George W. Bush ran for office promising to continue what conservative icon Ronald Reagan started, and two years into his first term, Bush was still being described as "Reagan's son." Today, with the Iraq War spinning out of control and the Democrats in charge of Congress, Republicans and the conservative movement have all but abandoned George W. Bush. What happened? Did Bush change, or did his party's perceptions? Has the war and Bush's performance on other issues derailed the larger goals of the Reagan Revolution -- and even undermined its foundations? Or does the nation remain on a conservative path despite Bush's low standing with his fellow Americans? In Reagan's Disciple, two widely respected reporter/ historians provide an authoritative and concise investigation into these issues. They describe the essence of the 40th and the 43rd presidencies, and compare them to shed new light on the history of the past three decades. They show both how extraordinary a leader Reagan was, and how preposterous the expectations for Bush were from the beginning. As Americans look toward choosing a new leader in 2008, Reagan's Disciple will serve as an instructive tale for Republicans, Democrats, and independents alike.

During the first two years of Ronald Reagan’s second term the United States developed an offensive strategy for dealing with conflict in the developing world. Nicaragua was a primary target of this policy. Scholars refer to this as the Reagan offensive: the first time that the United States eschewed the norms of containment and sought to “roll-back” the gains of communism. However, the Reagan offensive was also significantly driven by a response to the emergent threat of international terrorism. Terrorism provided a vehicle that justified its use of aggressive proxy war and pursuit of regime change in Central America. U.S. policy with Nicaragua demonstrates the importance of terrorism to the development of a more aggressive United States in the post-Cold War world. This book examines the influence of the U.S.-Contra War in establishing a precedent for the use of overt pre-emptive force against sovereign nations in the name of counterterrorism. In the 21st century, the United States undertook a policy with the world based on a broad definition of self-defense that called for an array of actions that often violated traditional norms of international law and recognition of sovereign rights. This book demonstrates that the precedent for this change occurred in the late Cold War as the United States sought to respond to an escalation of global terrorism. The emergent problem of terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s transformed how and when the United States applied force in the world.

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The political importance of Christian churches in the 1 980s is the focus of this wide-ranging book of readings. Contributors begin by placing the current involvement of religious groups in politics in historical perspective and then analyze the politics and ideologies of both the religious right and religious left. They al30 explore specific issues, including the separation of church and state, the impact of religious interest groups on public policy, religion and abortion, and feminist theological views.

Concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship and, in the past, Iraq’s apparent pursuit of WMD have captured the world’s attention, and dominated the agenda of the American foreign policy establishment. But, what led policymakers and the US military to emphasise the threat of rogue states at the end of the Cold War? Going behind the vivid language of the ‘axis of evil’ and portrayals of undeterrable and reckless rogue states, this work demonstrates how the rogue state doctrine satisfied both domestic and international goals in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, underpinning efforts to maintain US leadership and hegemony. It offers a clear picture of the policymaking process, taking a broad, historical approach that places the actions of US officials towards Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Cuba in a wider context. Through an understanding of the long-standing influences on the US approach we are better able to appreciate why, for instance, regime change dominated the post-9/11 agenda and led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Explaining in detail how the tackling of rogue states became a central aim of US foreign policy, Miles examines whether there was continuity between the Clinton and Bush approach. He moves on to highlight the influence of Congress on the implementation of US policies and the difficulties the US faced in ‘selling’ its approach to allies and adapting its hard-line strategies to reflect developments within the targeted states. By considering the impulses and drivers behind the development of the rogue states approach, this work will extend the scope of existing work in the field and will be of interest to scholars and policymakers alike.