This 2002 book demonstrates how property law and rights shift and cycle in the US.

This volume brings together a collection of essays, many of them scholarly classics, which form part of the debates on three questions central to criminal law theory. The first of these questions is: what conduct should be necessary for criminal liability, and what sufficient? The answer to this question has wider implications for the debate about morality enforcement given the concern that the "harm principle" may have collapsed under its own weight. Secondly, essays address the question of what culpability should be necessary for criminal liability, and what sufficient? Here, the battles continue over whether the formulation of doctrines - such as the insanity defense, criminal negligence, strict liability, and others - should ignore or minimize the extent of an offender's blameworthiness in the name of effective crime-control. Or, are methods of accommodating the tension now in sight? Finally, essays consider the question of how criminal law rules should be best organized into a coherent and clarifying doctrinal structure. The structure grown by the common law process competes not only with that of modern comprehensive codifications, such as the America Law Institute's Model Penal Code, but also with alternative structures imagined but not yet tried.

Despite some significant advances in the creation and protection of rights affecting women’s health, these do not always translate into actual health benefits for women. This collection asks: 'What is an effective law and what influences law’s effectiveness or ineffectiveness? What dynamics, elements, and conditions come together to limit law’s capacity to achieve instrumental goals for women’s health and the advancement of women’s health rights?' The book presents an integrated, co-referential and sustained critical discussion of the normative and constitutive reasons for law’s limited effectiveness in the field of women’s health. It offers comprehensive and cohesive explanatory accounts of law’s limits and for the first time in the field, introduces a distinction between formal and substantive effectiveness of laws. Its approach is trans-systemic, multi-jurisdictional and comparative, with a focus on six countries in North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa and international human rights case law based on matters arising from Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Peru and Bolivia. The book will be a valuable resource for educators, students, lawyers, rights advocates and policymakers working in women’s health, socio-legal studies, human rights, feminist legal studies, and legal philosophy more broadly.

Eighty percent of the American people say congressional terms should be limited. Fifteen states have already done so, and efforts are spreading to more states and hundreds of cities. Would term limits be a good idea? Would they be constitutional? The Politics and Law of Term Limits presents both sides of the issue and lets the reader decide. Contributors include syndicated columnist George F. Will, League of Women Voters president Becky Cain, Thomas E. Mann of the Brookings Institution, constitutional scholar Ronald D. Rotunda, and former White House counsel Lloyd Cutler, among others. The Founding Fathers did not include term limits in the Constitution because they thought citizen legislators, not professional politicians, would be the rule, and an overwhelming number of voters from every demographic group in the nation believe that should be the case today. Problems such as the burgeoning federal deficit indicate that careerism and legislative "experience" may not be all they are cracked up to be. Proponents of term limits argue that abolishing careerism would open the political process to a new type of candidate - the aspiring citizen legislator - who wishes to take a brief time out from his or her work to make a contribution to society. But opponents of term limits counter that such a change would induce an unhealthy dependence on congressional aides and professional lobbyists. Who is correct? You decide.

ÔLaw and the Limits of Government by Frank Fagan is a creative and enormously useful book for any scholar of legislation, timing rules, and politics.Õ Ð Jacob Gersen, Harvard Law School, US Why do legislatures pass laws that automatically expire? Why are so many tax cuts sunset? In this first book-length treatment of those questions, the author explains that legislatures pass laws temporarily in order to reduce opposition from the citizenry, to increase the level of information revealed by lobbies, and to externalize the political costs of changing the tax code on to future legislatures. This book provides a careful analysis which does not normatively prescribe either permanent or temporary legislation in every instance, but rather specifies the conditions for which either permanent or temporary legislation would maximize social welfare. Containing comprehensive, theoretical, normative and empirical analysis of temporary lawmaking, Law and the Limits of Government will appeal to academics in law, economic and political science, lawmakers and policy advocates.

The increase in the European Union's executive powers in the areas of economic and financial governance has thrown into sharp relief the challenges of EU law in constituting, framing, and constraining the decision-making processes and political choices that have hitherto supported European integration. The constitutional implications of crisis-induced transformations have been much debated but have largely overlooked the tension between law and discretion that the post-2010 reforms have brought to the fore. This book focuses on this tension and explores the ways in which legal norms may (or may not) constrain and structure the discretion of the EU executive. The developments in the EU's post-crisis financial and economic governance act as a reference point from which to analyze the normative problems pertaining to the law's relationship to the exercise of discretion. Structured in three parts, the book starts by analyzing the challenges to the maxim that the law both grounds and constrains EU executive and administrative discretion, setting out the concepts, problems and approaches to the relation between law and discretion both in general public law and in EU law. It progresses to analyze how these problems and approaches have unfolded in EU's financial, economic and monetary governance. Finally, it moves on from these specific developments to assess how existing legal principles and means of judicial review contribute to ensuring the rationality and legality of EU's discretionary powers.