Using a constructivist model, this study brings nuclear arms control and disarmament back into the debates on the future of Indo-Pakistani relations. Constructivism recognizes the independent impact of international norms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Norm (NNPN), on India and Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. Even though the NNPN does not legally bind them, it is reinforced at the global level, and may lead the South Asian rivals to move in the direction of nuclear arms control and disarmament, thus reducing the costs, dangers, and risks of an eternal strategic rivalry. After examining the main tenets of constructivism in international relations, the works delves into the proliferation debate, discussing nuclear reversal and U.S. policy toward the subcontinent since the G. W. Bush administration. It looks at the prospects for nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia after the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2008, and the nuclear abolitionist wave during the first Obama administration. It concludes with the contribution of social constructivism to understanding how changes in the India-Pakistan nuclear status quo can happen.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics, in contrast to other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how India and Pakistan utilise them for politico-strategic purposes in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape. Written by a group of perceptive observers of South Asia, this volume evaluates the current state of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrents, the challenges that the two countries confront in building their nuclear forces, the post-test nuclear doctrines of the two strategic rivals, the implications of Indo-Pakistani politics for regional cooperation, the role of two systemic actors (USA and China) in the region's nuclear politics and the critical issues of confidence-building and nuclear arms control.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics, in contrast to other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how India and Pakistan utilise them for politico-strategic purposes in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape. Written by a group of perceptive observers of South Asia, this volume evaluates the current state of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrents, the challenges that the two countries confront in building their nuclear forces, the post-test nuclear doctrines of the two strategic rivals, the implications of Indo-Pakistani politics for regional cooperation, the role of two systemic actors (USA and China) in the region's nuclear politics and the critical issues of confidence-building and nuclear arms control.

Drawing on a wide body of literature on international rivalries, this comprehensive and theoretically grounded work explains the origins and evolution of the Sino-Indian rivalry. Contrary to popular belief, the authors argue that the Sino-Indian rivalry started almost immediately after the emergence of the two countries in the global arena. They demonstrate how the rivalry has systemic implications for both Asia and the global order, intertwining the positional and spatial dimensions that lie at the heart of the Sino-Indian relationship. Showing how this rivalry has evolved from the late 1940s to the present day, the essays in this collection underscore its significance for global politics and highlight how the asymmetries between India and China have the potential to escalate conflict in the future.

The Cold War may have ended, and with it the superpower rivalry, but the world still contains many nuclear-armed states. This wide-ranging analysis of the continuing role of nuclear weapons in inter-state rivalry shows how they remain a central issue for the future of world peace. Determining the role of such weapons is crucial to the prospects for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The book starts by examining the relevance of nuclear weapons to the `long peace' between the superpowers during the Cold War. Were they a necessary condition for peace? Were they irrelevant or only marginally relevant to that peace? Can such questions be answered at all? Can the record of the past point to a future for nuclear weapons?

The security relationship between India and Pakistan is generally viewed through a neo-realist lens. This book explains the rivalry of these countries by looking at the socio-cultural norms at two levels, and discusses a hypothetical security community that could result in peace in the region.

This annual volume includes papers from the 2015 CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues' Capstone Conference. Spanning a wide range of technical and policy issues, the papers further discussion in their respective areas and contribute to the training of the greater nuclear community.

While a substantial body of research explains how the conflict between India and Pakistan originated and developed over time, a systematic and multivariate inquiry cutting across different IR paradigms to understand this rivalry is rare or limited. Surinder Mohan contributes to the understanding of India and Pakistan’s rivalry by presenting a new type of framework, also known as complex rivalry model. This comprehensive model, by not limiting its theoretical tool-kit to any single paradigm, is unique in its approach and better positioned to debate and answer baffling questions that the single-paradigm-based studies address rather inadequately and in isolation. This book, through an examination of fifty-seven militarized disputes between 1947 and 2021, explains the life cycle of India-Pakistan rivalry in four phases: initiation; development; maintenance; and a possible transformation/termination. Mohan delineates five specific conditions that evolved the subcontinental conflict into a complex rivalry: first, its survival in spite of the Bangladesh War and the end of the Cold War; second, its linkage with other rivalries; third, the inclusion of nuclear factor; fourth, the dyadic stability in the militarized disputes and hostility level despite changes in the regime type; and fifth, the dyad’s involvement in a multilayered conflict pattern. To break this deadlock and mitigate their longstanding differences, Mohan proposes that India and Pakistan must reframe their national priorities and political goals so that the new situation or combinations of conditions would assist their peace strategists to downgrade the dyadic hostility and implement risky policies to make headway to a promising transformation.

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional—and possibly nuclear—war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.