The International Criminal Court remains a sensitive issue in U.S. foreign policy circles. It was agreed to at the tail end of the Clinton administration, but with serious reservations. In 2002 the Bush administration ceremoniously reversed course and "unsigned" the Rome Statute that had established the Court. But recent developments in Washington and elsewhere indicate that the United States may be moving toward de facto acceptance of the Court and active cooperation in its mission. In Means to an End, Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg reassess the relationship of the United States and the ICC, as well as American policy toward international justice more broadly. Praise for the hardcover edition of Means to an End "Books of this sort are all too rare. Two experienced policy intellectuals, one liberal, one conservative, have come together to find common ground on a controversial foreign policy issue.... The book is short, but it goes a long way toward clearing the ideological air." — Foreign Affairs "A well-researched and timely contribution to the debate over America's proper relationship to the International Criminal Court. Rigorous in its arguments and humane in its conclusions, the volume is an indispensable guide for scholars and policymakers alike." —Madeleine K. Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State "Two of our nation's leading authorities on preventing atrocities have joined to make a convincing argument that closer cooperation with the International Criminal Court will help promote human rights and the values on which America was founded." —Angelina Jolie, co-chair, Jolie-Pitt Foundation

The contemporary US legal culture is marked by ubiquitous battles among various groups attempting to seize control of the law and wield it against others in pursuit of their particular agenda. This battle takes place in administrative, legislative, and judicial arenas at both the state and federal levels. This book identifies the underlying source of these battles in the spread of the instrumental view of law - the idea that law is purely a means to an end - in a context of sharp disagreement over the social good. It traces the rise of the instrumental view of law in the course of the past two centuries, then demonstrates the pervasiveness of this view of law and its implications within the contemporary legal culture, and ends by showing the various ways in which seeing law in purely instrumental terms threatens to corrode the rule of law.

This book is a full-scale account of the morally important ideas of treating persons merely as means and treating them as ends. Audi clarifies these independently of Kant, but with implications for understanding him, and presents a theory of conduct that enhances their usefulness both in ethical theory and in practical ethics.

The specter of the apocalypse has always been a semiotic fantasy: only at the end of all things will their true meaning be revealed. Our long romance with catastrophe is inseparable from the Western hermeneutical tradition: our search for an elusive truth, one that can only be uncovered through the interminable work of interpretation. Catastrophe terrifies and tantalizes to the extent it promises an end to this task. 9/11 is this book’s beginning, but not its end. Here, it seemed, was the apocalypse America had long been waiting for; until it became just another event. And, indeed, the real lesson of 9/11 may be that catastrophe is the purest form of the event. From the poetry of classical Greece to the popular culture of contemporary America, The End of Meaning seeks to demonstrate that catastrophe, precisely as the notion of the sui generis, has always been generic. This is not a book on the great catastrophes of the West; it offers no canon of catastrophe, no history of the catastrophic. The End of Meaning asks, instead, what if meaning itself is a catastrophe?

This book is about the possibility of organising society without the state, but, crucially, it makes the claim, contrary to much anarchist theory, that such a life would not entail absolute freedom; rather, as the title suggests, it would mean creating new forms of social organisation which, whilst offering more freedom than state-capitalism, would nonetheless still entail certain limits to freedom. In making this argument, a secondary point is made, which highlights the book’s originality; namely, that, whilst anarchism is defended by an increasing number of radicals, the reality of what an anarchist society might look like, and the problems that such a society might encounter, are rarely discussed or acknowledged, either in academic or activist writings.

Sinceits founding by Jacques Waardenburg in 1971, Religion and Reason has been a leading forum for contributions on theories, theoretical issues and agendas related to the phenomenon and the study of religion. Topics include (among others) category formation, comparison, ethnophilosophy, hermeneutics, methodology, myth, phenomenology, philosophy of science, scientific atheism, structuralism, and theories of religion. From time to time the series publishes volumes that map the state of the art and the history of the discipline.

Working with clients who abuse drugs or alcohol poses formidable challenges to the clinician. Addicted persons are often confronting multiple, complex problems, from the denial of the addiction itself, to legacies of early trauma or abuse, to histories of broken relationships with parents, spouses, and children. Making matters more confusing, the treatment field is too often splintered into different approaches, each with its own competing claims. This eloquently written book proposes a narrative approach that builds a much-needed bridge between family therapy, psychodynamic therapy, and addictions counseling. Demonstrated are innovative, flexible ways to help clients form new understandings of what has happened in their lives, explore their relationships to drugs and alcohol, and develop new stories to guide and nourish their recovery.

A Philosophical Anthropology Drawn from Simone Weil’s Life & Writings situates Weil’s thought in the time between the two world wars through which she lived, and traces Weil’s consistent conception of a mind-body dualism in the Cartesian sense to a dualism that places the mind within a carnal part of the soul and establishes an eternal part of the soul as the essence of human beings. Helen Cullen argues that in Weil’s early conception of human nature, her Cartesian conception of perception already shows a glimpse of the eternal. Weil’s dualistic conception also forms the basis of her political analysis of the left of her time, and through working in factories and in the fields, she develops a conception of labour as a theory of “action” and “work with a method.” Weil was influenced by leading thinkers of her time, prompting her to do an analysis of current scientific theories. Cullen argues that Weil’s analysis of Christianity, already present in Greek philosophy, shows us a theory of “identical thought” inherited from the East (India and China) and brought forth by peoples around Israel. This theory leads to Weil’s analysis, developed in The Need for Roots, of how we’ve been uprooted through colonization and how we can grow roots in a free local society (both rural and urban).