The study of the works of the great commanders and philosophers of the past is a very important part of military education Military activity has been a constant process over thousands of years, and the essential tactics, strategy, and goals of military operations have been unchanging throughout history. Via the study of history, the military seeks to avoid past mistakes, and improve upon its current performance by instilling an ability in commanders to perceive historical parallels during battle, so as to capitalize on the lessons learned. The main areas military history includes are the history of wars, battles, and combats, history of the military art, and history of each specific military service. This book includes unique works of Sun Tsu, Thucydides, Sextus Julius Frontinus, Julius Caesar, Xenophon, Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Machiavelli, T.E. Lawrence, Napoleon Bonaparte, Carl von Clausewitz. Contents: Sun Tzu - The Art of War Thucydides - The History of the Peloponnesian War Caius Julius Caesar - The War In Gaul; The Civil War Niccolo Machiavelli - The Art of War; The Prince Sextus Julius Frontinus - Stratagems Xenophon - Anabasis Flavius Vegetius Renatus - The Military Institutions of the Romans Carl von Clausewitz - On War T.E. Lawrence - Seven Pillars of Wisdom Napoleon Bonaparte - The Officer's Manual Napoleon's Maxims of War war strategy, Strategies of War

Since its publication in 1911, Sir Julian's Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy has remained a key document within naval strategic thinking. Yet despite his undoubted influence, Corbett's theories have not been subjected to scientific review and systematic comparison with other naval thinkers. In this assessment, Dr Widen has provided a fresh interpretation of Corbett's legacy and his continued relevance as a classic theorist of naval war. Divided into three parts, the book begins with a brief biographical overview of Corbett's life, highlighting in particular his bibliographic history and the influences on his thinking. The latter two sections then describe and assess Corbett's views on military and naval theory, respectively. Together these two parts represent his overall theory of maritime strategy, including his conception of limited war, his intellectual debt to Clausewitz, command of the sea, his critic of decisive battle, as well as the different methods of naval operations. By means of a thorough assessment of Corbett's theory of maritime strategy, Dr Widén highlights the continued relevance of his theories. Both the strengths and shortcomings of Corbett's thinking are discussed and reflections offered on their intellectual, practical and doctrinal value. In so doing, Dr Widen has written a book that deserves to be read by anyone with an interest in the past, present or future of maritime strategy.

Sun Tzu's The Art of War is a series of lessons in the applied art of problem solving. Sun (544 BC-496 BC), an experienced general from the Warring States period of Chinese history, saw war as an inevitable problem – indeed, the ultimate problem confronting the state. The Art of War summarises his lessons on how to solve the problems raised by conflict. The work comprises a series of pithy discussions of the different strategic situations that might arise, and the best responses for each. In many ways it is a masterclass in the application of critical thinking to practical affairs. Aspiring generals are advised to 'appraise the situation' according to five separate criteria, and to plan accordingly. 'The expert at battle seeks his victory from strategic advantage', Sun writes, so every general must assess their situation from every angle, and establish not only the best way to give themselves the strategic advantage – but also of preventing the other side from giving itself the advantage. Throughout the text, Sun epitomises the qualities of a good problem solver by focusing on the nature of the problem; asking productive questions about it; and making sound decisions.

Now more than ever, in the arenas of national security, diplomacy, and military operations, effective communication strategy is of paramount importance. A 24/7 television, radio, and Internet news cycle paired with an explosion in social media demands it. According to James P. Farwell, a former political consultant, the US government's approach to strategic communication has been misguided. Persausion and Power stands apart for its critical evaluation of the concepts, doctrines, and activities that the US Department of Defense and Department of State employ for the art of strategic communication including psychological operations, military information support operations, propaganda, and public diplomacy. Farwell stresses that words, deeds, actions, and symbols may qualify as strategic communication and aim to mold or shape public opinion to influence behavior in order to attain specific objectives, advance interests, or—viewed from a military perspective—satisfy or create conditions that produce a desired end-state. He contends that a message that is true, consistent, and persuasive is more powerful than any deception. Persuasion and Power is a book about the art of strategic communication, how it is used, where, and why. Using historical examples, Farwell illustrates how its principles have made a critical difference throughout history in the outcomes of crises, conflicts, politics, and diplomacy across different cultures and societies. This insightful volume will help communications officers, policymakers, and students understand when, where, and how they can apply the principles of strategic communication to advance national security interests.

Provides an overview of the principles, theories, policies, and other fundamentals of modern warfare and their applications in the twenty-first century

State ordained child torturer Minister prisoner represents the offices of the Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick, TDCJ Director Bryan Collier, TBCJ, and wardens throughout the prison—but the greatest piece of fantasy is how the Executive Culture of cover ups came to see this Fools’ Parade as good for Texas, even “God’s will” to change the world. TDCJ destroys records of violence after 7 years and has hired the lowest qualified of the applicant pool many times in the last 25 years, even ordered the cleaning of contraband at the Polunsky Prison, and all those responsible for covering up a horde were promoted! 25 years of this! Who thinks a director that allowed that can competently supervise a naïve volunteer in a systemwide program of indenturing prisoners? Why is the director sponsoring psychopaths counseling psychopaths? Answer? MONEY—selling the Fools’ Parade Fantasy that buying faith from prisoners with favor turns them into saints after 4 years of Bible to naïve Evangelicals. Who thinks it JUSTICE that 400,000,000 hours of officer contact has zero definitive influence on parole when a commissioner spends