Pritchard describes the domestic and international political circumstances in France that gave rise to the expedition, outlining strategy and politics in the context of colonial defence and continental ambition. He reconstructs the events that contributed to the failure of the expedition - human and institutional weakness, weather, spoiled provisions, disease, and the death of the commanding admiral. Anatomy of a Naval Disaster exposes the ambitions and frailties of men, the arbitrariness of success, and the limits of power in the eighteenth century.

From the author of "Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century" and "The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509-1815", this book serves as a single- volume survey of war at sea and the expansion of naval power in the 18th century. The book is intended for undergraduate courses on 18th century European history, and for amateur and professional military historians, and for navy colleges, and navy and ex-navy professionals.

The second edition of Historical Dictionary of the United States Navy covers U.S. Naval developments, personnel, and engagements from the colonial times to the present day. This is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, an extensive bibliography, and over 600 cross-referenced dictionary entries on people, places, events and other terminology of the Navy. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the United States Navy.

Explores the varied relationship between political leaders and naval experts, from the 16th to 21st centuries The shaping of national defence strategies is particularly difficult in the case of navies. Few political leaders have naval experience, in contrast to the case of armies where political leaders and army commanders have often shared similar social and professional backgrounds. Bringing together historical examples from Britain, the United States, Spain and France, the book provides insights into this key relationship.The authors highlight factors which have made for successful relationships between political leaders and naval experts, showing how changing circumstances have affected the dialogue and underlines the importance of good exchange of knowledge, expertise and understanding for successful policy making and strategic outcomes. Sea power continues to be crucial in the present world's increasingly unstable geopolitical situation, the mutual exchange of expertise between naval experts and political leaders is as important as ever, and the risk of political 'sea blindness' remains high. This book's historical examples provide good guidance on how to manage the relationship between political leaders and naval experts well.al leaders is as important as ever, and the risk of political 'sea blindness' remains high. This book's historical examples provide good guidance on how to manage the relationship between political leaders and naval experts well.al leaders is as important as ever, and the risk of political 'sea blindness' remains high. This book's historical examples provide good guidance on how to manage the relationship between political leaders and naval experts well.al leaders is as important as ever, and the risk of political 'sea blindness' remains high. This book's historical examples provide good guidance on how to manage the relationship between political leaders and naval experts well.

Charting Northern Waters also offers a detailed review of Russian hydrography on their northern coast from 1900 to 1940 and an in-depth discussion of American oceanographic work in the north in 1951. Other topics include the Labrador survey of HMS Challenger in 1932-34, German hydrographic and oceanographic support of the U-boat campaign in Canadian waters during World War II, and Canadian technical developments over the past fifty years.

Shows how the system of supply was perfected during the later part of the Napoleonic Wars, enabling fleets to stay at sea on a permanent basis. After the Battle of Trafalgar, the navy continued to be the major arm of British strategy. Decades of practice and refinement had rendered it adept at executing operations - fighting battles, blockading and convoying - across theglobe. And yet, as late as 1807, fleets were forced from their stations due to an ineffective provisioning system. The Transformation of British Naval Strategy shows how sweeping administrative reforms enacted between 1808and 1812 established a highly-effective logistical system, changing an ineffective supply system into one which successfully enabled a fleet to remain on station for as long as was required. James Davey examines the logistical support provided for fleets sent to Northern Europe during the Napoleonic War and shows how this new supply system successfully transformed naval operations, enabling the navy to pursue crucial objectives of national importance, protect essential exports and imports and attack the economies of the Napoleonic Empire. The Transformation of British Naval Strategy is a detailed study of national policy, administrative and political reform and strategic viability. It delves into the nature of the British state, its relationship with the private sector and its ability to reform itself in a time of war. Bureaucratic restructuring represented the last stage in a century-long process of logistical improvement. As a result of the reforms, the navy was able to conduct operations beyond the realms of possibility even twenty years earlier and saw the reach of its power transformed. Military and Napoleonic historians will find this book invaluable. JAMES DAVEY is Research Curator at the National Maritime Museum and Visiting Lecturer at the University of Greenwich, where he teaches British naval history.

Ian K. Steele's pioneering work in imperial and early North American history was a pivotal contribution to the establishment of Atlantic history as a field. His study of a unified English - and later British - Atlantic challenged American exceptionalism and encouraged the current wave of interest in Atlantic studies.

Following the disastrous Java Sea campaign, the Allies went on the offensive in the Pacific in a desperate attempt to halt the Japanese forces that were rampaging across the region. With the conquest of Australia a very real possibility, the stakes were high. Their target: the Japanese-held Solomon Islands, in particular the southern island of Guadalcanal. Hamstrung by arcane pre-war thinking and a bureaucratic mind-set, the US Navy had to adapt on the fly in order to compete with the mighty Imperial Japanese Navy, whose ingenuity and creativity thus far had fostered the creation of its Pacific empire. Starting with the amphibious assault on Savo Island, the campaign turned into an attritional struggle where the evenly matched foes sought to grind out a victory. Following on from his hugely successful book Rising Sun, Falling Skies, Jeffrey R. Cox tells the gripping story of the first Allied offensive of the Pacific War, as they sought to prevent Japan from cutting off Australia and regaining dominance in the Pacific.

The Battle of Midway is traditionally held as the point when Allied forces gained advantage over the Japanese. In Islands of Destiny, acclaimed historian and military intelligence expert John Prados points out that the Japanese forces quickly regained strength after Midway and continued their assault undaunted. Taking this surprising fact as the start of his inquiry, he began to investigate how and when the Pacific tide turned in the Allies’ favor. Using archives of WWII intelligence reports from both sides, Prados offers up a compelling reassessment of the true turning in the Pacific: not Midway, but the fight for the Solomon Islands. Combat in the Solomons saw a series of surface naval battles, including one of the key battleship-versus-battleship actions of the war; two major carrier actions; daily air duels, including the aerial ambush in which perished the famous Japanese naval commander Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku; and many other hair-raising exploits. Commencing with the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal, Prados shows how and why the Allies beat Japan on the sea, in the air, and in the jungles.