The conventional narrative of the Vietnam War often glosses over the decade leading up to it. Covering the years 1954-1963, this book presents a thought-provoking reexamination of the war's long prelude--from the aftermath of French defeat at Dien Bien Phu--through Hanoi's decision to begin reunification by force--to the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Established narratives of key events are given critical reappraisal and new light is shed on neglected factors. The strategic importance of Laos is revealed as central to understanding how the war in the South developed.

The conventional narrative of the Vietnam War often glosses over the decade leading up to it. Covering the years 1954-1963, this book presents a thought-provoking reexamination of the war's long prelude--from the aftermath of French defeat at Dien Bien Phu--through Hanoi's decision to begin reunification by force--to the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Established narratives of key events are given critical reappraisal and new light is shed on neglected factors. The strategic importance of Laos is revealed as central to understanding how the war in the South developed.

An overview of the revisionist case on the Vietnam War, showing how it could have been won by the US at a lower cost than was suffered in defeat.

"Using new and largely inaccessible Vietnamese sources as well as French, British, Canadian and American archives, Pierre Asselin sheds valuable light on Hanoi's path to war. Step by step the narrative makes Hanoi's revolutionary strategy from the end of the French Indochina War to the start of the Anti-American Resistance Struggle for Reunification and National Salvation (the Vietnam War) transparent. The book reveals how North Vietnamese leaders moved from a cautious policy emphasizing nonviolent political and diplomatic struggle to a far riskier pursuit of military victory"--

Using previously unseen Russian archive material, this book analyzes how the Soviet leadership evaluated developments in Soviet-Vietnamese relations in the years from 1949 to 1964. It focuses on how Soviet leaders perceived China's role in Vietnam relative to the Soviet role, and shows how these perceptions influenced the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship.

One of the first books to look at how the Vietnamese themselves experienced the wars for Vietnam, including both the French and the American wars. Combining political, social, and cultural history, Bradley examines how the war was seen both by top policy makers and also everyday soldiers and civilians in both North and South Vietnam.

This work examines the development of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces as a national institution; explores the historical origins of the political warfare system; and assesses that system's nurturing of military morale, popular support, and ways to weaken enemy resolve. North Vietnam in the 1940s and South Vietnam in the 1960s embraced the system of political control over the military that was developed in Soviet Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution and in Republican China in the 1920s where it influenced both the Nationalist and Communist movements. The book discusses the overall effectiveness of political warfare activities in the Republic of Vietnam's army, the advice and support offered by the U.S. military to the South Vietnamese political warfare establishment, and the consequences of the war's end for the members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces who served in the political warfare system.

Using recently released archival materials from the United States and Europe, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam explains how and why the United States came to assume control as the dominant western power in Vietnam during the 1950s. Acting on their conviction that American methods had a better chance of building a stable, noncommunist South Vietnamese nation, Eisenhower administration officials systematically ejected French military, economic, political, bureaucratic, and cultural institutions from Vietnam. Kathryn C. Statler examines diplomatic maneuvers in Paris, Washington, London, and Saigon to detail how Western alliance members sought to transform South Vietnam into a modern, westernized, and democratic ally but ultimately failed to counter the Communist threat. Abetted by South Vietnamese prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem, Americans in Washington, D.C., and Saigon undermined their French counterparts at every turn, resulting in the disappearance of a French presence by the time Kennedy assumed office. Although the United States ultimately replaced France in South Vietnam, efforts to build South Vietnam into a nation failed. Instead, it became a dependent client state that was unable to withstand increasing Communist aggression from the North. Replacing France is a fundamental reassessment of the origins of U.S. involvement in Vietnam that explains how Franco-American conflict led the United States to pursue a unilateral and ultimately imperialist policy in Vietnam.