The author gives a critical and comprehensive study of the fundamental problem of universals in Indian Philosophy. The centre of the study is the controversy between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa realists on the one hand and the Buddhist nominalists on the other. The author discusses not only the epistemological and metaphysical approach to the problem of universals but also the semantic approach made by the various systems of Indian Philosophy. In this context the view of the Grammarions with special reference to Bhartrhari has been discussed in some detail. A brief but critical analysis of some of the main trends of thought on universals in Western Philosophy--beginning from Pluto to the contemporary philosophers--has also been given. Besides his scholarly and eminently readable treatment of fundamental problem of universals, the author has attempted to give his own solution of the problem. It is based on the recurrent identities and similarities which are the principles of grouping and which form the foundation of our thought and speech.

John Duns Scotus (d.1308), known as the ‘subtle doctor' among medieval schoolmen, produced a formidable philosophical theology using and adapting an Aristotelian metaphysical framework. Critical of Thomas Aquinas' grand Summas, Scotus died before producing a final synthesis of his own. Indeed, his work, left in disarray for centuries, has only recently become available in an edited format. Contemporary metaphysics, taking up the problem of universals, treads on ground already well-worked by Scotus. Duns Scotus and the Problem of Universals shows how Scotus' treatment of the problem of universals is both coherent and, even by contemporary standards, cogent. Todd Bates recovers and sets out Scotus' understanding of the structure of material substance, reconstructs Scotus' arguments for universals and haecceities, and shows how Scotus' theory applies to the metaphysics of the Incarnation. This book makes an important contribution to a neglected but crucial area of Scotus scholarship.

The ancient topic of universals was central to scholastic philosophy, which raised the question of whether universals exist as Platonic forms, as instantiated Aristotelian forms, as concepts abstracted from singular things, or as words that have universal signification. It might be thought that this question lost its importance after the decline of scholasticism in the modern period. However, the fourteen contributions contained in The Problem of Univerals in Early Modern Philosophy indicate that the issue of universals retained its vitality in modern philosophy. Modern philosophers in fact were interested in 3 sets of issues concerning universals: (i) issues concerning the ontological status of universals, (ii) issues concerning the psychology of the formation of universal concepts or terms, and (iii) issues concerning the value and use of universal concepts or terms in the acquisition of knowledge. Chapters in this volume consider the various forms of "Platonism," "conceptualism" and "nominalism" (and distinctive combinations thereof) that emerged from the consideration of such issues in the work of modern philosophers. Furthermore, this volume covers not only the canonical modern figures, namely, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, but also more neglected figures such as Pierre Gassendi, Pierre-Sylvain Regis, Nicolas Malebranche, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth and John Norris.

New translations of the central mediaeval texts on the problem of universals are presented here in an affordable edition suitable for use in courses in mediaeval philosophy, history of mediaeval philosophy, and universals. Includes a concise Introduction, glossary of important terms, notes, and bibliography.

In this provocative work, David N. Stamos tackles the problem of determining exactly what a biological species is: in short, whether species are real and the nature of their reality. Although many have written on this topic, The Species Problem is the only comprehensive single-authored book on this central concern of biology. Stamos critically considers the evolution of the three major contemporary views of species: species nominalism, species as classes, and species as individuals. Finally, he develops his own solution to the species problem, a solution aimed at providing a universal species concept worthy of the Modern Synthesis. This book will be of interest to philosophers of biology and of science in general, to historians of biology, and to biologists concerned with one of the most significant (and practical) conceptual issues in their field.

The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, first published in 2003, takes its readers into one of the most exciting periods in the history of philosophy. It spans a millennium of thought extending from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas and beyond. It includes not only the thinkers of the Latin West but also the profound contributions of Islamic and Jewish thinkers such as Avicenna and Maimonides. Leading specialists examine what it was like to do philosophy in the cultures and institutions of the Middle Ages and engage all the areas in which medieval philosophy flourished, including language and logic, the study of God and being, natural philosophy, human nature, morality, and politics. The discussion is supplemented with chronological charts, biographies of the major thinkers, and a guide to the transmission and translation of medieval texts. The volume will be invaluable for all who are interested in the philosophical thought of this period.

Are there universal properties grounding our sense of resemblance or qualitative identity among a number of distinct things or events which appear to form a class, a type or a kind of some other sort? Do universals such as humanness, triangularity, or being an oak exist? Is being a laptop computer a universal which has only recently come into existence? Do predicate expressions, adjectives or abstract nouns refer to objective properties or cognitive contents called concepts? The problem of universals has been at the centre of ancient, medieval, Western and Indian metaphysics. After the logico-linguistic turn in philosophy, this problem re-surfaced in the discourse on the meaning of predicate expressions on the one hand and in the theories of concepts on the other. By introducing newly commissioned essays written by the leading metaphysicians, epistemologists, philosophers of language and philosophers of mathematics, this anthology evinces current analytic philosophy's healthy re-engagement with this perennial problem. Issues raised include: Do properties and other abstract entities exist independently of human language and thought? Can we be in direct perceptual touch with properties or particular qualities? Is a higher order quantification over predicated properties intelligible or indispensable? Insights from current Western thought are compared with recent work in analytic Indian philosophy on such issues. No serious researcher or teacher of contemporary and comparative analytical metaphysics can afford to ignore the essays of this collection.

Many significant problems in metaphysics are tied to ontological questions, but ontology and its relation to larger questions in metaphysics give rise to a series of puzzles that suggest that we don't fully understand what ontology is supposed to do, nor what ambitions metaphysics can have for finding out about what reality is like. Thomas Hofweber aims to solve these puzzles about ontology and consequently to make progress on four central metaphysical problems: the philosophy of arithmetic, the metaphysics of ordinary objects, the problem of universals, and the question of whether the reality is independent of us. Crucial parts of the proposed solution involve considerations about quantification and its relationship to ontology, the place of reference in natural languages, the possibility of ineffable facts, the extent of empirical evidence in metaphysics, and whether metaphysics can be properly esoteric. Overall, Hofweber defends a rationalist account of arithmetic, an empiricist picture in the philosophy of ordinary objects, a restricted form of nominalism, and realism about reality, understood as all there is, but idealism about reality, understood as all that is the case. He defends metaphysics as having some questions of fact that are distinctly its own, with a limited form of autonomy from other parts of inquiry, but rejects several metaphysical projects and approaches as being based on a mistake.

The first analysis of the influence the concept of space exercised on the emergence and continuing operation of international law.

In a letter of 1932, Karl Popper described Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie – The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge – as ‘...a child of crises, above all of ...the crisis of physics.’ Finally available in English, it is a major contribution to the philosophy of science, epistemology and twentieth century philosophy generally. The two fundamental problems of knowledge that lie at the centre of the book are the problem of induction, that although we are able to observe only a limited number of particular events, science nevertheless advances unrestricted universal statements; and the problem of demarcation, which asks for a separating line between empirical science and non-science. Popper seeks to solve these two basic problems with his celebrated theory of falsifiability, arguing that the inferences made in science are not inductive but deductive; science does not start with observations and proceed to generalise them but with problems, which it attacks with bold conjectures. The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge is essential reading for anyone interested in Karl Popper, in the history and philosophy of science, and in the methods and theories of science itself.