Examines the relationship between imperialism and international law.

Written by one of the world's leading international lawyers, this is a landmark publication in the teaching of international law. International law can be defined as 'the rules governing the legal relationship between nations and states', but in reality it is much more complex, with political, diplomatic and socio-economic factors shaping the law and its application. This refreshingly clear, concise textbook encourages students to view international law as a dynamic system of organizing the world. Bringing international law back to its first principles, the book is organised around four questions: where does it come from? To whom does it apply? How does it resolve conflict? What does it say? Building on these questions with both academic rigour and clarity of expression, Professor Klabbers breathes life and energy into the subject. Footnotes point students to the wider academic debate while chapter introductions and final remarks reinforce learning.

The book explores the various means of making non-conventional/non-treaty law and the cross-cutting issues that they raise. Law-making by technical/informal expert bodies, Conferences of Parties, international organizations, the UN Security Council, regional organizations and arrangements and non-state actors is examined in turn. This forms the basis for the analysis of the complementarity of international treaty law, customary international law and non-traditional law-making, potential subject matters of non-treaty law-making, domestic consequences of non-treaty law-making, proliferation of actors, commissions and treaty bodies of the UN system, and International courts and tribunals.

This Oxford Handbook examines the sources of international law, how the understanding of sources changed throughout the history of international law; how the main legal theories understood sources; the relationship between sources and the legitimacy of international law; and how sources differ across the various sub-areas of international law.

The question of the authority of international law over domestic authorities and the duties of state officials to international law are fundamental concerns in international legal theory and practice. The Authority of International Law: Obedience, Respect, and Rebuttal addresses these concerns by reframing the present accounts of authority in international law, construing its authority as imposing three different layers of duties on domestic officials: the duty to obey, the duty to respect, and the duty to rebut. The book provides an original interpretation of this authority - one that is not tied to prior state consent or domestic constitutional frameworks. It offers a nuanced account, arguing that whether or not international law is obeyed within any given situation depends on the type of duty it imposes on the state, and that duty's normative force. There is no strict framework in which international law always trumps domestic law or vice versa. Instead, Çalı presents a realistic account of when international law has absolute authority, and when it can afford a margin of appreciation to states. The Authority of International Law contributes to existing debates by considering the gap between consent-based jurisprudential theories of authority and self-interest and identity-based theories of compliance, and by considering monism, dualism, and normative pluralism as theories for addressing authority competition between domestic legal orders and international law.

This book revisits the theory of the sources of international law from the perspective of formalism. It critically analyzes the virtues of formalism, construed as a theory of law ascertainment, as a means of distinguishing between law and non-law. The theory of formalism is re-evaluated against the backdrop of the growing acceptance by international legal theorists of the blurring of the lines between law and non-law. At the same time, the book acknowledges that much international normative activity nowadays takes place outside the ambit of traditional international law and that only a limited part of the exercise of public authority at the international level results in the creation of international legal rules. The theory of ascertainment that the book puts forward attempts to dispel some of the illusions of formalism that accompany the delimitation of customary international law. It also sheds light on the tendency of scholars, theorists, and advocates to deformalize the identification of international legal rules with a view to expanding international law. The book seeks to revitalize and refresh the formal identification of rules by engaging with some tenets of the postmodern critique of formalism. As a result, the book not only grapples with the practice of law-making at the international level, but it also offers broad theoretical insights on international law, dealing with the main schools of thought in legal theory (positivism, naturalism, legal realism, policy-oriented jurisprudence, and postmodernism). The main theory of law ascertainment presented in this work remains however principally informed by a rejuvenated version of Herbert Hart's social thesis.

This book explores the question of how the multiplication of judicial decisions on international law has influenced the way in which legal findings in international law adjudication are justified. International law practitioners frequently cite judicial decisions to persuade. Courts interpreting international law are no exception to this practice. However, judicial decisions do much more than persuading: they enable and constrain interpretive discretion. Instead of taking the road of the sources of international law, this book turns to the somewhat uncharted terrain of legal argumentation. Using international criminal law as a case study, it shows how the growing number of judicial decisions has normalised courts' resort to them in legal justification and enabled some argumentative practices to become constitutive of international law. In so doing, it critically revisits the implications of an iterative use of judicial decisions, and reassesses the influence of the 'judicialisation turn' on the ways in which the meaning of international law is formed, shaped and reshaped by reference to judicial decisions.

This is the first monograph to scrutinize the relationship between the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct and the position of the ultimate subject, the individual, as a matter of positive international law. By testing the four main theoretical conceptions of international legal personality against historical and existing norms of positive international law that regulate the conduct of individuals, the book argues that the common narrative in contemporary scholarship about the development of the role of the individual in the international legal system is flawed. Contrary to conventional wisdom, international law did not apply to states alone until World War II, only to transform during the second half of the 20th century so as to include individuals as its subjects. Rather, the answer to the question of individual rights and obligations under international law is - and always was - strictly empirical. It follows, of course, that the entities governed by a particular norm tell us nothing about the legal system to which that norm belongs. Instead, the distinction between international law and national law turns exclusively on whether the source of the norm in question is international or national in kind. Against the background of these insights, the book shows how present-day international lawyers continue to allow an idea, which was never more than a scholarly invention of the 19th century, to influence the interpretation and application of international law. This state of affairs has significant real-world ramifications as international legal rights and obligations of individuals (and other non-state entities) are frequently applied more restrictively than interpretation without presumptions regarding 'personality' would merit.