First published in 1996. The First World War was the single most important event of the twentieth century. This volume concentrates on non-U.S. aspects of the conflict. Organized alphabetically, its more than 600 detailed entries offer information and insight on such subjects as the causes of the conflict, major battles and campaigns, weapons systems (including military aviation, chemical warfare, the submarine, and the tank), and the terms of the peace. Some 350 biographies provide information on the roles played in the conflict by generals, admirals, and civilian leaders. There are also biographies of individuals who were shaped by the war, such as Charles De Gaulle, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Joseph Stalin; essays on each of the countries involved in the conflict; new appraisals of such subjects as military medicine and artillery tactics; and essays on such diverse subjects as art, literature, and music in the war. Each entry has references for additional reading, and a subject index provides easy access. The volume is an excellent reference source for scholar and neophyte alike.

This book examines the use of presidential power during the War on Terror. Justin DePlato joins the debate on whether the Constitution matters in determining how each branch of the federal government should use its power to combat the War on Terror. The actions and words of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama are examined. DePlato's findings support the theory that executives use their own prerogative in determining what emergency powers are and how to use them. According to DePlato, the Presidents argue that their powers are implied in Article II of the Constitution, not expressed. This conclusion renders the Constitution meaningless in times of crisis. The author reveals that Presidents are becoming increasingly cavalier and that the nation should consider adopting an amendment to the Constitution to proffer expressed executive emergency powers.

Most wars between countries end quickly and at relatively low cost. The few in which high-intensity fighting continues for years bring about a disproportionate amount of death and suffering. What separates these few unusually long and intense wars from the many conflicts that are far less destructive? In Logics of War, Alex Weisiger tests three explanations for a nation's decision to go to war and continue fighting regardless of the costs. He combines sharp statistical analysis of interstate wars over the past two centuries with nine narrative case studies. He examines both well-known conflicts like World War II and the Persian Gulf War, as well as unfamiliar ones such as the 1864-1870 Paraguayan War (or the War of the Triple Alliance), which proportionally caused more deaths than any other war in modern history. When leaders go to war expecting easy victory, events usually correct their misperceptions quickly and with fairly low casualties, thereby setting the stage for a negotiated agreement. A second explanation involves motives born of domestic politics; as war becomes more intense, however, leaders are increasingly constrained in their ability to continue the fighting. Particularly destructive wars instead arise from mistrust of an opponent's intentions. Countries that launch preventive wars to forestall expected decline tend to have particularly ambitious war aims that they hold to even when fighting goes poorly. Moreover, in some cases, their opponents interpret the preventive attack as evidence of a dispositional commitment to aggression, resulting in the rejection of any form of negotiation and a demand for unconditional surrender. Weisiger's treatment of a topic of central concern to scholars of major wars will also be read with great interest by military historians, political psychologists, and sociologists.

This book presents a comprehensive history of the seven Apache tribes, tracing them from their genetic origins in Asia and their migration through the continent to the Southwest. The work covers their social history, verbal traditions and mores. The final section delineates the recorded history starting with the Spanish expedition of 1541 through the Civil War.

This volume provides a collection of insightful essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba’athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency. Written by leading scholars on the Iraq War, many of whom have practical first-hand experience of the war, the book includes a Conclusion by leading US strategic thinker Eliot Cohen. This is the first work on the Iraq War to incorporate an understanding of the Iraqi side of the war, based on a systematic analysis of captured Iraqi archives. War in Iraq will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, small wars and insurgencies, international security and strategic studies in general.

History is replete with pronouncements on war. Some reflect on man’s warlike nature (“We are quick to flare up, we races of men on the earth”—Homer); others deal with the practical strategies of the combatants (“If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons”—Winston Churchill); and still others offer advice for avoiding conflict (“The most disadvantageous peace is better than the most just war”—Desiderius Erasmus). More than 2,700 quotations on war and conflict are presented in this reference work. The quotations are arranged by more than 100 broad categories, from action to winning. For each, the quotation is first given, followed by its author, the work in which it appeared (when appropriate), and the date. The book includes numerous cross-references, and keyword-in-context and author indexes are provided for further utility.

Robert M. La Follette (1855–1925), the Republican senator from Wisconsin, is best known as a key architect of American Progressivism and as a fiery advocate for liberal politics in the domestic sphere. But "Fighting Bob" did not immediately come to a progressive stance on foreign affairs. In The Education of an Anti-Imperialist, Richard Drake follows La Follette's growth as a critic of America's wars and the policies that led to them. He began his political career with conventional Republican views of the era on foreign policy, avidly supporting the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars. La Follette's critique of empire emerged in 1910, during the first year of the Mexican Revolution, as he began to perceive a Washington–Wall Street alliance in the United States' dealings with Mexico. La Follette subsequently became Congress's foremost critic of Woodrow Wilson, fiercely opposing United States involvement in World War I. Denounced in the American press as the most dangerous man in the country, he became hated and vilified by many but beloved and admired by others. La Follette believed that financial imperialism and its necessary instrument, militarism, caused modern wars. He contended they were twin evils that would have ruinous consequences for the United States and its citizens in the twentieth century and beyond. “An excellent book. . . . As Drake fully documents, La Follette's warnings about [World War I] profiteers and the lust for power were fully justified. Then as now, the American people were lied to by the government and media and manipulated into the stink and blood of war."—Mark Taylor, The Daily Call “Scholars will . . . value the insights into La Follette's foreign policy education.”—The Historian