Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility brings together leading researchers from psychology and philosophy to present new findings and ideas about human agency and moral responsibility. Their contributions reflect the growth of research in these areas over the past decade and highlight both the ways that philosophy can be relevant to empirical research and how empirical work can be relevant to philosophical investigations. Mixing new empirical work with the meta-philosophical and philosophical upshot of the latest research being done, chapters cover motivated cognition and free will beliefs, folk intuitions about manipulation and agency, mental control in assessments of responsibility, the importance of skilled decision making to free will judgments and the relationship between free will and substance dualism. Blending cutting-edge research from philosophy with methods from psychology, this collection is a compelling example of the value of interdisciplinary approaches, contributing to our understanding of the complex networks of attitudes, beliefs, and judgments that inform how we think about agency and responsibility.

What is self-control? Does a person need to be conscious to act? Are delusions always irrational? Questions such as these are fundamental for investigations into action and rationality, as well as how we assign responsibility for wrongdoing and assess clinical symptoms. Bridging the gap between philosophy and psychology, this interdisciplinary collection showcases how empirical research informs and enriches core questions in the philosophy of action. Exploring issues such as truth, moral judgement, agency, consciousness and cognitive control, chapters offer an overview of the current state of research, present new empirical findings and identify where future experimental work can further advance the frontier between philosophy and psychology. This is an essential resource for anyone looking to better understand how science and philosophy can meaningfully inform our knowledge of human agency.

Provides a comprehensive, cutting-edge, and accessible accompaniment to various narratives about free will A Companion to Free Will is an indispensable resource for anyone interested in the philosophy of free will, offering an authoritative survey of perennial issues and contemporary debates within the field. Bringing together the work of a diverse team of established and younger scholars, this well-balanced volume offers innovative perspectives and fresh approaches to the classical compatibility problem, moral and legal responsibility, consciousness in free action, action theory, determinism, logical fatalism, impossibilism, and much more. The Companion’s 30 chapters provide general coverage of the discipline as well as an in-depth exploration of both CAP (Classical Analytic Paradigm) and non-CAP perspectives on the problem of free will and the problem of determinism—raising new questions about what the free will debate is, or should be, about. Throughout the book, coverage of modern exchanges between the world’s leading philosophers is complemented by incisive commentary, novel insights, and selections that examine compatibilist, libertarian, and denialist viewpoints. Offers a balanced presentation of conflicting theories and ongoing debates about the nature, existence, and implications of free will Explores the role of scientific advances and empirical methods in contributing to discourses on free will and action theory Reviews new developments in longstanding arguments between compatibilist and incompatibilist approaches to free will including those that question this way of framing the debate and critique the standard terminology Discusses descriptive, revisionary, and pragmatic approaches for defining key concepts and addressing compatibility problems surrounding free will Considers various issues of moral responsibility and philosophical approaches to the problem of free will in new ways Part of the acclaimed Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, A Companion to Free Will is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students of philosophy, professional philosophers and theorists, and interested novices alike.

The new field of experimental philosophy has emerged as the methods of psychological science have been brought to bear on traditional philosophical issues. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy is the place to go to see outstanding new work in the field. It features papers by philosophers, papers by psychologists, and papers co-authored by people in both disciplines. The series heralds the emergence of a truly interdisciplinary field in which people from different disciplines are working together to address a shared set of questions. This new volume of Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy showcases the continuing development of the field. The submitted papers go ever more deeply into some of the issues that have long been central topics of experimental philosophy research (epistemic intuitions, metaethical intuitions, intuitions about causation) but also venture into new topics that illustrate the broadening the scope of experimental philosophy research (slurs, experimental economics, Socratic questionnaires). The volume concludes with three specially commissioned essays reviewing recent work on three central topics: causal judgment, knowledge ascription, and the experimental philosophy of consciousness.

The relatively new movement of Experimental Philosophy applies different systematic experimental methods to further illuminate classical philosophical issues. This book brings together experts from the field to give the reader a compact yet extensive overview, offering a ready at hand introduction to the state of the art.

This volume provides an introduction to the major themes of work in experimental philosophy, bringing together some of the most influential articles in the field along with a collection of papers that explore the theoretical significance of this research.

This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might operate. It draws from philosophy and psychology, the two fields that have grappled most fundamentally with these issues. In this wide-ranging volume, the contributors explore such issues as how free will is connected to rational choice, planning, and self-control; roles for consciousness in decision making; the nature and power of conscious deciding; connections among free will, consciousness, and quantum mechanics; why free will and consciousness might have evolved; how consciousness develops in individuals; the experience of free will; effects on behavior of the belief that free will is an illusion; and connections between free will and moral responsibility in lay thinking. Collectively, these state-of-the-art chapters by accomplished psychologists and philosophers provide a glimpse into the future of research on free will and consciousness.

Pritchard provides a deliberate and convincing argument for a starting point for the discussion of moral development, on in which self regard and empathy provide equally essential groundings for individual morality. Drawing essential elements from the work of Reid, Strawson, Rawls, Kohlberg, and Gilligan, he builds a comprehensive framework for tracing moral development from childhood--one that allows human morality to be grounded in both reason and emotion and that recognizes the importance to morality of justice and rights as well as caring and responsibility.