Elgar Advanced Introductions are stimulating and thoughtful introductions to major fields in the social sciences, business and law, expertly written by the world'Äôs leading scholars. Designed to be accessible yet rigorous, they offer concise and lucid surveys of the substantive and policy issues associated with discrete subject areas. New institutional economics (NIE) is a powerful tool for understanding real world phenomena. This Advanced Introduction explores NIE'Äôs answers to fundamental questions about the organization, growth and development of economies, such as why are some countries rich and others poor? Why are activities organized as firms or markets or through alternative organizational solutions? When are shared resources overexploited? Key Features: Elucidates the essence of NIE'Äôs main branches, focusing on the governance of transactions and organizations (identified with Oliver Williamson), the fundamental institutional environment (Douglass North), and the role of communal institutions and collective action (Elinor Ostrom) Explores how NIE has transformed perspectives on collective action, state and legal institutions, public policy and regulation, and economic growth Extensive references to allow interested readers to dive deeper into specific topics Authored by scholars associated early on with leading figures in NIE and the development of NIE'Äôs research agenda. This Advanced Introduction is an ideal read for advanced students of economics, political science, management, law and sociology interested in learning about new institutional economics. Policy makers, especially those responsible for business and utility regulation and development policy and assistance, will also benefit from this concise yet detailed book.

New institutional economics (NIE) is a powerful tool for understanding real world phenomena. This Advanced Introduction explores NIE’s answers to fundamental questions about the organization, growth and development of economies, such as why are some countries rich and others poor? Why are activities organized as firms or markets or through alternative organizational solutions? When are shared resources overexploited?

New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research.

Institutions frame behaviors and exchanges in markets, business networks, communities, and organizations throughout the world. Thanks to the pioneering work of Ronald Coase, Douglas North and Olivier Williamson, institutions are now recognized as being a key factor in explaining differences in performance between industries, nations, and regions. The fast-growing field of new institutional economics analyzes the economics of institutions and organizations using methodologies, concepts, and analytical tools from a wide range of disciplines (including political science, anthropology, sociology, management, law, and economics). With contributions from an international team of researchers, New Institutional Economics provides theoreticians, practitioners, and advanced students in economics and social sciences with a guide to the many recent developments in the field. It explains the underlying methodologies, identifies issues and questions for future research, and shows how results apply to decision making in law, economic policy, management, regulation and institutional design.

A concise and clear introduction to the new institutional economics that summarizes current knowledge whilst addressing its gaps and weaknesses.

A comprehensive introduction to and critical assessment of the theory and applications of the New Institutional Economics.

The New Institutional Economics incorporates a theory of institutions into economics. It builds upon the fundamental assumptions of scarcity and competition but abandons institutional rationality. Consequently, NIE assumes that individuals make choices based on incomplete information and limited mental capacity, forming institutions to reduce uncertainty in human exchange. These insights have implications for technological change, property rights, and public choice. The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics presents new essays written specifically for this volume. These essays Provide an introduction to the nature and practice of the New Institutional Economics, with a special emphasis on economic history and political economy. Among the contributors are Nobel Prize winners Douglass North and Robert Fogel. Key Features * Contains essays by Nobel Prize winners Douglass North and Robert Fogel * Presents a field of economics useful to students of political science and sociology. * Applicable to studies of technological change, property rights, and public choice

A major contribution to an area of debate still in its formative phase. It offers new perspectives on both the micro-foundations of economics and the long run dynamics of economic development.

Artificial intelligence-enabled digital platforms collect and process data from and about users. These companies are largely self-regulating in Western countries. How do economic theories explain the rise of a very few dominant platforms? Mansell and Steinmueller compare and contrast neoclassical, institutional and critical political economy explanations. They show how these perspectives can lead to contrasting claims about platform benefits and harms. Uneven power relationships between platform operators and their users are treated differently in these economic traditions. Sometimes leading to advocacy for regulation or for public provision of digital services. Sometimes indicating restraint and precaution. The authors challenge the reader to think beyond the inevitability of platform dominance to create new visions of how platforms might operate in the future.