W. J. Mander presents a history of metaphysics in nineteenth-century Britain. The story focuses on the elaboration of, and differing reactions to, the concept of the unknowable or unconditioned, first developed by Sir William Hamilton in the 1829. The idea of an ultimate but unknowable way that things really are in themselves may be seen as supplying a narrative arc that runs right through the metaphysical systems of the period in question. These thought schemes may be divided into three broad groups which were roughly consecutive in their emergence but also overlapping as they continued to develop. In the first instance there were the doctrines of the agnostics who developed further Hamilton's basic idea that fundamental reality lies for the great part beyond our cognitive reach. These philosophies were followed immediately by those of the empiricists and, in the last third of the century, the idealists: both of these schools of thought—albeit in profoundly different ways—reacted against the epistemic pessimism of the agnostics. Mander offers close textual readings of the main contributions to First Philosophy made by the key philosophers of the period (such as Hamilton, Mansel, Spencer, Mill, and Bradley) as well as some less well known figures (such as Bain, Clifford, Shadworth Hodgson, Ferrier, and John Grote). By presenting, interpreting, criticising, and connecting together their various contrasting ideas, this book explains how the three traditions developed and interacted with one another to comprise the history of metaphysics in Victorian Britain.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

Lacy critiques the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, specifically his concept of the 'unknowable' as the ultimate reality beyond human comprehension. Lacy argues that such a concept is both inconsistent and unnecessary, and offers alternative perspectives on the nature of reality. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

This book is designed to separate Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable from his general system of evolution, and to refute the former while leaving the latter to stand as "a law of things" and not "only a law of appearances." Its author sums up his conclusions in about the following terms (p. 211 f.): Every argument that is used, or that can be used, in proof of the existence of the objective Unknowable is based on the very knowledge which the argument purports to prove impossible (Chap. II.). A number of problems which Mr. Spencer supposes peculiar to Ontology and considers insoluble, the author finds to be capable of solution by Phenomenology (Chaps. III.-VI.). Actual nature does not exclude realities from its sphere (Chap. VII.). The unknowableness deduced by Mr. Spencer is the unknowableness of something neither in existence nor capable of existence (Chap. VIII.). Spencer's deduction of the unknowableness of things outside of consciousness from the conception of life, Mr. Lacy considers meaningless and-erroneous (Chap. IX.). Absolute knowledge is possible and can be accounted for (Chapter X.). The author justly declares that Spencer's "reconciliation" is a "high" (he might have said a pompous and meaningless) abstraction; but he himself believes that "Science and the Religion of to-day shall pass into something more worthy than either, which shall take their place" (p. 235). Mr. Lacy has studied this doctrine of Spencer with painstaking care, and his refutations of its details are tolerably successful in consideration of the fact that he so largely looks upon metaphysical problems in Spencer's way, and almost-it might be said- with borrowed eyes. The "Synthetic Philosophy" he considers "as perhaps the noblest speculative product of a single mind" (p. 4). Yet he does not hesitate to criticise it with commendable thoroughness. This estimate of the "Synthetic Philosophy," in connection with many other tokens, would seem to indicate that the author is not familiar with the masters in modern philosophy; especially that he, like the one master whom he so admiringly but sharply criticises, little knows or appreciates the critical method and results of Kant, or the process of thought in the solution of metaphysical problems since the time of Kant. We are quite willing to have Mr. Spencer's theory of the Unknowable so thoroughly refuted by one avowedly an admirer of the "Synthetic Philosophy." For ourselves, we are looking to see this entire system of philosophy speedily disintegrate and deliver over its elements, so far as they have any stable quality, to a new and different process of philosophical integration. -New Englander and Yale Review, Volume 43 [1884]

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

The republication of this book is eminently fitting at this time. Jay Rumney's Herbert Spencer's Sociology first appeared in 1937. In that year Talcott Parsons, citing Crane Brinton, declared: "Spencer is dead. But who killed him and how?" It was the thesis of Parsons' famous The Structure of Social Action that the evolution of scientific theory had put an end to Spencer. For more than a generation the man whose name had been synonymous with sociology was, or so it seemed, repressed and forgotten.

Vols. 1-14, 16- include the society's Proceedings, 1871-1905, 1961-