This book presents the first full-length explanation in English of Heinsohn and Steiger's groundbreaking theory of money and interest, which emphasizes the role played by private property rights. Ownership economics gives an alternative explanation of money and interest, proposing that operations enabled by property lead to interest and money, rather than exchange of goods. Like any other approach, it has to answer economic theory's core question: what is the loss that has to be compensated by interest? Ownership economics accepts neither a temporary loss of goods, as in neoclassical economics, nor Keynes's temporary loss of already existing, exogenous money as the cause of interest. Rather, money is created as a non-physical title to property in a credit contract secured by a debtor's collateral and the creditor's net worth. This book is an edited English translation of a highly successful German text, and offers the first book-length treatment of a theory which has received much interest since its first appearance in articles in the late 1970s.

The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.

The empirical studies presented in this book model the endogeneity by applying the simultaneous equations methodology on the relation of ownership and financial performance as well as on different ownership dimensions themselves. Its final model comprises a four equations system containing performance, general ownership concentration, managerial and institutional ownership.

This publication provides insight into the varied and rich experience in SOE reform in the region over the past decade, highlighting reform initiatives undertaken at national and country specific levels.

This monograph is concerned with two foundational principles of English property law: the principle of relativity of title and the principle that possession is a source of title. It is impossible to understand the relationship between possession and ownership in English law unless one has a sound understanding of these principles. Yet the principles have been interpreted in different ways by judges, practitioners, and academics. The volume seeks to illuminate this area of law by addressing four questions. What is possession? What is the nature of the title acquired through possession? What are the grounds of relativity of title? And, what is the relationship between relativity of title and ownership? Drawing on the analysis of the law concerning relativity of title and the acquisition of proprietary interests through possession, the author also implies that the architecture of land law and the law of personal property have many similarities.

This publication examines beneficial ownership transparency in nine countries in Asia and the Pacific and explains how overcoming hurdles to ensure the full disclosure of company ownership is key to cracking down on crime and corruption. Focusing on countries including Armenia, Mongolia, and the Philippines, it offers a breakdown of relevant international standards and details challenges related to accurate data verification, collection, and disclosure. It highlights best practices, provides practical recommendations, and shows why a multipronged approach to cross-checking ownership information can help reduce money laundering, terrorism financing, tax evasion, and other economic crimes.

This book examines the shareholder activism of institutional investors, and the effect of this activism on portfolio performance. By focusing on 118 institutional investors headquartered in the United States, the book is unique in addressing the shareholder activism of a large sample. Institutional shareholder activism is defined to include both traditional mechanisms of influence (i.e. filing shareholder proposals) and relationship investing. Institutional owners included private and public pension funds, mutual funds, bank trusts, insurance companies, endowments, and foundations. These institutional owners differ substantially, and these differences lead institutions to use their ownership power to pursue different philosophies and actions. Some institutions follow a passive governance policy, While others adopt an activist role. This book seeks to answer four questions: (1) Are institutional owners actively involved in the strategic affairs of companies in their portfolios? (2)Which forms of activism do institutional owners employ (either confrontational mechanisms, such as filing shareholder proposals, or relationship building mechanisms)? (3)Which forms of activism employed are most effective? and (4) Does the institutional type affect its pursuit of shareholder activism? In answering these questions the author suggests new important results that in many cases are contrary to what prior reports of the activities by a small number of institutional owners may intimate.

Ownership and Control of Oil examines government decisions about how much control to exert over the petroleum industry, focusing on the role of National Oil Companies in the production of crude oil since the nationalizations in the 1970s. What are the motives for which some producing states opt for less and NOT more control of their oil production sector? When can International Oil Companies enter the upstream industry of producing states and under what conditions? The diversity of policy choices across producers provides the stage for this investigation: different theoretical explanations are confronted, with the empirical evidence, with the aim of finally proposing an interdisciplinary framework of analysis to explain who controls oil production around the world. This book is intended for both specialists and general readers who have an interest in the issue of government control of the petroleum industry. Due to its multidisciplinary approach, the book is aimed at a large academic public composed of scholars of Political Science, International Political Economy, Comparative Politics, and Middle East Area Studies. Moreover, this book should be relevant to international consultants, industry professionals and decision-makers in countries assessing their experience with existing control structures as well as the many countries in the process of joining the ‘petroleum club’ of oil producing nations.