This is an introduction to game theory and applications with an emphasis on self-discovery from the perspective of a mathematical modeller. The book deals in a unified manner with the central concepts of both classical and evolutionary game theory. The key ideas are illustrated throughout by a wide variety of well-chosen examples of both human and non-human behavior, including car pooling, price fixing, food sharing, sex allocation and competition for territories or oviposition sites. There are numerous exercises with solutions.

This book introduces game theory and its applications from an applied mathematician's perspective, systematically developing tools and concepts for game-theoretic modelling in the life and social sciences. Filled with down-to-earth examples of strategic behavior in humans and other animals, the book presents a unified account of the central ideas of both classical and evolutionary game theory. Unlike many books on game theory, which focus on mathematical and recreational aspects of the subject, this book emphasizes using games to answer questions of current scientific interest. In the present third edition, the author has added substantial new material on evolutionarily stable strategies and their use in behavioral ecology. The only prerequisites are calculus and some exposure to matrix algebra, probability, and differential equations.

Game Theory: A Modeling Approach quickly moves readers through the fundamental ideas of the subject to enable them to engage in creative modeling projects based on game theoretic concepts. The authors match conclusions to real-world scenarios and applications. The text engages students in active learning, group work, in-class discussions and interactive simulations. Each chapter provides foundation pieces or adds more features to help readers build game theoretic models. The chapters include definitions, concepts and illustrative examples. The text will engage and challenge both undergraduate and graduate students. Features: Enables readers to apply game theorty to real-world scenarios Chapters can be used for core course materials or independent stuides Exercises, included at the end of the chapters, follow the order of the sections in the text Select answers and solutions are found at the end of the book Solutions manual for instructors is available from the authors

Comprises lectures given at Tel Aviv University and Oxford University in 1990.

An exciting new edition of the popular introduction to game theory and its applications The thoroughly expanded Second Edition presents a unique, hands-on approach to game theory. While most books on the subject are too abstract or too basic for mathematicians, Game Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition offers a blend of theory and applications, allowing readers to use theory and software to create and analyze real-world decision-making models. With a rigorous, yet accessible, treatment of mathematics, the book focuses on results that can be used to determine optimal game strategies. Game Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition demonstrates how to use modern software, such as MapleTM, Mathematica®, and Gambit, to create, analyze, and implement effective decision-making models. Coverage includes the main aspects of game theory including the fundamentals of two-person zero-sum games, cooperative games, and population games as well as a large number of examples from various fields, such as economics, transportation, warfare, asset distribution, political science, and biology. The Second Edition features: • A new chapter on extensive games, which greatly expands the implementation of available models • New sections on correlated equilibria and exact formulas for three-player cooperative games • Many updated topics including threats in bargaining games and evolutionary stable strategies • Solutions and methods used to solve all odd-numbered problems • A companion website containing the related Maple and Mathematica data sets and code A trusted and proven guide for students of mathematics and economics, Game Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition is also an excellent resource for researchers and practitioners in economics, finance, engineering, operations research, statistics, and computer science.

This book is intended as an introduction to game theory which goes beyond the field of application, economics, and which introduces the reader to as many different sides of game theory as possible within the limitations of an introduction. The main goal is to give an impression of the diversity of game theoretical models, while at the same time covering the standard topics. The book has an equal coverage of non-cooperative and cooperative games, and it covers several topics such as selecting Nash equilibria, non-transferable utility games, applications of game theory to logic, combinatorial and differential games.

This revised edition contains new material & shows students how to apply game theory to model human behaviour in ways that reflect the special nature of sociality & individuality. It continues its in-depth look at cooperation in teams, agent-based simulations, experimental economics, & the evolution & diffusion of preferences.

It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.

Game theory, defined in the broadest sense, is a collection of mathematical models designed for the analysis of strategic aspects of situations of conflict and cooperation in a broad spectrum of fields including economics, politics, biology, engineering, and operations research. This book, besides covering the classical results of game theory, places special emphasis on methods of determining `solutions' of various game models. Generalizations reaching beyond the `convexity paradigm' and leading to nonconvex optimization problems are enhanced and discussed in more detail than in standard texts on this subject. The development is theoretical-mathematical interspersed with elucidating interpretations and examples. Audience: The material in the book is accessible to PhD and graduate students and will also be of interest to researchers. Solid knowledge of standard undergraduate mathematics is required to read the book.

A graduate-level, mathematically rigorous introduction to strategic behavior in a networked world. This introductory graduate-level text uses tools from game theory and graph theory to examine the role of network structures and network effects in economic and information markets. The goal is for students to develop an intuitive and mathematically rigorous understanding of how strategic agents interact in a connected world. The text synthesizes some of the central results in the field while also simplifying their treatment to make them more accessible to nonexperts. Thus, students at the introductory level will gain an understanding of key ideas in the field that are usually only taught at the advanced graduate level. The book introduces basic concepts from game theory and graph theory as well as some fundamental algorithms for exploring graphs. These tools are then applied to analyze strategic interactions over social networks, to explore different types of markets and mechanisms for networks, and to study the role of beliefs and higher-level beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). Specific topics discussed include coordination and contagion on social networks, traffic networks, matchings and matching markets, exchange networks, auctions, voting, web search, models of belief and knowledge, and how beliefs affect auctions and markets. An appendix offers a “Primer on Probability.” Mathematically rigorous, the text assumes a level of mathematical maturity (comfort with definitions and proofs) in the reader.