"But Echevarria disputes this traditional view and convincingly shows that these theorists - Boguslawski, Goltz, Schlieffen, Hoening, and their American and European counterparts - were not the architects of outmoded theories. In fact, they duly appreciated the implications of the vast advances in modern weaponry (as well as in transportation and communications) and set about finding solutions that would restore offensive maneuver to the battlefield."--BOOK JACKET.

Carl von Clausewitz's masterwork, On War, is generally considered the greatest text on military theory ever written. Clausewitz is a touchstone for the field today, and is read by scholars, students, and military personnel around the world. And yet to Clausewitz himself, far more important than achieving recognition for his scholarly and theoretical contributions was achieving glory on the field of battle-winning renown not with his pen but with his sword. Military historian Donald Stoker's perceptive biography of Carl von Clausewitz moves skillfully between Clausewitz's career as a soldier and his work as a theoretician and author, exploring the composition of On War and other works while also emphasizing the many military engagements in which Clausewitz fought. Though Clausewitz certainly spilled his share of ink, he also spilled blood--his as well as that of the enemy. As an officer in the Prussian army, Clausewitz fought in battles from Jena-Auerstedt to Waterloo, as well as the battle of Borodino while serving the Russians. Stoker takes readers through the heat of these battles, providing historical overview and discussing each engagement in detail. Rich context is provided by Clausewitz himself, who wrote abundant letters to his wife and friends throughout his life, and from which Stoker draws extensively. Clausewitz argues for the centrality of Clausewitz's work as a soldier, but it does not neglect his historical achievements in military theory. Stoker unpacks each of Clausewitz's significant works, considering their influences and describing the circumstances around their composition. The interplay between the biographical details of Clausewitz's life and the arguments put forth in his written works allows for a deeper understanding of these familiar texts, and Stoker's insightful commentary adds depth to the discussion. The result is an absorbing reassessment of both the man and his legacy, and a significant contribution to the study of Clausewitz and his place in today's military and political landscape.

A pathbreaking critique of the thought of military studies icon Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz and his magnum opus On War that illuminates why and how that work should be viewed as much more mature, coherent, innovative, and complete than suggested by previous accounts.

The Reality of War: A Companion to Clausewitz is a book by Stewart L Murray. A text for everyone who takes an interest in the every so often gruesome realities of war and the prices paid on both sides of conflict.

Clausewitz is often quoted but more often misunderstood. On Clausewitz presents his central ideas about war and politics - such as war as an instrument of policy, the concept of Absolute War, friction and the fog of war - in a clear and systematic fashion. It also presents the man, his life and the military and intellectual environment in which he produced his great work On War . A final section considers Clausewitz's relevance to the rapidly changing nature of war today.

In an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the British public in even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. The wide and varied experience which the British officer gradually gains in so many different parts of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces a certain distrust of them. Also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly one of our national characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal to the British officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier. Such was General Clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great experience in the long series of wars 1793 to 1815, and one present throughout that most awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian campaign in 1812. "General Karl von Clausewitz was born near Magdeburg in 1780, and entered the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in 1792. He served in the campaigns of 1793–1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he entered the military school at Berlin as an officer, and remained there till 1803. He here attracted the notice of Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, was present at the battle of Jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight later in the surrender at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured, he was sent into France as a prisoner till the end of the war." "On his return (in November, 1807) he was placed on General Scharnhorst's staff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization of the Prussian army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the Russian service, was employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much experience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time." "In the spring campaign of 1813 (battles of Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as a Russian officer, was attached to Blucher's staff; during the winter campaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count Walmoden, who fought against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid action of the Goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. In 1815 he again entered the Prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to the III. Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny formed the left of the line of battle, and at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's army." "In addition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note, enormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present day), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of military history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general history" (Von Caemmerer). After the Peace he was employed in a command on the Rhine. In 1818 he became major-general, and was made Director of the Military School at Berlin. Here he remained for some years. This was the chief period of his writings. As General von Caemmerer, in his "Development of Strategical Science," puts it: "This practical and experienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now, in peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop and systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also resolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in order that his soul, which is thirsting for Truth, may be safely and finally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations."

Clausewitz and Modern Strategy is the first-ever volume devoted to the influence and interpretation of Clausewitz' On War to be published in the English language. Among all the better-known works on military theory in Western civilization, it is Carl von Clausewitz' magnum opus that has been able to withstand every kind of political, social, economic, and technological change since it first appeared in 1832 and will always remain of more than purely historical interest. This collection of essays, first presented at an international conference on Clausewitz at the US Army War College in April 1985, spans every possible aspect of Clausewitz' influence. It is grouped into three parts. The first addresses the issue of whether an early nineteenth-century book on war is still pertinent today in an era when war - more than any other human activity - has been revolutionized by modern technology. In the second part, analyses are made of selected theoretical concepts and other specific subjects discussed by Clausewitz, ranging from chance and uncertainty, space and time, and intelligence in war to guerrilla warfare. The final part takes a critical look at Clausewitz' influence on the development of strategic doctrines in several European countries, as well as the degree to which his theories were not only understood but misunderstood by various military thinkers. In many instances, Clausewitz' readers interpreted his ideas out of context and selectively employed his theories to match their own preconceived notions. Like many other works on political theory and philosophy, On War is not always easy to read and understand. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy provides an excellent introduction to the complex world of Clauswitzian thought, offering a better overall understanding of Clausewitz' key concepts, his system of thinking, and his influence on the study of modern war. It is indispensable reading for all students, military historians, strategic analysts and thinkers.

This fascinating book assesses Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz's famous theory on warfare in relation to historical and modern-day conflict—and future trends. Carl von Clausewitz's On War is arguably the most important single work ever written on the theory of warfare and military strategy. In Clausewitz Reconsidered, two prominent military historians assess his theories, examining their viability at a time when asymmetric warfare and "war" conducted by and against nonstate actors is increasingly common and state control often ephemeral. The basis of the book's analysis is an examination of war over the last four centuries, since the Thirty Years' War, including the Cold War and subsequent conflicts. What is discovered is that war is far more endemic and brutal today than when Clausewitz tried to explain it. This volume explores that paradox and shows that if anything, we can anticipate further uncontrolled violence. The authors conclude that Clausewitz and On War have assumed a status akin to holy writ, but are obviously dated. The aim of Clausewitz Reconsidered is to bring the master's theories up to date, providing the current generation with a new basis for thought and analysis.

Originally published in 1976, Clausewitz and the State presents a comprehensive analysis of one of the significant thinkers of modern Europe. Peter Paret combines social and military history and psychological interpretation with a study of Clausewitz's military theories and of his unduly neglected historical and political writing. This timely new edition includes a preface which allows Paret to recount the past thirty years of discussion on Clausewitz and respond to critics. A companion volume to Clausewitz's On War, this book is indispensable to anyone interested in Clausewitz and his theories, and their proper historical context.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) is, by far, the most celebrated military theorist, whose prestige has reached new heights. However, this book argues that his reputation has been largely inflated because of the notorious difficulties of understanding his major book, On War (1832). Many of Clausewitz's interpreters, struggling to make sense of his work, have not admitted - to themselves no less than to their readers - that they did not quite figure it out. Hence, ‘the emperor's new clothes.' Returning to the subject in an updated and expanded form after 35 years, the pre-eminent Clausewitz scholar Azar Gat lays out Clausewitz's real intellectual background and the actual development of his ideas on war and its conduct. The Clausewitz Myth makes sense of Clausewitz's train of thought, removing the veils of mystification and idolization surrounding it to clearly explain what the man and his work were about. Thereby the real Clausewitz, with both his significant contributions and his major errors in the field of military theory, replaces the current interpreters' myth of ‘Clausewitz the absolute.' An indispensable book for every student of war, military theory, and strategy.