The Korean War was the first armed engagement for the newly formed U.S. Air Force, but far from the type of conflict it expected or wanted to fight. As the first air war of the nuclear age, it posed a major challenge to the service to define and successfully carry out its mission by stretching the constraints of limited war while avoiding the excesses of total war. Conrad Crane analyzes both the successes and failures of the air force in Korea, offering a balanced treatment of how the air war in Korea actually unfolded. He examines the Air Force's contention that it could play a decisive role in a non-nuclear regional war but shows that the fledgling service was held to unrealistically high expectations based on airpower's performance in World War II, despite being constrained by the limited nature of the Korean conflict. Crane exposes the tensions and rivalries between services, showing that emphasis on strategic bombing came at the expense of air support for ground troops, and he tells how interactions between army and air force generals shaped the air force's mission and strategy. He also addresses misunderstandings about plans to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the war and includes new information from pilot correspondence about the informal policy of "hot pursuit" over the Yalu that existed at the end of the war. The book considers not only the actual air effort in Korea but also its ramifications. The air force doubled in size during the war and used that growth to secure its position in the defense establishment, but it wagered its future on its ability to deliver nuclear weapons in a high-intensity conflict—a position that left it unprepared to fight the next limited war in Vietnam. As America observes the fiftieth anniversary of its initial engagement in Korea, Crane's book is an important reminder of the lessons learned there. And as airpower continues to be a cornerstone of American defense, this examination of its uses in Korea provides new insights about the air force's capabilities and limitations.

This important and comprehensive historical account of the Korean War and the American Air Force seeks to record the story of the air war as it was. The Korean War was the first in American history to be limited not by technology, or by the ability of the combatants to mobilize their military power, but by political design. The newly independent Air Force, shaped in the previous two decades by an increasing concentration on the strategic role of attacking an enemy's homeland, now faced a conflict almost entirely tactical in character and limited as to how and where airpower could be applied. Like the rest of the American military establishment, the Air Force was in no way prepared for battle at the western rim of the Pacific. Yet despite these limitations, the Air Force responded quickly and effectively, proving in many ways the utility of airpower in modern war. With virtually no warning, the Air Force injected itself into the war in the first critical week. It transported troops and equipment from Japan to Korea, evacuated American nationals, provided significant intelligence through aerial reconnaissance, and most importantly helped to slow the North Korean advance so that United Nations forces could construct a defensive position on the peninsula. For the next three years, American airpower contributed everywhere to the allied military effort; maintaining control of the airspace over the battlefield; disrupting enemy supplies and movement; supporting the ground armies at the point of contact with the enemy; transporting men and materiel at critical times to the zone of operations.Futrell describes all of these operations with a clarity and a balance that have since become a model for official military history. Even better, he has analyzed the operations, interpreting their significance overall to the course of the conflict and their importance in the application of airpower to modern war. He shows the effects of close air support in enemy killed, supplies denied, and the turn of battle; he assesses the success or failure of various strategies, tactics, techniques, and methods; he emphasizes the difficulties the Air Force faced and how the challenges were met and overcome. Futrell details the modifications to doctrine and procedure, the changes in organization necessitated by distance or shortages in men and equipment, or by austere and inadequate fields and facilities. And in Dr. Futrell's skilled hands, analyses of failures teaches as much as examinations of successes.CHAPTER 1. The First Six Days of Communist Aggression * CHAPTER 2. Plans and Preparations * CHAPTER 3. Drawing the Battleline in Korea * CHAPTER 4. In Defense of the Pusan Perimeter * CHAPTER 5. Victory in the South * CHAPTER 6. The Strategic Bombing Campaign * CHAPTER 7. On to the Yalu * CHAPTER 8. Two Months of Defeat and Retreat * CHAPTER 9. Air Superiority-Key to Victory * CHAPTER 10. Target Logistics * CHAPTER 11. Air-Ground Operations on the Field of Battle * CHAPTER 12. Armistice Talks Mark a New Phase of Korean Hostilities * CHAPTER 13. MIG s Seek Air Superiority * CHAPTER 14. Ten Months of Comprehensive Railway Interdiction * CHAPTER 15. Toward an Air-Pressure Strategy * CHAPTER 16. Summer. Autumn 1952 * CHAPTER 17. Air Reconnaissance. Transport, and Rescue * CHAPTER 18. Sustained Air-Pressure Operations * CHAPTER 19. Airpower Achieves United Nations Military Objectives * CHAPTER 20. Air Mission AccomplishedA degree of calculated risk is involved in the preparation of any history of recent events, and this history--written at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in the months between March 1957 and November 1958--is no exception. The passing of time and the completion of definitive Army and Navy service histories of the Korean war will undoubtedly provide additional historical perspective which was not available to the author of this USAF history.

The book describes the creation and conduct of American airpower strategy in World War II, and explains how the legacies of that experience have affected warfare ever since.

Official U.S. Air Force history of the Korean War.

Collection of articles analyzing and describing the operation of U.S. airpower in the Korean conflict.

Resistance is a product of will times means, Carl von Clausewitz postulated in his treatise On War. In his 1993 Bombs, Cities, and Civilians, which the American Historical Review judged "must reading for anyone interested in the subject of air warfare," Conrad C. Crane focused on the moral dimension of American air strategy in World War II—specifically, the Allied effort to break the enemy's will through targeting civilians. With decades of research and reflection, and a wealth of new material at his command, Crane returns to the subject of America's WWII airpower strategy to offer an analysis fully engaged with the "means" side of Clausewitz's equation: the design and impact of strategic bombing of the enemy's infrastructure and thus its capacity to fight. A marked advance in our understanding of the use of airpower in war in general and the Second World War in particular, Crane's work shows how, despite an undeniable lack of concern about civilian casualties in Germany and Japan late in the war, American strategic bombing in WWII consistently focused on destroying the enemy's war-making capacity instead of its collapsing will. Further, Crane persuasively argues that in the limited wars since then, separating such targets has become increasingly more difficult, and all air campaigns against states have subsequently escalated to accept greater risks for civilians. American Airpower Strategy in World War II also provides an expanded close look at the use of airpower in the last three months of the strategic air war against Germany, when so many bombing missions relied upon radar aids, as well as the first direct comparison of 8th and 15th Air Force bombing campaigns in Europe. The result is the most coherent and concise analysis of the application and legacy of Allied strategic airpower in WWII—and a work that will inform all future practical and theoretical consideration of the use, and the role, of airpower in war.

In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War, the official history offices of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and their respective historical associations collaborated to sponsor as comprehensive a symposium as possible, including as participants some of the coalition partners who contributed forces and weapons to the war. The intent of this symposium, titled Coalition Air Warfare during the Korean War, 1950 -1953, was to focus not only on the contributions made by the armed forces of the United States, but also on those of America's allies. The diverse group of panelists and speakers included not only scholars with subject matter expertise, but also veteran soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had served in that conflict. It was hoped that the melding of these diverse perspectives would provide interesting, if sometimes conflicting, views about the Korean War. The symposium organizers designated an agenda of six specific panels for investigation, including Planning and Operations; Air Superiority, Air Support of Ground Forces; Air Interdiction and Bombardment, Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence, and Logistical Support of Air Operations. Each session began with commentary by the panel chairman, which was followed by formal papers, and in some instances included a lively question and answer session. The papers and most of the proceedings found their way into print and are recorded here in an effort to permanently capture the activities, challenges, contributions, and heroics of the coalition air forces and the airmen who fought during the Korean conflict.

The American Culture of War presents a sweeping, critical examination of every major American war of the late 20th century: World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the First and Second Persian Gulf Wars, through to Operation Enduring Freedom. Lewis deftly traces the evolution of US military strategy, offering an original and provocative look at the motives people and governments used to wage war, the debates among military personnel, the flawed political policies that guided military strategy, and the civilian perceptions that characterized each conflict. Now in its second edition, The American Culture of War has been completely revised and updated. New features include: Completely revised and updated chapters structured to facilitate students’ ability to compare conflicts New chapters on Operation Iraqi Freedom and the current conflict in Afghanistan New conclusion discussing the American culture of war and the future of warfare Over fifty maps, photographs, and images to help students visualize material Expanded companion website with additional pedagogical material for both students and researchers. The American Culture of War is a unique and invaluable survey of over seventy years of American military history, perfect for any student of America’s modern wars. For additional information and classroom resources please visit The American Culture of War companion website at www.routledge.com/cw/lewis.

A theory of tactical air power explaining US air power effectiveness in Vietnam and the modern air wars that followed.

A major theoretical statement by a distinguished political scholar explains why a policy of liberal hegemony is doomed to fail It is widely believed in the West that the United States should spread liberal democracy across the world, foster an open international economy, and build international institutions. The policy of remaking the world in America's image is supposed to protect human rights, promote peace, and make the world safe for democracy. But this is not what has happened. Instead, the United States has become a highly militarized state fighting wars that undermine peace, harm human rights, and threaten liberal values at home. In this major statement, the renowned international-relations scholar John Mearsheimer argues that liberal hegemony--the foreign policy pursued by the United States since the Cold War ended--is doomed to fail. It makes far more sense, he maintains, for Washington to adopt a more restrained foreign policy based on a sound understanding of how nationalism and realism constrain great powers abroad. The Great Delusion is a lucid and compelling work of the first importance for scholars, policymakers, and everyone interested in the future of American foreign policy.