Epistemic injustice was conceptualized by Fricker as a form of social injustice, which occurs when people’s authority ‘as a knower’ is ignored, dismissed, or marginalized. It is attracting increasing interest in the mental health field because of the asymmetries of power between people using mental health services and mental health professionals. People experiencing mental health distress are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice as a consequence of deeply embedded social stigma, negative stereotyping, and assumed irrationality. This is amplified by other forms of stereotyping or structural discrimination, including racism, misogyny, and homophobia. Consequently, individual testimonies may be discounted as both irrational and unreliable. Epistemic injustice also operates systemically reflecting social and demographic characteristics, such a race, gender, sexuality or disability, or age.

In the era of information and communication, issues of misinformation and miscommunication are more pressing than ever. Epistemic injustice - one of the most important and ground-breaking subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years - refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject. The first collection of its kind, it comprises over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, divided into five parts: Core Concepts Liberatory Epistemologies and Axes of Oppression Schools of Thought and Subfields within Epistemology Socio-political, Ethical, and Psychological Dimensions of Knowing Case Studies of Epistemic Injustice. As well as fundamental topics such as testimonial and hermeneutic injustice and epistemic trust, the Handbook includes chapters on important issues such as social and virtue epistemology, objectivity and objectification, implicit bias, and gender and race. Also included are chapters on areas in applied ethics and philosophy, such as law, education, and healthcare. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is essential reading for students and researchers in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, feminist theory, and philosophy of race. It will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as cultural studies, sociology, education and law.

The ethical issues we face in health care, justice, and human rights extend beyond national boundaries—they are global and cross-cultural in scope. Editors Wanda Teays and Alison Dundes Renteln have assembled the works of a diverse interdisciplinary and international team of bioethics experts into a comprehensive, innovative, and accessible resource. Following a consideration of theoretical frameworks that inform a global bioethics, units on human rights, life and death, and public health form an in-depth look at contemporary issues in the field. Each unit includes cutting edge analyses and thought-provoking case studies, as well as discussion prompts. Topics range from torture and lethal injection to euthanasia, abortion, medical tourism, vulnerable human subjects, to health equity, vaccination programs, mental health, the ethics of surrogacy, and more. The second edition includes new essays on • bioethics and environmental ethics • medical tourism • torture and solitary confinement • institutional review boards • pediatric genomics • the abortion debate • the ethics of surrogacy • issues in global health ethics • revirgination surgery • global mental health • feminist perspectives on global aging • ethical considerations for vaccination programs

Disability raises profound and fundamental issues: questions about human embodiment and well-being; dignity, respect, justice and equality; personal and social identity. It raises pressing questions for educational, health, reproductive, and technology policy, and confronts the scope and direction of the human and civil rights movements. Yet it is only recently that disability has become the subject of the sustained and rigorous philosophical inquiry that it deserves. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability is the first comprehensive volume on the subject. The volume's contents range from debates over the definition of disability to the challenges posed by disability for justice and dignity; from the relevance of disability for respect, other interpersonal attitudes, and intimate relationships to its significance for health policy, biotechnology, and human enhancement; from the ways that disability scholarship can enrich moral and political philosophy, to the importance of physical and intellectual disabilities for the philosophy of mind and action. The contributions reflect the variety of areas of expertise, intellectual orientations, and personal backgrounds of their authors. Some are founding philosophers of disability; others are promising new scholars; still others are leading philosophers from other areas writing on disability for the first time. Many have disabilities themselves. This volume boldly explores neglected issues, offers fresh perspectives on familiar ones, and ultimately expands philosophy's boundaries. More than merely presenting an overview of existing work, this Handbook will chart the growth and direction of a vital and burgeoning field for years to come.

This third edition collection provides a contemporary survey of current international issues in bioethics and human rights for study across social science disciplines. New chapters discuss the reproductive justice in the US, immigration politics and medical duty during pandemics, climate change implications for bioethics, acoustic weaponry technologies, and vaccine politics. Following a consideration of theoretical frameworks, there three units on human rights, life and death, and public health form an in-depth look at contemporary issues in the field of bioethics. Each unit includes cutting edge analyses by international experts and thought-provoking case studies, as well as discussion and essay prompts, and Internet and film resources. Topics range from pediatric genomics, abortion (including the Dobbs decision, medical tourism, human experimentation, climate change, the Havana syndrome, the care of aging family members, truth-telling, vulnerable human subjects, health equity, healthcare in ICE detention facilities, solitary confinement, euthanasia, lethal injections and the harvesting of human organs, pandemic ethics, vaccine controversies, and more. The new, updated, and retained chapters make this book an appealing resource as a primary text, scholarly reference book, or a course supplement. Contributors:Robert Baker, Tom L. Beauchamp, Michael Boylan, Marlene Brant Castellano, Cher Weixia Chen, Zenon Culverhouse, Bernard Gert, Søren Holm, Ilhan Ilkilic, Akiko Ito, Rita Manning, Kimberly Mutcherson, Peter F. Omonzejele, Pinit Ratanakul, Alison Dundes Renteln, Maya Sabatello, Udo Schüklenk, Edward H. Spence, Bradley P. Stoner, Scott Stonington, Peter Tagore Tan, Wanda Teays, Rosemarie Tong, Carlos Verdugo-Serna, Virginia L. Warren, Cecilia (Lim) Wee

This is a vital resource for anyone looking to better support people with psychosis and serious mental illnesses.

The experience of illness is a universal and substantial part of human existence. Like death, illness raises important philosophical issues. But unlike death, illness, and in particular the experience of being ill, has received little philosophical attention. This may be because illness is often understood as a physiological process that falls within the domain of medical science, and is thus outside the purview of philosophy. In Phenomenology of Illness Havi Carel argues that the experience of illness has been wrongly neglected by philosophers and proposes to fill the lacuna. Phenomenology of Illness provides a distinctively philosophical account of illness. Using phenomenology, the philosophical method for first-person investigation, Carel explores how illness modifies the ill person's body, values, and world. The aim of Phenomenology of Illness is twofold: to contribute to the understanding of illness through the use of philosophy and to demonstrate the importance of illness for philosophy. Contra the philosophical tendency to resist thinking about illness, Carel proposes that illness is a philosophical tool. Through its pathologising effect, illness distances the ill person from taken for granted routines and habits and reveals aspects of human existence that normally go unnoticed. Phenomenology of Illness develops a phenomenological framework for illness and a systematic understanding of illness as a philosophical tool.

Collaborative Ethnographic Working in Mental Health seeks to chart a new direction for research into mental healthcare, with the aim of creating the conditions for more productive interdisciplinary dialogue. People involved in mental health often fail to recognise how they are described by researchers from the humanities and social sciences, which inhibits productive collaboration. This book seeks to address this problem, by including clinicians and patients in the research process and by shifting attention away from power and knowledge and towards the organisational context. It explores how clinical thinking and behaviour, illness experience, and clinical relationships are all shaped by the bureaucratic context. In particular, it examines tensions between what we want from mental healthcare and how accountable bureaucracies actually work, and proposes that mental healthcare research should not just evaluate new interventions but should investigate new ways of organising. This book is written with a non-specialist audience in mind, as it is intended for all with a stake in mental healthcare research and practice. It is also for those with an interest in ethnographic methods, as a novel way of deploying ethnography, autoethnography and coproduced ethnography to address clinically important research topics.

Prejudice influences people’s thoughts and behaviors in many ways; it can lead people to underestimate others’ credibility, to read anger or hysteria into their words, or to expect knowledge and truth to ‘sound’ a certain way—or to come from a certain type of person. These biases and mistakes can have a big effect on everything from an institutional culture to an individual’s self-understanding. These kinds of intellectual harms are known as epistemic injustice. Most people are opposed to unfair prejudices (at least in principle), and no one wants to make avoidable mistakes. But research in the social sciences reveals a disturbing truth: Even people who intend to be fair-minded and unprejudiced are influenced by unconscious biases and stereotypes. We may sincerely want to be epistemically just, but we frequently fail, and simply thinking harder about it will not fix the problem. The essays collected in this volume draw from cutting-edge social science research and detailed case studies, to suggest how we can better tackle our unconscious reactions and institutional biases, to help ameliorate epistemic injustice. The volume concludes with an afterward by Miranda Fricker, who catalyzed recent scholarship on epistemic injustice, reflecting on these new lines of research and potential future directions to explore.