In The Global Financial Crisis, contributors argue that the complexity of the Global Financial Crisis challenges researchers to offer more comprehensive explanations by extending the scope and range of their traditional investigations. To achieve this, the volume views the financial crisis simultaneously through three different lenses---economic, psychological, and social values. Contributors offer a constructive methodology suitable for exploring financial crises. They recognize how current economic analysis did not prepare academic economists, business economists, traders, and regulators to anticipate economic and financial crises. So, they search more extensively within the broader discipline of economics for ideas related to crises but neglected perhaps because they were not mathematically rigorous. They affirm that the complexity of financial crises necessitates complementary research. Thus, to put the focal purpose of this book differently, they explore the Global Financial Crisis from three interconnected frameworks: the standards of orthodox economic analysis, Minskyan economics, and the role of ideas and values in economics. Values are the subject of both philosophy and psychology and can contribute to a better understanding of the Global Financial Crisis. Values, in general, have been relatively neglected by economists. This is not because there is doubt about their significance, but rather because welfare economics and collective choice still operate within the neoclassical paradigm. This volume argues that analyzing the value implications requires moving from the neoclassical framework to something that is broader and multidisciplinary.

This book provides a critique of the neoclassical explanations of the 2008 financial collapse, of the ensuing long recession and of the neoliberal austerity responses to it. The study argues that while the prevailing views of deregulation and financialization as instrumental culprits in the explosion and implosion of the financial bubble are not false, they fail to point out that financialization is essentially an indication of an advanced stage of capitalist development. These standard explanations tend to ignore the systemic dynamics of the accumulation of finance capital, the inherent limits to that accumulation, production and division of economic surplus, class relations, and the balance of social forces that mold economic policy. Instead of simply blaming the ‘irrational behavior’ of market players, as neoliberals do, or lax public supervision, as Keynesians do, this book focuses on the core dynamics of capitalist development that not only created the financial bubble, but also fostered the ‘irrational behavior’ of market players and subverted public policy. Due to its interdisciplinary perspective, this book will be of interest to students and researchers in economics, finance, politics and sociology.

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: Macroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were the two key elements in starting the virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation, and strong productive growth that formed the basis for East Asia s success. (World Bank, 1993). Public perception of the Asian economies could hardly have shifted more since that time. Currency depreciation, rising corporate bankruptcy, bank failures, and sovereign bonds downgraded to junk bond status ended the euphoria in Asian emerging markets . Almost overnight, the reputation of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East and South East Asia deteriorated from a model of efficient development to an example of worst crony capitalism . Politicians, rating agencies, and investors were caught off guard by the development of the Asian financial crisis. During the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC) in November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton referred to the financial crisis in Asia as merely a few small glitches in the road . Moody s and Standard and Poor s had upgraded the Philippines long term debt rating a few months earlier and downgraded the affected economies only when the crisis persisted for more than three months. Com-paring Thailand s situation to Mexico s economy prior to the peso crisis 1994-1995, the Morgan Stanley star analyst Barton Biggs wrote in January 1997: Thailand s problems are cyclical, not secular. Thailand is not Mexico in late1994. [..]On the numbers, Thailand qualifies for the euro and is healthier than Germany . The optimism seemed warranted by a history of high growth in the Asian countries. Before the outbreak of the crisis, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand had experienced uninterrupted growth of more that 5 percent of GDP per year for almost two decades. The economic profession also experienced its Waterloo in Asia. Economists not only failed to predict the crisis; they also failed to recognize the vulnerability of the region. Paul Krugman (1994) in his now famous article in Foreign Affairs was the only well-known economist to doubt the sustainability of rapid growth in East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, even he did not predict this kind of collapse, but rather a gradual economic slowdown of growth. Despite the initial confusion among economists, academic discussion about the Asian financial crisis quickly crystallized around two different explanations of the crisis. One explanation [...]

The global financial crisis has sent shockwaves through the world’s economies, and its effects have been deep and wide-reaching. This book brings together a range of applied studies, covering a range of international and regional experience in the area of finance in the context of the global downturn. The volume includes an exploration of the impact of the crisis on capital markets, and how corporate stakeholders need to be more aware of the decision-making processes followed by corporate executives, as well as an analysis of the policy changes instituted by the Fed and their effects. Other issues covered include research into the approach of solvent banks to toxic assets, the determinants of US interest rate swap spreads during the crisis, a new approach for estimating Value-at-Risk, how distress and lack of active trading can result in systemic panic attacks, and the dynamic interactions between real house prices, consumption expenditure and output. Highlighting the global reach of the crisis, there is also coverage of recent changes in the cross-currency correlation structure, the costs attached to global banking financial integration, the interrelationships among global stock markets, inter-temporal interactions between stock return differential relative to the US and real exchange rate in the two most recent financial crises, and research into the recent slowdown in workers’ remittances. This book was published as a special issue of Applied Financial Economics.

Japan is only one of many industrialized economies to suffer a financial crisis in the past 15 years, but it has suffered the most from its crisis--as measured in lost output and investment opportunities, and in the direct costs of clean-up. Comparing the response of Japanese policy in the 1990s to that of US monetary and financial policy to the American Savings and Loan Crisis of the late 1980s sheds light on the reasons for this outcome. This volume was created by bringing together several leading academics from the United States and Japan--plus former senior policymakers from both countries--to discuss the challenges to Japanese financial and monetary policy in the 1990s. The papers address in turn both the monetary and financial aspects of the crisis, and the discussants bring together broad themes across the two countries' experiences. As the papers in this Special Report demonstrate, while the Japanese government's policy response to its banking crisis in the 1990s was slow in comparison to that of the US government a decade earlier, the underlying dynamics were similar. A combination of mismanaged partial deregulation and regulatory forebearance gave rise to the crisis and allowed it to deepen, and only the closure of some banks and injection of new capital into others began the resolution. The Bank of Japan's monetary policy from the late 1980s onward, however, was increasingly out of step with US or other developed country norms. In particular, the Bank of Japan's limited response to deflation after being granted independence in 1998 stands out as a dangerous and unusual stance.

In recent years, as part of the increasing “informationization” of industry and the economy, enterprises have been accumulating vast amounts of detailed data such as high-frequency transaction data in nancial markets and point-of-sale information onindividualitems in theretail sector. Similarly,vast amountsof data arenow ava- able on business networks based on inter rm transactions and shareholdings. In the past, these types of information were studied only by economists and management scholars. More recently, however, researchers from other elds, such as physics, mathematics, and information sciences, have become interested in this kind of data and, based on novel empirical approaches to searching for regularities and “laws” akin to those in the natural sciences, have produced intriguing results. This book is the proceedings of the international conference THICCAPFA7 that was titled “New Approaches to the Analysis of Large-Scale Business and E- nomic Data,” held in Tokyo, March 1–5, 2009. The letters THIC denote the Tokyo Tech (Tokyo Institute of Technology)–Hitotsubashi Interdisciplinary Conference. The conference series, titled APFA (Applications of Physics in Financial Analysis), focuses on the analysis of large-scale economic data. It has traditionally brought physicists and economists together to exchange viewpoints and experience (APFA1 in Dublin 1999, APFA2 in Liege ` 2000, APFA3 in London 2001, APFA4 in Warsaw 2003, APFA5 in Torino 2006, and APFA6 in Lisbon 2007). The aim of the conf- ence is to establish fundamental analytical techniques and data collection methods, taking into account the results from a variety of academic disciplines.

One striking weaknesses of our financial architecture, which helped bring on and perhaps deepen the Panic of 2008, is an inadequate appreciation of the past. Information about how the system functioned and the reliability of organizations and institutional controls were drawn from a relatively narrow group of recent examples. History and Financial Crisis: Lessons from the 20th Century is an attempt to broaden the range of historical sources used by policy makers to understand and treat financial crises. Many recent discussions of the 2008 panic and the economic turmoil have found the situation to either be unprecedented or greatly similar to that of 1931. However, the book's wide range of contributors suggest that the economic crisis of 2008 cannot be categorised in this way. This book was originally published as a special issue of Business History.

The global financial crisis of 2008 was largely unpredicted. If economic theory has a role to play in predicting future catastrophes then the methods we rely on need to change. The authors of this study propose a new theory of economics based on more detailed understanding of how and why people behave as they do within their environment. This anthropological approach uses the strengths of many existing economic theories, including Keynesian and Austrian economics, to present a new framework for anticipating and averting the financial crises of the future.

The world's best financial minds help us understand today's financial crisis With so much information saturating the market for the everyday investor, trying to understand why the economic crisis happened and what needs to be done to fix it can be daunting. There is a real need, and demand, from both investors and the financial community to obtain answers as to what really happened and why. Lessons from the Financial Crisis brings together the leading minds in the worlds of finance and academia to dissect the crisis. Divided into three comprehensive sections-The Subprime Crisis; The Global Financial Crisis; and Law, Regulation, the Financial Crisis, and The Future-this book puts the events that have transpired in perspective, and offers valuable insights into what we must do to avoid future missteps. Each section is comprised of chapters written by experienced contributors, each with his or her own point of view, research, and conclusions Examines the market collapse in detail and explores safeguards to stop future crises Encompasses the most up-to-date analysis from today's leading financial minds We currently face a serious economic crisis, but in understanding it, we can overcome the challenges it presents. This well-rounded resource offers the best chance to get through the current situation and learn from our mistakes.