region. At a time when many are frustrated or fatigued with what has become an enduring multigenerational conflict, this book will provide an illuminating narrative that not only traces the arc of the fight but projects its likely future. Weaving together internal documents from al-Qaeda and the U.S. offices of counterterrorism, first-person interviews with top-level jihadists and senior Washington officials, along with his own experiences on the ground in the Middle East, Bergen balances the accounts of each side, revealing how al-Qaeda has evolved since 9/11 and the specific ways the U.S. government has responded in the ongoing fight. Bergen also uncovers the strategic errors committed on both sides—the way that al-Qaeda’s bold attack on the United States on 9/11 actually undermined its objective and caused the collapse of the Taliban and the destruction of the organization’s safe haven in Afghanistan, and how al-Qaeda is actually losing the war of ideas in the Muslim world. The book also shows how the United States undermined its moral position in this war with its actions at Guantánamo and coercive interrogations—including the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar, who was kidnapped by the CIA in Milan in 2003 and was tortured for four years in Egyptian prisons; his case represents the first and only time that CIA officials have been charged and convicted of the crime of kidnapping. In examining other strategic blunders the United States has committed, Bergen offers a scathing critique of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ inability to accurately assess and counter the al-Qaeda threat, Bush’s deeply misguided reasons for invading Iraq—including the story of how the invasion was launched based, in part, on the views of an obscure academic who put forth theories about Iraq’s involvement with al-Qaeda—and the Obama administration’s efforts in Afghanistan. At a critical moment in world history The Longest War provides the definitive account of the ongoing battle against terror.

There is no explicit separation in Islâmic law between public and private law, but a special system has been used throughout history. Some scholars use the term Muslim personal law, which derived from the term al-aḥwâl al-shaḫṣiyyah in Fiqh books. But we prefer Islâmic private law; because Muslim personal law indicates different legal meaning – rules governing natural and legal persons. In this book, we will elaborate on Islâmic rules relating to seven branches of private law: personal law, family law, inheritance law, obligations and contracts’ law, property law, commercial law, and international private law. We will explain or summarize Islâmic rules in this book, rather than my (the author’s) personal views. Unfortunately, there is a misunderstanding in Western countries: if any Muslim scholar writes an article or book or grants an interview to a journalist to explain Islâmic rules on any issue, most Westerners, and especially people ignorant of Islâmic Law attribute these views to this scholar and holds him or her accountable. For example, a Dutch journalist came to see me and asked about the issue of beating women in the Qur’an, I explained the verse in the Qur’an and some interpretations by the Prophet Muhammed and Muslim jurists. The journalist did not understand what I explained, and many people have accused me of advising Muslims to beat their women. This is absolutely false. This is why we have to explain the following points. The first point is this: All the regulations in Islâmic law are divided into two groups with respect to to legal authority. First, rules that were based directly on the Qur’an and the Sunnah and codified in books on Fiqh (Islâmic Law) are called Sharî‘ah rules, Shar‘-i Sharîf, or Sharî‘ah law; these rules constitute 85% of the legal system. The exclusive sources of these rules are the Qur’an, the consensus of Muslim jurists, and true analogy (qiyâs). All explanations of these rules based completely on the Qur’an and the Sunnah. If any Muslim scholar writes an article on ‘beating women’ or ‘polygamy,’ he is responsible only for his/her interpretations. Could any scholar be responsible for the religious ideology that he/she explains? Are his/her explanations to be considered propaganda for that religion or ideology? Absolutly not. Western authorities, politicians and journalists should know that Muslims hold that every machine has a manual. If the manual is not followed when the machine is being used or operated, it will break. Allah sent the Qur’an as the manual for human beings. If a society does not take the Qur’an as its guide, it is destined to have the same fate as a machine that is operated without the manual. This is a basic creed for Muslims. A Muslim cannot disagree with a explicit verse of the Qur’an. Second, financial law, land law, ta‘zîr penalties, arrangements concerning military law and administrative law in particular were based on the restricted legislative authority vested by Sharî‘ah decrees and those jurisprudential decrees that were founded on secondary sources such as customs and traditions and the public good, which fell under public law, al-Siyâsah al-Shar‘iyyah (Sharî‘ah policies), Qânûn (Legal Code), and the like. Since these could not exceed the limits of Sharî‘ah principles either, they should not be viewed as a legal system outside of Islâmic Law. The second point is that another classification of the Islâmic rules should be explained. Many Muslims and non-Muslims think that all injunctions in Islâmic Law, such as polygamy and slavery, were established by the Qur’an or the Sunnah directly, and Islâmic Law has been criticized severely for this. The supposition here is false. A further point that causes confusion is the view that there was no slavery, male or female, before Islâm and that Islâm introduced it. There are, however, two kinds of injunctions in Islâmic law. 1) The first are injunctions that were laid down by Islâm as principles for the first time since they did not exist in previous legal systems. Islâm established these principles, such as zakâh, waqf(endowments) and inheritance shares. Muslim scholars state that these are completely beneficial for humankind as a whole. They also contain many instances of wisdom and purpose, even if people are not aware of them. 2) The second are injunctions that Islâm did not introduce; they already existed and Islâm modified them. That is, Islâm was not the first to set them down; rather, they were part of the law systems of other societies and were applied in a savage form. Since it would have been contrary to human nature to abolish injunctions of this kind suddenly and completely, Islâmic Law modified them so that they were no longer barbaric but civilized. Slavery and polygamy are good examples of this.[2] My third point is that I have explained theoretical rules of Islâmic Law in this book, but have not neglected the practice aspect of Islâmic private law. We have focused on the practice of the Ottoman State for Sharî‘ah especially because the Ottoman State practiced Islâmic Law completely, and we have archival documents proving this claim. The study of Shar‘iyyah Records (Shari‘iyyah Sijilleri) proves that in the Ottoman State Sharî‘ah rules were taken as the basis for personal law, family law, inheritance law, jus obligationum, law of commodities, commercial law, and all the branches of private law with respect to international private law. The analysis of the two essential sources of information regarding Ottoman law, viz. legal codices and Shar‘iyyah Records, leads to the following irrefutable conclusion: the Ottoman legislative authorities only and solely codified administrative law, with the exception of various subjects of constitutional law, property law, laws regarding state land, military law, financial law, ta‘zîr(punishment by way of reproof), crimes in criminal law and their penalties and decrees regarding some exceptional issues of private law. In issuing decrees on these it codified Sharî‘ah principles – if any – since matters transferred to the rulers’ arrangements would be made in consideration of such secondary sources as the public good, customs, and traditions. Because it could never be alleged that a state’s legal system consisted solely in the above-mentioned subjects, it could also not be claimed that the stated issues were arranged in disregard of Shar‘-i Sharîf. The explanations below will clarify this matter.[3] The fourth point is that contemporary Islâmic codes from different Muslim countries were not negleced. I have sometimes looked at the Morroccan Family Code (al-Mudawwana),[4] Egyptian laws that are the root of Muslim Middle Eastern countries’ legal systems, Pakistan’s law code which was based on the Ḥanafî Law School. We could say that in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, the effects of Ottoman legal codes, like Majallah and family law continue. The fifth point is as follows. This book is based principally in the Ḥanafî School and Ottoman practice. Nonetheless, comparisons with other schools have been made, especially with the Mâlikî School, which is the official school in Morrocco, the United Arab Emirates, and some other countries, the Shâfi‘î School, which is the official school in Indonesia and some other countries, the Ḥanbalî School, the official school in Saudi Arabia, and some other countries, and finally the Ja’farî School, which is the official school especially in Iran. For comparison between schools, this work has benefitted from some major works on Islâmic law. These works include: M. Zarqa, Al-Fıqh al-İslâmî Fî Thawbih al-Jadîd, c. I-II, Dimaşk 1395/1975; ‘abd al-Rahman al-Jaziri, Al-Fiqh ‘ala al-maḏâhib al-arba‘a, Cairo, 1969; Al-Shahid al Thani (Zayn al-Din Muḥammad ibn ‘Ali al–Jab’i al-‘Amili [d. 965/1558]), Al-Rawdat al-bahiyya fi sharh al-lum‘at al-Dimashqiyya, Beirut, 1967; Abdullah ibn Ahmad ibn Qudâmah al-M’aqdisî, Al-Muqni‘, Cairo, 2005; Ḫalil bin Isḥaq, Al-Tawdîh Sharhu Muḫtasar ibn al-Hâjib, Casablanca, 2012. Some comparative works have also been of benefit. These include: Imran Ahsan Ḫan Nyazee, Outlines of Muslim Personal Law, Advanced Legal Studies Institute, Islâmabad, Pakistan, 2011; Chibli Malla, “Identity and Community Rights Islâmic Family Law: Variations on State,” in Islâmic Family Law, edited by Chibli Mallat & Jane Connors, Graham & Trotman Limited, London 1993; Ahmad Nasir, The Status of Women under Islâmic Law and Modern Islâmic Legislation, Brill, Leiden and An Introduction to the Law of Obligations of Afghanistan, edited by Trevor Kempner, Andrew Lawrence, and Ryan Nelson, Stanford Law School, (PDF). We should not forget some official or semi-official legal codes in Muslim countries that are completely based on Sharî‘ah. For example, Muḥammad Qadri Pasha’a (1306/1889), Murshid al-Hayrân (Guide for the Perplexed), which consists of 1,045 articles; Al-‘Adl Wal Insâf Fi Hall Mushkilât al-Awqâf (Justice and Equity in Solving the Problems of Endowments), which consists of 343 articles; and Al-Aḥkâm al-Shar‘iyyah Fi al-Aḥwâl al-Shaḫṣiyyah (Legal Rulings on Personal Status Law), which consists of 647 articles; Morroccan Family Law (Mudawwanah); The Egyptian Civil Code was written in 1949, whose primary author was Abdel-Razzak al-Sanhuri, who was assisted by Dean Edouard Lambert of the University of Lille; The Egyptian Civil Code has been the source of law and inspiration for numerous other Middle Eastern jurisdictions, including the pre-dictatorship kingdoms of Libya, Jordan, and Iraq (both drafted by Al-Sanhuri himself and a team of native jurists under his guidance), Bahrain, as well as Qatar (the last two merely inspired by his notions) and the commercial code of Kuwait (drafted by Al-Sanhuri); Pakistan Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961. This book is divided into seven chapters: 1) personal law, 2) family law, 3) inheritance law, 4) obligations and contract Law, 5) property law, 6) commercial law, 7) international private law. We repeat again that we have preferred to write what Muslim jurists (fuqahâ) have argued is how the Qur’an and the Sunnah should be interpreted. Our success will be measured by our ability to correctly reproduce what existed in Islâmic sources. Every human enterprises falls short; we are ready to perfect our study with the help of contributions by readers and constructive criticism. I would like to thank all those who read this book and contribute constructively to it. I am thankful to God Who enabled me to complete this book.

This book provides a detailed account of the emergence and metamorphoses of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its political arm, Jamat ud Dawah, since the early 1990s. Linking the group's narratives to the process of Islamization in Pakistan and divergent views on the country's Islamic identity, it is the first systematic analysis of how the organization, globally reviled as the perpetrator of the 2008 Mumbai Bombings, has developed its conception of da'wah (proselytizing) and jihad in response to regional and global developments. Samina Yasmeen makes extensive use of Urdu materials (pamphlets, books, ephemera) by Markaz Da'wah wal Irshad, the parent organization of LeT, to examine the 'insider's vision' of the dominant threats to Pakistan and the Muslim ummah, as well as strategies for countering these threats. She argues that while adopting an oppositional narrative vis-à-vis India and the West, LeT has increasingly turned its attention to da'wah narratives within Pakistan engaging with broader spectrums of society. Women have increasingly been assigned significant agency in this narrative, and JuD's activism in education and social welfare has helped it acquire social capital. This, in turn, prompts a re-imagining of the movement's relationship with the Pakistani military.

December issue includes cumulative author index.

After formulating a theoretical foundation for the sociology of narrative genres based on the work of Bakhtin, Foucault, Goldmann, Jauss and Said, this work challenges the widely held assumption that Arabic culture stagnated before its contact with the West at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Hafez traces the revival to the mid-eighteenth century and follows its development throughout the Arab world, showing how the emergence of a new reading public with its distinct 'world view' induced the process of the transformation and genesis of a new literary discourse. This is followed by a study of the dynamics of this process and an outline of the various stages of the formation and transformation of the new narrative discourse until it culminates in the production of a sophisticated and mature narrative. The Genesis of Arabic Narrative Discourse shifts the terms of the debate on the rise of narrative from formal analysis to an analysis of social formation, clarifying many of the issues which have long dogged critical discussion. It changes the nature of literary history by overlaying its dry chronology with the vivid socio-cultural dimension and by achieving a fine balance between the textual and contextual. It tests its major theoretical suppositions by tracing the historical development of narrative discourse, as well as through a detailed and sensitive analysis of a short story in a manner that changes the nature of Arabic literary criticism and puts it on an equal footing with modern critical discourse in Western culture.

This profound book is a powerful yet balanced critique of mainstream economics that makes a forceful plea for taking economics out of its secular and occident-centred cocoon. It presents an innovative and formidable case to re-link economics with moral and egalitarian concerns so as to harness the discipline in the service of humanity. M. Umer Chapra is ranked amongst the Top 50 Global Leaders in Islamic economics (ISLAMICA 500, 2015) and has been awarded with two prestigious awards for his contributions to the field: Islamic Development Bank Award for Islamic Economics (1989) and the King Faisal International Prize for Islamic Studies (1989).

Studies on Sufism in Central Asia reproduces 12 studies which explore previously unstudied sources with an eye to identifying prominent developments in the social and organizational history of the major Sufi groupings of the region; The chronological range reflected in the studies included here runs from the 13th century to the 17th, with a somewhat uneven distribution between the earlier half of the period (13th-15th centuries, with six articles, Nos. II, IV, V, VII, VIII, and XI) and the later half (16th-17th centuries, with four pieces, Nos. III, IX, X, XII), and two studies (Nos. I and VI) spanning the entire period. In terms of specific Sufi traditions, the studies included here reflect DeWeese’s attention to groups and individuals that might be identified (despite the focus of some of his more recent work on questioning the use and meaning of such labels) as Kubravī, Yasavī, and KhwÄjagÄnī/Naqshbandī, with four studies focused entirely on ’Kubravī’ circles (Nos. I, II, V, XI), five on ’Yasavī’ subjects (Nos. III, VII, IX, X, XII), and one on the KhwÄjagÄn (No. VIII), as well as one dealing with Yasavī-Naqshbandī relations (No. VI) and another exploring a group that falls outside these labels (No. IV). KhwÄjagÄnī and Naqshbandī history has a strong ’background’ presence, nevertheless, in five other articles (Nos. I, III, IV, VII, and IX), reflecting the steady rise of the Naqshbandīya to predominance among Central Asian Sufi traditions.

Prior to the twentieth century, Arab society in Palestine was predominantly illiterate, with most social and political activities conducted through oral communication. There were no printing presses, no book or periodical production, and no written signs in public places. But a groundswell of change rapidly raised the region's literacy rates, a fascinating transformation explored for the first time in Reading Palestine. Addressing an exciting aspect of Middle Eastern history as well as the power of the printed word itself, Reading Palestine describes how this hurried process intensified the role of literacy in every sphere of community life. Ami Ayalon examines Palestine's development of a modern educational system in conjunction with the emergence of a print industry, libraries and reading clubs, and the impact of print media on urban and rural populations. Drawn from extensive archival sources, official reports, autobiographies, and a rich trove of early Palestinian journalism, Reading Palestine provides crucial insight into the dynamic rise of literacy that revolutionized the way Palestinians navigated turbulent political waters.

The Osama bin Laden I Know is an unprecedented oral history of Osama bin Laden's rise to revered leader of al Qaeda. Peter Bergen takes the reader onto the battlefields of Afghanistan as bin Laden goes from a shy, quiet teen to a leader; he brings you into Osama's intimate family life as he lives under the radar in Sudan, then Afghanistan; he puts you right in the room for al Qaeda's very first meeting; and he uses eyewitness accounts to relate what bin Laden said, and thought on 9/11 as he watched the twin towers fall. Derived from Bergen's interviews with more than 50 people who know bin Laden personally, from his high school teacher to an early al Qaeda member who later became a US informant, The Osama bin Laden I Know recounts individual experiences with the man who has declared the US, and its allies, his greatest enemies.