Who Is Winning The War In Afghanistan? A pro - Communist coup, the impact and aftermath of the Soviet (1978-79) invasion and 30 years of war have demolished the social life, cohesion, integrity, solidarity, trust, capacity, and economy of Afghanistan. Millions of people have migrated to foreign countries, houses and villages have been destroyed, the country’s economy and infrastructure has been utterly destroyed, millions of young civilians and children have been deprived of education and thousands of women have been widowed. The conflict in Afghanistan has also had a great impact on security, economy and the political prosperity of other parts of the world. The 9/11 incidents which shocked the world, once again drew international attention back to the forgotten Afghanistan. The Bonn conference (2001), the NATO led invasion, the collapse of the Taliban regime and the promises of the international community to build a democratic Afghan government with a solid institution and strong security force, created great hopes amongst the Afghan population for a better future. After the fall of the Taliban regime, the violence and insurgency began to increase. Despite all international efforts and an increase in troop numbers from 10,000 in 2002 to around 140,000 in 2010 and the spending of £50 billion in aid, the Afghan government is still weak and does not have control over the whole country; the armed forces are not strong enough; violence continues to rise and last year was the deadliest year in nearly nine year of war; additionally, the security situation across the country looks increasingly bad. The lasting war has had little success in Afghanistan, the pressure of insurgents, increasing casualties, unpopularity of war among the population of NATO-led countries and enormous war costs in a worsening economic climate have caused the announcement of the withdrawal of troops by US President B. Obama in 2011 and the UK Prime Minister D. Cameron by 2015. This book aims to determine the answer to the question of whether the Coalition Forces are winning the war in Afghanistan.

Ten years after the 9/11 attacks this book reassesses the effectiveness of the "War on Terror", considers how al-Qaeda and other jihadist movements are faring, explores the impact of wider developments in the Islamic world such as the Arab Spring, and discusses whether all this suggests that a new approach to containing international, especially jihadist, terrorism is needed. Among the book’s many richly argued conclusions are that the "War on Terror" and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have brutalised the United States; that the jihadist threat is not one, but rather a wide range of separate, unconnected struggles; and that al-Qaeda’s ideology contains the seeds of its own destruction, in that although many Muslims are content to see the United States worsted, they do not approve of al-Qaeda’s violence and are not taken in by the jihadists’ empty promises of utopia.

The United Nations (UN) has had an active presence in Afghanistan since 1988, and it is highly regarded by many Afghans for playing a brokering role in ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As a result of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, coordinating international donor activity and assistance have been tasked to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). However, there are other coordinating institutions tied to the Afghan government, and UNAMA has struggled to exercise its full mandate. The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense and complicated and, in coordination with the Afghan government, involves U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, international organizations, and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The coordinated aid programs of the United States and its European allies focus on a wide range of activities, from strengthening the central and local governments of Afghanistan and its security forces to promoting civilian reconstruction, reducing corruption, and assisting with elections. This report examines the role of UNAMA in Afghanistan and discusses the obstacles the organization faces in coordinating international efforts and explores related policy issues and considerations for the 112th Congress.

Afghanistan in the 20th century was virtually unknown in Europe and America. At peace until the 1970s, the country was seen as a remote and exotic land, visited only by adventurous tourists or researchers. Afghan Village Voices is a testament to this little-known period of peace and captures a society and culture now lost. Prepared by two of the most accomplished and well-known anthropologists of the Middle East and Central Asia, Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper-Lindisfarne, this is a book of stories told by the Piruzai, a rural Afghan community of some 200 families who farmed in northern Afghanistan and in summer took their flocks to the central Hazârajât mountains. The book comprises a collection of remarkable stories, folktales and conversations and provides unprecedented insight into the depth and colour of these people's lives. Recorded in the early 1970s, the stories range from memories of the Piruzai migration to the north a half century before, to the feuds, ethnic strife and the doings of powerful khans. There are also stories of falling in love, elopements, marriages, childbirth and the world of spirits. The book includes vignettes of the narrators, photographs, maps and a full glossary. It is a remarkable document of Afghanistan at peace, told by a people whose voices have rarely been heard.

Writers and analysts have uncovered the illegal role of private militias’ commanders in Afghanistan. These commanders and self-styled leaders were driven overwhelmingly by their personal power, and they were not only considered illegitimate on the domestic political scene, and viewed as irrelevant. The present Afghan government is a mix of all types of its efforts, including war criminals, and militia commanders who smuggle narcotics, drugs, arm, and kill women and children. War criminals and militias commanders have developed complex survival and legitimation strategies beyond their territorial realms. After years of its establishment, the Afghan local police (ALP) was undermined due to its failure to stabilize remote regions of the country. The US proxy militias are the source of consternation. The US Army established an incompetent intelligence agency (NDS) to serve its interest. The NDS established regional militias to support the CIA and Pentagon war mission against the people of the country. The NDS established Unit-01 for Central Region, Unit-02 for Eastern Region, Unit-03 for Southern Region, and Unit-04, as a Khost Protection Force (KPF), and committed war crimes in these regions with the support of the US Army and CIA. This book has documented the role of all internal and external actors, warlords and stakeholders.

"Containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the President", 1956-1992.