Anthropologists have long explained social behaviour as if people always do what they think is best. But what if most of these explanations only work because they are premised upon ignoring what philosophers call 'akrasia' – that is, the possibility that people might act against their better judgment? The contributors to this volume turn an ethnographic lens upon situations in which people seem to act out of line with what they judge, desire and intend. The result is a robust examination of how people around the world experience weaknesses of will, which speaks to debates in both the anthropology of ethics and moral philosophy.

Robinson Crusoe recognizes it is foolish to leave for the open seas; nevertheless, he boards the ship. William Wordsworth of The Prelude sees the immense poetic task ahead of him, but instead of beginning work, he procrastinates by going for a walk. Centering on this sort of intentionally irrational action, originally defined as " akrasia" by the ancient Greeks and "weakness of will" in early Christian thought, Against Better Judgment argues that the phenomenon takes on renewed importance in the long eighteenth century. In treating human minds and bodies as systems and machines, Enlightenment philosophers did not account for actions that may be undermotivated, contradictory, or self-betraying. A number of authors, from Daniel Defoe and Samuel Johnson to Jane Austen and John Keats, however, took up the phenomenon in inventive ways. Thomas Manganaro traces how English novelists, essayists, and poets of the period sought to represent akrasia in ways philosophy cannot, leading them to develop techniques and ideas distinctive to literary writing, including new uses of irony, interpretation, and contradiction. In attempting to give shape to the ways people knowingly and freely fail themselves, these authors produced a new linguistic toolkit that distinguishes literature’s epistemological advantages when it comes to writing about people.

For the first time, Robert Audi presents in Action, Intention, and Reason a full version of his theory of the nature, explanation, freedom, and rationality of human action. Ove the years Audi has set out in journal articles different aspects of a unified theory of action. This volume offers the unity of a single, seamless book with thirteen self-contained chapters, two of them previously unpublished, and a new overview of action theory and the book's contribution to it. The book is divided into four parts, each addressing a major problem area. The chapters in Part One describe the motivational grounds of action, explicate desire, belief, intention, and volition, and give a distinctive account of their interconnections. In the second part, Audi sets out a theory of the explanation of action and argues that actions can be both law-governed and performed for reasons. The third part provides an account of free action and its relation to causation and responsibility. Chapters in the fourth and final part construct an account of rational action and its connections with practical reasoning, self-deception, and weakness of will.

“What if my daughter had lived? Rachel—would she have looked like Jay’s daughters? She died because of me.” Lord Jim Fausscyn. Spare to the heir. Unprovided for. Must make his own way. Naval career first. Then His Majesty’s foreign service. Luckily, he’d won the pulchritudinous Rana, whose huge endowment of South African investments would keep them afloat. She’d also the rectitude of six Caesar’s wives! Although the bloody-mindedness of a child age nine. Childish nightmares too, hadn’t she once mentioned? Yes, they’d married, she warning him beforehand that adultery wouldn’t be tolerated. She’d meant it, her first husband having been a notorious womanizer. Her second husband should’ve been faithful if not to find himself in punishing pain. Now bloke in a choke hold, brawny bloke down for the count. His noble Pa threatened to disown him. She herself threatened to leave him unless he shaped up pronto! Career in ruins too. Would he lose everything? Lose his sons? Chap on his knees. Chap driven to prayer though he’d not trusted to prayer since boyhood. Family man pressing on—chastened chappie will muddle through. Rana struggles too. She and Jim hardly mesh; it’s jarring, even hilarious! Seriously though, why’s she so phobic? And what really happened to Rachel’s mum? Lost her mind, losing her baby? Occasionally even Rana weeps, wondering. This story, taking place in the midtwentieth century, is both serious and humorous. Foibles, idiosyncrasies, the utterly unexpected of silliness, irony upon irony, from intimate disaster to spiritual redemption. There’s a mystery of deceit and lies, or well-meant misdirection. Crucial names get changed—so who’s who? The younger generation is protected till truth must out. Forgiveness remains the issue.

Alfred Mele examines the concept of self-control on its terms, followed by an examination of its bearing on one's actions, beliefs, and emotions. He considers how, by understanding self-control, man can shed light on autonomous behaviour.

In this book, Christine Tappolet offers readers a thorough, wide-ranging, and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy of emotions. It covers recent interdisciplinary debates on the nature of emotions as well as standard theories of emotions, such as feeling theories, motivational theories, and evaluative theories. The book includes discussions of the alleged irrationality of emotions, and looks into the question of whether emotions could not, in some cases, contribute positively to theoretical and practical rationality. In addition, the role of emotions in the theory of virtues and the theory of values receives a detailed treatment. Finally, the book turns to the question of how we can regulate and even educate our emotions by engaging with music and with narrative art. The overall picture of emotions that emerges is one that does justice to the central role that emotions play in our lives, conceiving of emotions as crucial to our grasp of values. As an opinionated introduction, the book doesn’t pretend to be neutral but aims to engage readers in contemporary debates. Each chapter closes with questions for further discussion and suggestions for further reading. Key Features: Written for advanced undergraduates, suitable as the main text in a philosophy of emotion course or as a complement to a set of primary readings Includes useful features for student readers like introductions, study questions, and suggestions for further reading in each chapter Considers whether emotions interfere with our reasoning or whether they can, in some cases, help us to be more rational Argues against basic emotion theory and social constructionism that emotions are both shaped by biological forces and social forces Discusses a variety of subjectivist and objectivist approaches, which share the assumption that emotions and values are closely connected.

Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In addition, he defends an account of self-control, argues that "strict" akratic action is an insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation, and explains how a considerably modified model accommodates action of this sort.

Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.

This is the first reference ever devoted to medieval philosophy. It covers all areas of the field from 500-1500 including philosophers, philosophies, key terms and concepts. It also provides analyses of particular theories plus cultural and social contexts.