“A well researched and well analyzed study of the nature of insurgencies and guerilla warfare” (Military Review). The fighting skills and valor of the US military and its allies haven’t diminished over the past half-century—yet our wars have become more protracted and decisive results more elusive. With only two exceptions—Panama and the Gulf War under the first President Bush—our campaigns have taken on the character of endless slogs without positive results. This fascinating book takes a ground-up look at the problem to assess how our strategic objectives have become divorced from our true capability or imperatives. The book presents a unique examination of the nature of insurgencies and the three major guerrilla wars the United States has fought in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. It is both a theoretical work and one that applies the hard experience of the past five decades to address the issues of today. As such, it also provides a timely and meaningful discussion of America’s current geopolitical position. It starts with the previously close-held casualty estimate for Iraq that The Dupuy Institute compiled in 2004 for the US Department of Defense. Going from the practical to the theoretical, it then discusses a construct for understanding insurgencies and the contexts in which they can be fought. It applies these principles to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, assessing where the projection of US power can enhance our position and where it merely weakens it. It presents an extensive analysis of insurgencies based upon a unique database of eighty-three post-WWII cases. The book explores what is important to combat and what is not important to resist in insurgencies. It builds a body of knowledge, based upon a half-century’s worth of real-world data, with analysis, not opinion. In these pages, Christopher A. Lawrence, the President of The Dupuy Institute, provides an invaluable guide to how the US can best project its vital power while avoiding the missteps of the recent past. “Provides a unique quantitative historical analysis . . . Logically estimating the outcomes of future military operations, as the author writes, is what US citizens should expect and demand from their leaders who take this country to war.” —Military Review

This book investigates the use and utility of military force in modern war. After the Cold War, Western armed forces have increasingly been called upon to intervene in internal conflicts in the former Third World. These forces have been called upon to carry out missions that they traditionally have not been trained and equipped for, in environments that they often have not been prepared for. A number of these ‘new’ types of operations in allegedly ‘new’ wars stand out, such as peace enforcement, state-building, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid, and not the least counter-terrorism. The success rate of these missions has, however, been mixed, providing fuel for an increasingly loud debate on the utility of force in modern war. This edited volume poses as its central question: what is in fact the utility of force? Is force useful for anything other than a complete conventional defeat of a regular opponent, who is confronted in the open field? This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, war and conflict studies, counter-insurgency, security studies and IR. Isabelle Duyvesteyn is an Associate Professor at the Department of History of International Relations, Utrecht University in the Netherlands. Jan Angstrom is a researcher at the Swedish National Defence College.

Presenting a global history of aerial bombardment, this book shows how certain European powers initiated aerial bombardment of civilians after World War I, and how it was an instrument of choice in World War II. Beau Grosscup shows that such methods, used initially as a means of terrorizing native populations in Africa and the Middle East, have become the primary form of terrorism in more recent decades. While such 'strategic terror' is not classed as 'terrorism' in the West, this reflects an unwillingness to confront the human costs and immorality of aerial bombardment. Grosscup argues that if terrorism is to be diminished, the role of aerial bombing in sustaining global violence must be recognized.

A war of attrition is usually conceptualized as a bloody slogging match, epitomized by imagery of futile frontal assaults on the Western Front of the First World War. As such, many academics, politicians, and military officers currently consider attrition to be a wholly undesirable method of warfare. This first book-length study of wars of attrition challenges this viewpoint. A historical analysis of the strategic thought behind attrition demonstrates that it was often implemented to conserve casualties, not to engage in a bloody senseless assault. Moreover, attrition frequently proved an effective means of attaining a state's political aims in warfare, particularly in serving as a preliminary to decisive warfare, reducing risk of escalation, and coercing an opponent in negotiations. Malkasian analyzes the thought of commanders who implemented policies of attrition from 1789 to the present. His study includes figures central to the study of war, such as the Duke of Wellington, Carl von Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart, General William Slim, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgeway, and General William Westmoreland. While special attention is devoted to the Second World War in the Pacific and the Korean War, this study notes the utility of attrition during the Cold War, as the risk of a Third World War rendered more aggressive strategies unattractive. Increasingly, the United States finds itself facing conflicts that are not amenable to a decisive military solution in which opponents seek prolonged war that will inflict as many casualties as possible on American forces.

This book explores the issue of civilian devastation in modern warfare, focusing on the complex processes that effectively establish civilians’ identity in times of war. Underpinning the physicality of war’s tumult are structural forces that create landscapes of civilian vulnerability. Such forces operate in four sectors of modern warfare: nationalistic ideology, state-sponsored militaries, global media, and international institutions. Each sector promotes its own constructions of civilian identity in relation to militant combatants: constructions that prove lethal to the civilian noncombatant who lacks political power and decision-making capacity with regards to their own survival. Civilians and Modern Warprovides a critical overview of the plight of civilians in war, examining the political and normative underpinnings of the decisions, actions, policies, and practices of major sectors of war. The contributors seek to undermine the ‘tunnelling effect’ of the militaristic framework regarding the experiences of noncombatants. This book will be of much interest to students of war and conflict studies, ethics, conflict resolution, and IR/Security Studies.

This book examines the social and cultural consequences of a war normally looked at for its role in the story of Italian unification - the convergence of French, Austrian, and Piedmont-Sardinian armies in northern Italy in 1859, referred to in Italy as the "Second War for Independence."

A collection of original works covering all aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency through a multinational lens, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War addresses the need to look beyond the United States and other prominent counterinsurgency actors in the contemporary world. It also reassesses some of the latent and burgeoning insurgen

The American Civil War was a war of transition: a war of romanticism and idealism fought by a large citizen army with the first tools of modern warfare. This book is a must for students of American history and military affairs. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Warfare is the most dangerous threat faced by modern humanity. It is also one of the key influences that has shaped the politics, economics, and society of the modern period. But what do we mean by modern war? What causes modern wars to begin? Why do people fight in them, why do they end, and what have they achieved? In this accessible and compelling Very Short Introduction, Richard English explores the assumptions we make about modern warfare and considers them against the backdrop of their historical reality. Drawing on the wide literature available, including direct accounts of the experience of war, English provides an authoritative account of modern war: its origins, evolution, dynamics, and current trends. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

How would you react under fire? Fight or flight? What if you were in charge of a squad of men, with their lives in your hands? The next decision you make could be fatal for you and your comrades or could be devastating to your enemy. The wrong decision could haunt you for the rest of your career and beyond. The decisions taken by commanders in the field are analyzed in a detached manner by historians. But what, for example, was the thought process of a reconnaissance tank officer operating far ahead of any supporting troops in the Second World War, or a machine-gunner trying to differentiate friend from foe in the Gulf War? How might a British infantry officer in the Iraq War deal with the situations he faced in combat, or a platoon commander in the War Against ISIS, where the enemy had no fear of dying and even embraced it? How do you come to terms with the consequences of your decisions, the right ones as well as the tragically wrong ones? James Brooks presents defining moments such as these to put you in the shoes of the decision-maker. You can decide when to cross a bridge in Taliban territory, whether to land a helicopter under fire to rescue Marines in danger, and how to lead a command center targeting ISIS through air strikes. These decisions, compared with what the veterans did themselves, teach more about humanity than they do about the tactics of war and serve as lessons for the decisions we face in everyday life. In a career that traced the rise and fall of ISIS from 2014 to 2021, James served in the US Marine Corps as a scout sniper platoon commander, intelligence officer, and counter-propaganda mission lead. After two deployments to the Middle East and a year-and-a-half fighting ISIS propaganda online, James returned to his hometown to teach a subject called “Perspectives in Modern War” to high school seniors. Building from the stories of his own service, as well as those of the men and women he fought alongside, in Leadership in Modern War James captures these lessons and explores just what it is like to be on the front line facing your foe. Warfare has changed in the twenty-first century, but the enduring lessons of conflict remain the same. It is brutal and unforgiving – but it is also character-defining.