This open access book provides an exploration of the consequences of the ontological differences between natural and social objects (sometimes described as objects of nature and objects of thought) in the workings of causal and agency relationships. One of its important and possibly original conclusions is that causal and agency relationships do not encompass all of the dependent relationships encountered in social life. The idea that social reality is contingent has been known (and largely undisputed) at least since Wittgenstein’s “On Certainty”, but social science, and most notably economics has continued to operate on the basis of causal and agency theories borrowed or adapted from the natural sciences. This volume contains essays that retain and justify the partial or qualified use of this approach and essays that totally reject any use of causal and agency theory built on determined facts (closed systems).The rejection is based on the possibly original claim that, whereas causation in the objects of the natural sciences reside in their properties, human action is a matter of intentionality. It engages with critical realist theory and re-examines the role of free will in theories of human action in general and economic theory in particular.

This open access book provides an exploration of the consequences of the ontological differences between natural and social objects (sometimes described as objects of nature and objects of thought) in the workings of causal and agency relationships. One of its important and possibly original conclusions is that causal and agency relationships do not encompass all of the dependent relationships encountered in social life. The idea that social reality is contingent has been known (and largely undisputed) at least since Wittgenstein’s “On Certainty”, but social science, and most notably economics has continued to operate on the basis of causal and agency theories borrowed or adapted from the natural sciences. This volume contains essays that retain and justify the partial or qualified use of this approach and essays that totally reject any use of causal and agency theory built on determined facts (closed systems).The rejection is based on the possibly original claim that, whereas causation in the objects of the natural sciences reside in their properties, human action is a matter of intentionality. It engages with critical realist theory and re-examines the role of free will in theories of human action in general and economic theory in particular.

This open access book provides an exploration of the consequences of the ontological differences between natural and social objects (sometimes described as objects of nature and objects of thought) in the workings of causal and agency relationships. One of its important and possibly original conclusions is that causal and agency relationships do not encompass all of the dependent relationships encountered in social life. The idea that social reality is contingent has been known (and largely undisputed) at least since Wittgenstein's "On Certainty", but social science, and most notably economics has continued to operate on the basis of causal and agency theories borrowed or adapted from the natural sciences. This volume contains essays that retain and justify the partial or qualified use of this approach and essays that totally reject any use of causal and agency theory built on determined facts (closed systems).The rejection is based on the possibly original claim that, whereas causation in the objects of the natural sciences reside in their properties, human action is a matter of intentionality. It engages with critical realist theory and re-examines the role of free will in theories of human action in general and economic theory in particular. This work was published by Saint Philip Street Press pursuant to a Creative Commons license permitting commercial use. All rights not granted by the work's license are retained by the author or authors.

Approximately one in six top economic research papers draws an explicitly causal conclusion. But what do economists mean when they conclude that A ‘causes’ B? Does ‘cause’ say that we can influence B by intervening on A, or is it only a label for the correlation of variables? Do quantitative analyses of observational data followed by such causal inferences constitute sufficient grounds for guiding economic policymaking? The Philosophy of Causality in Economics addresses these questions by analyzing the meaning of causal claims made by economists and the philosophical presuppositions underlying the research methods used. The book considers five key causal approaches: the regularity approach, probabilistic theories, counterfactual theories, mechanisms, and interventions and manipulability. Each chapter opens with a summary of literature on the relevant approach and discusses its reception among economists. The text details case studies, and goes on to examine papers which have adopted the approach in order to highlight the methods of causal inference used in contemporary economics. It analyzes the meaning of the causal claim put forward, and finally reconstructs the philosophical presuppositions accepted implicitly by economists. The strengths and limitations of each method of causal inference are also considered in the context of using the results as evidence for policymaking. This book is essential reading to those interested in literature on the philosophy of economics, as well as the philosophy of causality and economic methodology in general.

In this article, past and recent accounts of causality and the notion of normal state adopted in various disciplines are linked to the philosophical insights of John Stuart Mill and Piero Sraffa in order to provide a particular focus on economic theory. A simple neuron model and the theory of natural price in Adam Smith are taken as typical applications of causality plus normality and serve to argue that the deviations from a normal state can play two roles in economic theory: (1) the selecting of causes and causal explanations and (2) agency represented by the variables of a causal model.

Warren J. Samuels has been a prominent figure in the study of economics in the twentieth century. This book brings together essays by leading scholars in the areas of economics in which Samuels has made his most important contributions: the history of economic thought, economic methodology, and institutional and post-Keynesian economics. This work is designed to give the reader a sense of the breadth and possibilities of economics. The essays, all published here for the first time, investigate issues such as: The institutional structures that shape economic activity and performance. The variety of approaches to economic analysis. The importance of the history of the discipline both inherently and for the study of economics in the modern age. With essays from leading scholars, collected and introduced by some of the most eminent authorities in the field, the work is a formidable volume, and one fit to honor one of the most renowned economists of our age.

This book provides the first comprehensive and critical examination of Mäki’s realist philosophy of economics.

Agent-based Models and Causal Inference Scholars of causal inference have given little credence to the possibility that ABMs could be an important tool in warranting causal claims. Manzo’s book makes a convincing case that this is a mistake. The book starts by describing the impressive progress that ABMs have made as a credible methodology in the last several decades. It then goes on to compare the inferential threats to ABMs versus the traditional methods of RCTs, regression, and instrumental variables showing that they have a common vulnerability of being based on untestable assumptions. The book concludes by looking at four examples where an analysis based on ABMs complements and augments the evidence for specific causal claims provided by other methods. Manzo has done a most convincing job of showing that ABMs can be an important resource in any researcher’s tool kit. Christopher Winship, Diker-Tishman Professor of Sociology, Harvard University, USA Agent-based Models and Causal Inference is a first-rate contribution to the debate on, and practice of, causal claims. With exemplary rigor, systematic precision and pedagogic clarity, this book contrasts the assumptions about causality that undergird agent-based models, experimental methods, and statistically based observational methods, discusses the challenges these methods face as far as inferences go, and, in light of this discussion, elaborates the case for combining these methods’ respective strengths: a remarkable achievement. Ivan Ermakoff, Professor of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA Agent-based models are a uniquely powerful tool for understanding how patterns in society may arise in often surprising and counter-intuitive ways. This book offers a strong and deeply reflected argument for how ABM’s can do much more: add to actual empirical explanation. The work is of great value to all social scientists interested in learning how computational modelling can help unraveling the complexity of the real social world. Andreas Flache, Professor of Sociology at the University of Groningen, Netherlands Agent-based Models and Causal Inference is an important and much-needed contribution to sociology and computational social science. The book provides a rigorous new contribution to current understandings of the foundation of causal inference and justification in the social sciences. It provides a powerful and cogent alternative to standard statistical causal-modeling approaches to causation. Especially valuable is Manzo’s careful analysis of the conditions under which an agent-based simulation is relevant to causal inference. The book represents an exceptional contribution to sociology, the philosophy of social science, and the epistemology of simulations and models. Daniel Little, Professor of philosophy, University of Michigan, USA Agent-based Models and Causal Inference delivers an insightful investigation into the conditions under which different quantitative methods can legitimately hold to be able to establish causal claims. The book compares agent-based computational methods with randomized experiments, instrumental variables, and various types of causal graphs. Organized in two parts, Agent-based Models and Causal Inference connects the literature from various fields, including causality, social mechanisms, statistical and experimental methods for causal inference, and agent-based computation models to help show that causality means different things within different methods for causal analysis, and that persuasive causal claims can only be built at the intersection of these various methods. Readers will also benefit from the inclusion of: A thorough comparison between agent-based computation models to randomized experiments, instrumental variables, and several types of causal graphs A compelling argument that observational and experimental methods are not qualitatively superior to simulation-based methods in their ability to establish causal claims Practical discussions of how statistical, experimental and computational methods can be combined to produce reliable causal inferences Perfect for academic social scientists and scholars in the fields of computational social science, philosophy, statistics, experimental design, and ecology, Agent-based Models and Causal Inference will also earn a place in the libraries of PhD students seeking a one-stop reference on the issue of causal inference in agent-based computational models.

The first edition established itself as one of the leading books to situate the issue of intellectual property within the discipline of International Political Economy (IPE). Since its publication, intellectual property has continued to rise up the global agenda, reflecting expanding interest in the area among policy-makers and advocacy groups, linked to the increasingly fraught politics of the global governance of IPRs. Significantly revised and updated to take account of developments within the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization, this edition incorporates the author’s recent research on IPRs. It retains the theoretical and analytical elements of the first edition, whilst offering students and researchers a detailed analysis of how intellectual property is politically constructed, and how it is linked to the economics of knowledge and information in the contemporary global political economy. Rapidly-developing issues addressed in the work include: arguments around the implementation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of IPRs (TRIPs) the WIPO Development agenda and the ‘resistance’ to socialization programmes the AIDS crisis and the pharmaceutical industry Digital Rights Management This book will be of interest to students and researchers of international political economy, international relations and intellectual property law.