'Magisterial . . . [a] fine, balanced and superb account. It deserves to be read for many years to come.' TELEGRAPH March 1945. Allied troops are poised to cross the Rhine and sweep on into Germany. Victory is at last within their grasp. But if they believe this victory can be easily won, they face swift disillusionment. The final I00 days of the Second World War will prove to be bitterly and bloodily fought, village by village, town by town. This is the extraordinary and gripping story of those final I00 days. _________________________________________________ 'Superbly written and full of wisdom and deep understanding, this will stand as a defining work on these darkest months of the conflict.' JAMES HOLLAND 'This is the most vivid and detailed narrative of the subject that we are likely to see.' MILITARY HISTORY MAGAZINE 'An impressive work. Lively, informative and comprehensively researched.' CAROLINE MOOREHEAD, SPECTATOR 'An important contribution to military history. A great read and powerful reminder of how the Second World War in Europe was definitely not over until the final surrender.' BBC HISTORY MAGAZINE

BOOK 11 OF THE LADYBIRD EXPERT HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, FROM AWARD-WINNING HISTORIAN JAMES HOLLAND Featuring stunning illustrations from Keith Burns, bringing the story to life in vivid detail What was Operation Bagration? Why did the Warsaw Uprising fail? How were the Nazis finally crushed? BRITAIN'S VICTORY IN EUROPE was a pivotal moment in the impending end of WW2, but it was no easy feat. With most of Europe under Axis control, the Allies battled through the brutal winter of 1945 to overcome German forces and finally defeat Hitler. THE PINNACLE MOMENT IN BRITAIN'S WW2 SUCCESS Written by historian, author and broadcaster James Holland, Victory in Europe is an essential, accessible introduction to Britain's triumph over the Nazis. __________ Discover the full Ladybird Expert WW2 series: Blitzkrieg The Battle of Britain Battle of the Atlantic The Desert War The Eastern Front The Pacific War The Bomber War The War in Italy The Battle for Normandy The War in Burma Victory in Europe Victory Against Japan

Historian John Buckley offers a radical reappraisal of Great Britain’s fighting forces during World War Two, challenging the common belief that the British Army was no match for the forces of Hitler’s Germany. Following Britain’s military commanders and troops across the battlefields of Europe, from D-Day to VE-Day, from the Normandy beaches to Arnhem and the Rhine, and, ultimately, to the Baltic, Buckley’s provocative history demonstrates that the British Army was more than a match for the vaunted Nazi war machine. This fascinating revisionist study of the campaign to liberate Northern Europe in the war’s final years features a large cast of colorful unknowns and grand historical personages alike, including Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and the prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill. By integrating detailed military history with personal accounts, it evokes the vivid reality of men at war while putting long-held misconceptions finally to rest.

Almost 80 years on the battle for the Arnhem Rhine crossing remains controversial. Opinion on its justification and success differs widely. This superbly researched book, written by two acknowledged experts, takes a wide-ranging examination of Operation Market Garden from the strategic, operational and tactical level. The role of the Allied commanders involved is scrutinized with surprising results. For example, US General Brereton’s pivotal role has seldom been mentioned, yet he is revealed as responsible for choosing landing and drop zones. The record of airborne forces, both German and Allied, prior to September 1944 raises questions and the doubt that many senior commanders, including Eisenhower, had as to their effectiveness is highlighted. The parts played by VIII and XII Corps of Second Army and General Dempsey, its Commander are scrutinized, as are the actions of local commanders and troops on the ground. Both those with a deep interest in military history and the layman will find much to inform and satisfy them in this valuable and at times provocative account.

"Wilt writes... well and offers many sound perceptions." -- Choice "... a stimulating book... a timely warning against overindulgence in hindsight in evaluating the great issues of the war... " -- Parameters "... a significant new study... a clearly written, excellent book... " -- Airpower Journal "... an impressive work of scholarship... " -- British Politics Group Newsletter "Wilt's comparative approach permits us fresh perspectives on both sides of the war. Moreover, Wilt has chosen to compare two of the major rival belligerents at the most stimulating and interesting level at which such comparison might be made, the level of the summit of decision making -- with the magnetic figures of Hitler and Churchill playing major roles in his narrative and analysis." -- Russell F. Weigley "This is a masterful treatment of a complex subject and a must read book for anyone writing about the Second World War." -- The Historian

Originally published in 1947, “This volume is the last of the series in which I have attempted to write the history of the war while it is actually taking place. It does not appear during the war for the best of reasons; but it is unduly late because of a number of personal mischances and because it covers much more ground than the earlier volumes. The battle-piece it attempts to portray is, in fact, the greatest in the history of the world. Never before have campaigns of the size and scope taken place. In the numbers engaged, in the amount of material used, in distances covered, in the novelty of the tactics and in the almost incredible brutality of some of the methods used, the campaigns of this period from May 1944 to the middle of August 1945 are unique.” Richly illustrated throughout with maps.

An army may march on its stomach, but it needs more than hot dinners to fight. As Canadians battled through Northwest Europe in the late stages of the Second World War, how did they reinforce their front line? And at what cost? An Army of Never-Ending Strength investigates the operational record of the First Canadian Army during 1944–45 to provide detailed insight into its administrative systems, structure, and troop and equipment levels. In a close analysis of monthly resources, losses, and replacement flow, Captain Arthur W. Gullachsen demonstrates the army’s effectiveness at reinforcing its three traditional combat arms. The total fighting power of the infantry, armour, and artillery units was never inhibited for long. An Army of Never-Ending Strength draws a powerful conclusion: the administrative and logistical capability of the Canadian Army created a constant state of overwhelming offensive strength, which made a marked contribution to eventual Allied victory.

By the summer of 1944, the war in Europe had reached a critical point. Both the western Allies and the Soviets possessed the initiative and forces capable of mounting strategic offensives against the German enemy. Writing a study of operations on first the Western then Eastern Front, respected military analyst C. J. Dick offers rare insight into the strengths and weaknesses of generalship on both fronts, especially the judgments, choices, and compromises made by senior commanders. At the same time, he clarifies the constraints imposed upon leadership—and upon operations—by doctrinal shortcomings, by logistics, and, not least, by the nature of coalition war. From Victory to Stalemate focuses on the Western Front, specifically American, British, and Canadian operations in France and the Low Countries. Dick's lens throughout is operational art, which links individual tactical battles to broader strategic aims. Beginning with the D-Day landings in Normandy and the strengths and weaknesses of the armies, including their military doctrines, Dick goes on to analyze the offensives launched in the high summer of 1944. He considers the strategic factors and plans that provide the context for his main concern: the Allied commanders’ handling of army, army group, and theatre offensive operations. Dick's analysis shows us an Allied command limited by thinking that is firmly rooted in the experience of small wars and the World War I. The resulting incremental approach was further complicated by a divergence in the ideas and interests of the Allied forces. The man responsible for pulling it all together, Dwight D. Eisenhower, proved remarkably capable in his role as statesman; he was to be less effective as a military technician who could govern such difficult subordinates as Bradley and Montgomery. As a result, the Allied offensive faltered and became a war of attrition, in contrast to the Soviet effort on the Eastern Front.

By September 1944, Allied forces had broken out from the Normandy beachheads, liberated Paris, and found themselves poised on the German border. As this offensive gained momentum, Patton and Montgomery, hoping to exploit the enemy's temporary weakness in the West, concocted their own alternatives to Eisenhower's broad front strategy. Each proposed a single thrust aimed directly into the German heartland, designed to bring the troops home by Christmas. This study examines this so-called broad front-single thrust controversy and concludes that the idea of early victory was wishful thinking--a product of the erroneous and dangerous assumption that the Nazi regime was already tottering on the brink of collapse. Precisely because of its lightning pace, the Allied advance resulted in severe logistical problems, limiting Patton's proposed operation to only ten combat divisions, while Montgomery's closer proximity to the coast might have allowed for as many as sixteen. But it should have been obvious that either thrust faced certain destruction against the 250 divisions still fielded by the Wehrmacht on all fronts in September. In light of this substantial German military capacity, despite serious losses and strategic setbacks, the single thrust could not have been a decisive war-ending maneuver. In fact, Andidora argues, it could not even have provided for its own security against the forces that would have coalesced against it. Rather than unnecessarily prolonging the war, as some have argued, Eisenhower's decision to stay the strategic course probably averted a military disaster.

"Readers may be astonished at how much scholarly digging and the release of once-secret information have transformed the history of this campaign. At times it seems like a whole new war". -- New York Times Book Review.