The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, and from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior? José Luis Bermúdez explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate. Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did). This controversial but accessible book shows that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously. And yet, it argues, no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.

Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory: Utility Theory and Causal Analysis provides the theoretical background to approach decision theory from a statistical perspective. It covers both traditional approaches, in terms of value theory and expected utility theory, and recent developments, in terms of causal inference. The book is specifically designed to appeal to students and researchers that intend to acquire a knowledge of statistical science based on decision theory. Features Covers approaches for making decisions under certainty, risk, and uncertainty Illustrates expected utility theory and its extensions Describes approaches to elicit the utility function Reviews classical and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference based on decision theory Discusses the role of causal analysis in statistical decision theory

This book presents the content of a year's course in decision processes for third and fourth year students given at the University of Toronto. A principal theme of the book is the relationship between normative and descriptive decision theory. The distinction between the two approaches is not clear to everyone, yet it is of great importance. Normative decision theory addresses itself to the question of how people ought to make decisions in various types of situations, if they wish to be regarded (or to regard themselves) as 'rational'. Descriptive decision theory purports to describe how people actually make decisions in a variety of situations. Normative decision theory is much more formalized than descriptive theory. Especially in its advanced branches, normative theory makes use of mathematicallanguage, mode of discourse, and concepts. For this reason, the definitions of terms encountered in normative decision theory are precise, and its deductions are rigorous. Like the terms and assertions of other branches of mathematics, those of mathematically formalized decision theory need not refer to anything in the 'real', i. e. the observable, world. The terms and assertions can be interpreted in the context of models of real li fe situations, but the verisimilitude of the models is not important. They are meant to capture only the essentials of adecision situation, which in reallife may be obscured by complex details and ambiguities. It is these details and ambiguities, however, that may be crucial in determining the outcomes of the decisions.

This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.

Planning of actions based on decision theory is a hot topic for many disciplines. Seemingly unlimited computing power, networking, integration and collaboration have meanwhile attracted the attention of fields like Machine Learning, Operations Research, Management Science and Computer Science. Software agents of e-commerce, mediators of Information Retrieval Systems and Database based Information Systems are typical new application areas. Until now, planning methods were successfully applied in production, logistics, marketing, finance, management, and used in robots, software agents etc. It is the special feature of the book that planning is embedded into decision theory, and this will give the interested reader new perspectives to follow-up.

Ira Horowitz Depending upon one's perspective, the need to choose among alternatives can be an unwelcome but unavoidable responsibility, an exciting and challenging opportunity, a run-of-the-mill activity that one performs seem ingly "without thinking very much about it," or perhaps something in between. Your most recent selections from a restaurant menu, from a set of jobs or job candidates, or from a rent-or-buy or sell-or-Iease option, are cases in point. Oftentimes we are involved in group decision processes, such as the choice of a president, wherein one group member's unwelcome responsibility is another's exciting opportunity. Many of us that voted in the presidential elections of both 1956 and 1984, irrespective of political affiliation, experienced both emotions; others just pulled the lever or punched the card without thinking very much about it. Arriving at either an individual or a group decision can sometimes be a time consuming, torturous, and traumatic process that results in a long regretted choice that could have been reached right off the bat. On other occasions, the "just let's get it over with and get out of here" solution to a long-festering problem can yield rewards that are reaped for many 1 ORGANIZATION AND DECISION THEORY 2 years to come. One way or another, however, individuals and organiza tions somehow manage to get the decision-making job done, even if they don't quite understand, and often question, just how this was accomplished.

This well-respected introduction to statistics and statistical theory covers data processing, probability and random variables, utility and descriptive statistics, computation of Bayes strategies, models, testing hypotheses, and much more. 1959 edition.

Within traditional decision theory, common decision principles -- e.g. the principle to maximize utility -- generally invoke idealization; they govern ideal agents in ideal circumstances. In Realistic Decision Theory, Paul Weirch adds practicality to decision theory by formulating principles applying to nonideal agents in nonideal circumstances, such as real people coping with complex decisions. Bridging the gap between normative demands and psychological resources, Realistic Decision Theory is essential reading for theorists seeking precise normative decision principles that acknowledge the limits and difficulties of human decision-making.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Second International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2011, held in Piscataway, NJ, USA, in October 2011. The 24 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 50 submissions.

In this new edition the author has added substantial material on Bayesian analysis, including lengthy new sections on such important topics as empirical and hierarchical Bayes analysis, Bayesian calculation, Bayesian communication, and group decision making. With these changes, the book can be used as a self-contained introduction to Bayesian analysis. In addition, much of the decision-theoretic portion of the text was updated, including new sections covering such modern topics as minimax multivariate (Stein) estimation.