On title page and cover a star is used for the letter "[a]."

Earl J.Hess's study of armies and fortifications turns to the 1864 Overland Campaign to cover battles from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. Drawing on meticulous research in primary sources and careful examination of battlefields at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Bermuda Hundred, and Cold Harbor, , Hess analyzes Union and Confederate movements and tactics and the new way Grant and Lee employed entrenchments in an evolving style of battle. Hess argues that Grant's relentless and pressing attacks kept the armies always within striking distance, compelling soldiers to dig in for protection.

A compelling narrative of one of the Civil War's most pivotal campaigns in which Federal armies drove Robert E. Lee's army to the brink of defeat in April 1865. The Richmond-Petersburg Campaign lasted for ten months, the longest in any theater of the war, and dwarfed all of the war's other campaigns for length of sustained combat, distances covered by the opposing forces, number of troops deployed, and number of battles and engagements. Yet this military operation has traditionally received little attention from scholars, considering its importance in bringing the war to an end. This concise reference analyzes the grueling 1864–65 campaign, particularly its strategic, operational, and tactical decisions, which shaped the course and outcome of the war. The Richmond-Petersburg Campaign affected every segment of American society, bringing the impact of the war home to soldiers and civilians alike. General Ulysses S. Grant's armies employed more African Americans than in any other Civil War campaign, and their contributions were critical to Union victory. In an indication of the decisive importance of the campaign, the Confederacy took the unimaginable step of attempting to arm slaves for military service. A historian and lifelong resident of Virginia, Charles R. Bowery Jr. combines a vivid narrative, in-depth character study, and technical aspects of warfare to describe the human drama of one of the Civil War's most complex, decisive, and fascinating conflicts. This riveting account reveals how, in spite of the exceptional commands of leaders Grant and Lee, both sides suffered from personal rivalries, questions of honor, ineffective organization, and poor communication. The book concludes with an assessment of the mixed performances of both armies, the factors that influenced the outcome, and the campaign's role in ending the Civil War.

A comprehensive look at the Civil War and how it shaped American history and culture, includes coverage of major figures and the war's affect on politics, religion, gender, race, diplomacy, and technology.

This monograph explores the economic foundations behind General Ulysses S. Grant’s 1864-1865 campaign, the final campaign of the American Civil War. This paper will compare and contrast the economic conditions in the Union and the Confederacy with respect to manpower, social systems, finance infrastructure and industrial capacity. This will result in calculus of relative strategic power to analyze the strength and protracted military capability of the two belligerents. The campaign was long and bloody—truly a campaign that destroyed vast resources in people and national treasure. While the fighting was both protracted and vicious, the outcome was never in doubt. Based upon a strategic calculus of power, particularly industrial capacity and economic power it was clear that the Union had a decisive advantage. While the South was primarily a traditional society with an agriculturally based economy, the North was in the stage of precondition for take-off fully on the road to industrialization. Simply stated the South could ill afford to use up resources in manpower, military equipment and treasure at a rate near equal to the North. General Grant’s final campaign was successful because it flowed from conditions set by a strong, vibrant economy and was guided by a strategy that thrived on this productive strength. Pressed into a corner due to Grant’s final campaign, the South was sure to lose.

William B. Feis offers us the first scholarly examination of the use of military intelligence under Ulysses S.øGrant?s command during the Civil War. Feis makes the new and provocative argument that Grant?s use of the Army of the Potomac?s Bureau of Military Information played a significant role in Lee?s defeat. Feis?s work articulately rebuts accusations by Grant?s detractors that his battlefield successes involved little more than the bludgeoning of an undermanned and outgunned opponent.