How does law possess the normative force it requires to direct our actions? This book argues that this seemingly innocuous question is of central importance to the philosophy of law and, by extension, of the very concept of law itself. It advances a position grounded in the secular natural law tradition, and in doing so addresses the two success criteria for this position head on: Firstly, that commitment to the existence of a supreme moral principle is required; Secondly, that any supreme moral principle must be identifiable through human reason. The book argues that these conditions are met by Alan Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), which – through a dialectically necessary argument – locates the existence of universally applicable moral norms in the concept of agency. Given the very purpose of law is to guide action, legal norms must be located in a unified hierarchy of practical reason. It follows that, if law is to succeed in claiming to be capable of guiding our action, moral permissibility with reference to the PGC is a necessary condition of a rule's legal validity. This strong theory of natural law is defended throughout, both against moral sceptics and positions within contemporary legal positivism.

These essays are concerned with the psychology of moral agency, focusing on moral feelings and moral motivation.

A collection of new essays on the interplay between intentions and practical reasons in law and practical agency.

"Bernard Williams (1929-2003) was one of the great philosophical figures of the second half of the twentieth century. This collection, devoted to Williams's ethical thought, is divided into two sections. The papers in the first section deal with Williams's attempts to explore theoretical options beyond the confines of what he called the "morality system." These papers show how, through a critical confrontation with this system, Williams found new ways to think about moral obligation, morally relevant emotions such as shame, the relevance of the history of philosophy, and also how these new ways of thinking are linked to Williams's novel metaethical ideas concerning the possibility and limits of moral knowledge. In the book's second section, readers will find papers related to Williams's discussions of freedom and responsibility, the role of luck in our moral lives, and the reasons that agents can be said to have. Williams's concerns about the morality system still loom large here. For example, Williams was skeptical about the prospects of putting our responsibility practices, and the conception of free will with which they are associated, on a firm footing. But as more than one author shows, Williams's skepticism is largely confined to conceptions of free will and responsibility that are conditioned by the morality system's uneasiness with luck. Williams has a more vindicatory story to tell about the prospects for freedom and responsibility once these concepts have been untethered from the assumptions of this system"--

Andrews Reath presents a selection of his best essays on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on his conception of rational agency and his conception of autonomy. The opening essays explore different elements of Kant's views about motivation, including his account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and his view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These essays stress the unity of Kant's moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the essays develop an original approach to Kant's conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant's writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final essays explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant's moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself. The collection offers revised versions of several previously published essays, as well as two new papers, 'Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality' and 'Agency and Universal Law'. It will be of interest to all students and scholars of Kant, and to many moral philosophers.

Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency provides a novel interpretation and rational reconstruction of Kant's doctrine of freedom. Markus Kohl shows how Kant defends the belief that we are free from foreign (natural and super-natural) causes as a presupposition of all meaningful human activity. While this interpretation focuses on the essential role that freedom of will plays in our moral agency, it also examines how our status as rational cognitive agents hinges on our freedom of thought, and why our aesthetic engagement with beauty requires our freedom of imagination. Kohl thereby gives a compelling sense of Kant's estimation that freedom is a "cardinal point"—even the "keystone"—of his entire critical philosophy. Kant's doctrine of freedom emerges in this account as a systematic critique of a naturalistic worldview which regards all our capacities, representations, and actions as the causal upshot of natural laws and forces. Kant holds that the naturalistic worldview fatally undermines our self-conception as rational agents. This critique of naturalism culminates in the argument that naturalistic cognizers cannot explain away our freedom from natural forces because they must presuppose such a freedom in their own cognitive efforts to devise rationally valid naturalistic theories.

This volume explores how individuals use moral agency to craft the moral dispositions and moral capabilities needed for living well-lived lives. It draws on Eastern and Western philosophical and ethical traditions to formulate and address key issues concerning character development and moral agency. In both Eastern and Western traditions, the complexities of shaping an individual’s moral agency focus on sustained processes of inner self-cultivation. The chapters in this volume highlight the ways in which one is to manage and direct one’s desires and aspirations, and what is to count as the source of guidance for a well-lived life. They engage with key figures and traditions in the history of Eastern and Western philosophy, including Confucian, Buddhist, and Western sources, from Aristotle to Kant. The juxtaposition of sources from the different parts of the world highlights striking similarities and significant contrasts and provides rich conceptual resources for further exploration of these issues. The volume provides a broader, deeper pursuit of central issues of moral psychology and ethics in ways that highlight the inexhaustible resources in these traditions. The focus on character is a way to draw together perspectives on ethical life, theories of human agency, views of fundamental, life-guiding values, and relations between individuals and society and how persons see their place in the world. Moral Agency in Eastern and Western Thought will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on virtue ethics, moral psychology, comparative philosophy, and history of philosophy.

This volume investigates Kant's conception of what a human being is and how a human being can act autonomously. Scholars explore fundamental topics such as freedom, autonomy, and personhood from both practical and theoretical perspectives, and consider their importance within Kant's wider system of philosophy.

One of the most exciting developments in philosophy in the last fifty years is the resurgence in the philosophy of action. The concept of action now occupies a central place in ethics, metaphysics and jurisprudence. This collection of original essays, by some of the most astute and influential philosophers working in this area, covers the entire range of the philosophy of action. Topics covered include the nature of actions themselves; how the concepts of act, agent, cause and event are related to each other; self-knowledge, emotion, autonomy and freedom in human life; and the place of the concept of action in criminal law. The volume concludes with a major essay by one of America's leading authorities in the philosophy of law on 'the 3.5 billion dollar question': was the destruction of the World Trade Center one event or two?

This collection of thoughtful essays re-examines the notion of human agency from the perspective of the major traditions of Christian belief. Comprehensive in scope and stimulating in subject matter, this volume will be of value to philosophers as well as scholars of religion.