The 13 contributions of this collective offer new and challenging ways of reading well-known and more neglected texts on akrasia (lack of control, or weakness of will) in Greek philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus).

Discussions on akrasia (lack of control, or weakness of will) in Greek philosophy have been particularily vivid and intense for the past two decades. Standard stories that presented Socrates as the philosopher who simply denied the phenomenon, and Plato and Aristotle as rehabilitating it straightforwardly against Socrates, have been challenged in many different ways. Building on those challenges, this collective provides new, and in some cases opposed ways of reading well-known as well as more neglected texts. Its 13 contributions, written by experts in the field, cover the whole history of Greek ethics, from Socrates to Plotinus, through Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Epictetus).

Self-knowledge - a person's knowledge of their own thoughts, character, and psychological states - has long been a central focus of philosophical enquiry. The concerns which occupy ancient thinkers with regard to self-knowledge, however, diverge in critical ways from contemporary investigations on the topic. In this volume, based upon the eighth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, leading scholars explore the treatment of self-knowledge in ancient Greek thought, particularly in Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic thinkers, and Plotinus. A number of chapters identify specific modes of self-knowledge in ancient thought, such as knowledge of one's individual moral or political character in Plato, or one's own discursive thought as compared to that arising from the self-presence of intellect in Plotinus. Others identify interesting points of convergence with contemporary thinking to make interventions in existing debates as well as to articulate new research questions, such as whether Plato regarded self-knowledge as synoptic and diachronic in the Republic, or whether self-knowledge is a condition on virtue for Aristotle. By exploring the distinctions between the fundamental assumptions and conceptual frameworks in which ancient and modern philosophers examine self-knowledge, this volume makes a novel contribution to current scholarship in the field.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback. 'The serial Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (OSAP) is fairly regarded as the leading venue for publication in ancient philosophy. It is where one looks to find the state-of-the-art. That the serial, which presents itself more as an anthology than as a journal, has traditionally allowed space for lengthier studies, has tended only to add to its prestige; it is as if OSAP thus declares that, since it allows as much space as the merits of the subject require, it can be more entirely devoted to the best and most serious scholarship.' Michael Pakaluk, Bryn Mawr Classical Review

This volume congregates articles of leading philosophers about potentials and potentiality in all areas of philosophy and the empirical sciences in which they play a relevant role. It is the first encompassing collection of articles on the metaphysics of potentials and potentiality. Potentials play an important role not only in our everyday understanding of objects, persons and systems but also in the sciences. An example is the potential to become an adult human person. Moreover, the attribution of potentials involves crucial ethical problems. Bioethics makes references to the theoretical concept "potential" without being able to clarify its meaning. However, despite its relevance it has not been made subject of philosophical investigation. Mostly, potentials are regarded as a subspecies of dispositions. Whilst dispositions are a flourishing field of research, potentials as such have not come into focus. Potentials like dispositions are modal properties. But already a first glance at the metaphysics of potentials shows that concerning their ascription potentials are more problematic than dispositions since "potential" means that an entity has the potential to acquire a property in the future. Therefore, potentials involve a time structure of the entities in question that is much more complex than those of dispositions. This handbook brings this important concept into focus in its various aspects for the first time. It covers the history of the concept as well as contemporary systematic problems and will be of special interest for philosophers in the fields of general metaphysics, philosophy of science and ethics, especially bioethics. It will also be of interest to scientists and persons concerned with bioethical problems.

The book provides a collection of scientific papers which are dedicated to the memory of Burkhard Mojsisch. The collection includes highly qualified papers on ancient, medieval and early modern philosophy, and demonstrates the importance of the historical research of philosophy at the beginning of the 21st century and its current trends. It documents historical aspects of important philosophical discussions of contemporaneity (e.g. in the fields of intercultural philosophy and interdisciplinary philosophy, such as philosophy of neuroscience). The authors are leading specialists of philosophy, especially of ancient and medieval philosophy. The collection includes papers in German, English, and French.

Ancient lessons for sustainable citizenship An ecologically sustainable society cannot be achieved without citizens who possess the virtues and values that will foster it, and who believe that individual actions can indeed make a difference. Eco-Republic draws on ancient Greek thought—and Plato's Republic in particular—to put forward a new vision of citizenship that can make such a society a reality. Melissa Lane develops a model of a society whose health and sustainability depend on all its citizens recognizing a shared standard of value and shaping their personal goals and habits accordingly. Bringing together the moral and political ideas of the ancients with the latest social and psychological theory, Lane illuminates the individual's vital role in social change, and articulates new ways of understanding what is harmful and what is valuable, what is a benefit and what is a cost, and what the relationship between public and private well-being ought to be. Eco-Republic reveals why we must rethink our political imagination if we are to meet the challenges of climate change and other urgent environmental concerns. Offering a unique reflection on the ethics and politics of sustainability, the book goes beyond standard approaches to virtue ethics in philosophy and current debates about happiness in economics and psychology. Eco-Republic explains why health is a better standard than happiness for capturing the important links between individual action and social good, and diagnoses the reasons why the ancient concept of virtue has been sorely neglected yet is more relevant today than ever.

The focus of Aristotle on Prescription is Aristotle’s reflections on rule-making. It is widely believed that Aristotle was only concerned with decision-making, understood as a deliberative process enabling a person to arrive at particular, contingent decisions. However, rule-making is fundamental to Aristotle’s ethical texts. Establishing rules means indicating patterns for action that are sufficiently specific to meet situational difficulties and sufficiently constant in time to provide us with a code of behaviour to be used in similar situations. When we prescribe rules, we demonstrate the ability to direct not only our own life but also other people’s lives. Alesse’s book explores Aristotle’s deep reflections on the nature and functions of prescription, and on the relationship between rules and individual decisions.

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis -- the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues.

Metaphor familiarizes things strange with things familiar to enrich old things with things newly made familiar. Thus metaphor is an effective intercultural highway without shared thinking-way, for each culture is a specific thinking-way. This volume shows such intercultural communication.