This collection of documents traces the relationship between the Royal Navy and the United States Navy from Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 until the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

The account in this volume begins with Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham’s assumption of the First Sea Lordship on 5 October 1943, and concludes with the formal surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945. This volume is entitled Anglo-American-Canadian Naval Relations, 1943-1945, for the very good reason that, by the end of the war, the Royal Canadian Navy was the third largest in the world, after its two great partners, and Canadian naval and air forces played a major role in anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic, and rendered important service also in other theatres. The period covered by this volume was the time in which victory was forged and the three major Allies enjoyed an almost unbroken series of maritime triumphs. In Part I, the relationships of the senior commanders, their services and their countries are discussed. Part II deals with the last stage of the fight against the U-boats, a war which by 1943 had spread to most of the world’s seas. Part III deals with the Western Allies’ eventual return to North West Europe. In Part IV, the final operations in the Mediterranean, including the landings in Southern France and at Anzio in Italy, are covered. Part V recounts the participation of the British Pacific Fleet in the concluding operations against Japan.

This “uncommonly astute study” examines the early development of the US-UK military alliance that would eventually lead to victory in WWII (Paul Miles, author of FDR’s Admiral). On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft sank the American gunboat Panay outside Nanjing, China. Although the Japanese apologized, President Roosevelt set Captain Royal Ingersoll to London to begin conversations with the British admiralty about Japanese aggression in the Far East. While few Americans remember the Panay Incident, it was the start of what would become the “Special Relationship” between the United States and Great Britain. In The Origins of the Grand Alliance, William T. Johnsen provides the first comprehensive analysis of Anglo-American military collaboration before the Second World War. He sets the stage by examining Anglo-French and Anglo-American coalition military planning from 1900 through World War I and the interwar years. Johnsen also considers the formulation of policy and grand strategy, operational planning, and the creation of the command structure and channels of communication. He addresses vitally important logistical and materiel issues, particularly the difficulties of war production. Drawn from extensive sources and private papers held in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, Johnsen’s exhaustively researched study casts new light on the twentieth century’s most significant alliance.

This collection examines the complex struggle for supremacy conducted between the United States and Britain in the decade following World War I. The aim is to throw light on a crucial period in the history of British and American foreign policy and on 20th-century international affairs.

During the crucial period of 1917-1918, the United States superseded Great Britain as the premier power in the world. The differing strategic perspectives of London and Washington were central to the tensions and misunderstandings that separated the two dominant powers in 1918 and determined how these two countries would interact following the Armistice. David R. Woodward traces the projection of American military power to western Europe and analyzes in depth the strategic goals of the American political and military leadership in this first comprehensive study of Anglo-American relations in the land war in Europe. Based on extensive research in British and American archives, the study focuses on Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George, whose relationship was poisoned by the mutual suspicion and hostility generated by their disagreements over strategy and military policy. President Wilson sought to use his country's military effort in western Europe as a tool to gain acceptance for his "new diplomacy." The British, anxious over the Turko-German threat to Asia and their worsening manpower situation, sought to utilize American military intervention for their own political/military purposes. Woodward's use of unpublished sources provides new perspectives on war leadership, and his analysis of the British-American interaction serves as a case study of the inevitable tension between national self-interest and efforts at collective security, even among nations that share many cultural and political values. For historians and anyone interested in military history and World War I, Trial by Friendship fills a gap in the study of Anglo-American relations by providing a strong, well- written study on an area of American history that has received scant attention from scholars.

This is the first scholarly book examining naval coalition warfare over the past two centuries from a multi-national perspective. Containing case studies by some of the foremost naval historians from the US, Great Britain, and Australia, it also examines the impact of international law on coalitions. Together these collected essays comprise a comprehensive examination of the most important naval coalitions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chapters are arranged chronologically, beginning with the Napoleonic Wars, and ending with the second Gulf War, and each makes use of new research and methodologies to address the creation of the coalition, its actions, and its short- and long-term repercussions. The editors draw contemporary lessons from the book’s historical case studies. These findings are used to discuss the likelihood and character of future naval coalition; for example, the likelihood and possible outcome of an anti-PRC coalition in defence of Taiwan. Naval Coalition Warfare will be of great interest to students of naval history, strategic studies, international history and international relations in general.

The relationship of the United States and Great Britain has been the subject of numerous studies with a particular emphasis on the idea of a special relationship based on traditional common ties of language, history, and political affinity. Although certainly special, Anglo-American cooperation arose from mutual necessity. Soybel examines the special relationship through a new lens—that of the most intimate of wartime collaborations, the naval intelligence relationship. Rather than looking at the uses of intelligence and espionage, Soybel explores how the cooperation was established and maintained, particularly through the creation of administrative bureaucracies, as well as how World War I and pre-war efforts helped pave the way towards wartime cooperation. The development of the wartime cooperation in naval intelligence between 1939 and 1943 highlights the best and worst of the alliance and shows both its advantages and its limitations. It demonstrates that the Anglo-American partnership during World War II was a necessary one, and its intimacy demanded by the exigencies of the total war then being fought. Its problems were the result of traditional conflicts based on economics, imperial concerns, and national interests. Its successes found their bases in individual partnerships formed during the war, not in the overall one given mythical status by men like Winston Churchill. While still giving credit to the unique alliance that has survived in the last fifty years, this study shows that the close ties were necessary, not special.

U.S. and British naval power developed in quite different ways in the early 20th century before the Second World War. This study compares, contrasts, and evaluates both British and American naval power as well as the politics that led to the development of each. Naval power was the single greatest manifestation of national power for both countries. Their armies were small and their air forces only existed for part of the period covered. For Great Britain, naval power was vital to her very existence, and for the U.S., naval power was far and away the most effective tool the country could use to exercise armed influence around the world. Therefore, the decisions made about the relative strengths of the two navies were in many ways the most important strategic choices the British and American governments ever made. An important book for military historians and those interested in the exercise and the extension of power.

A navy is a state's main instrument of maritime force. What it should do, what doctrine it holds, what ships it deploys, and how it fights are determined by practical political and military choices in relation to national needs. Choices are made according to the state's goals, perceived threat, maritime opportunity, technological capabilities, practical experience, and, not the least, the way the sea service defines itself and its way of war. This book is a history of the modern U.S. Navy. It explains how the Navy, in the century after 1890, was formed and reformed in the interaction of purpose, experience, and doctrine.

This book is based on the Wiles lectures for 1981 delivered at the Queen's University of Belfast in October 1981. It is not a history of Anglo-American relations in the century; its theme deals with how the United States of America came to replace Britain as the primary world and oceanic power confronting a grouping of land-based continental powers, the position Britain occupied throughout the nineteenth century. This theme is examined in the light of how the process of replacement was conceived and perceived by those groups which had the primary responsibility for the formulation and conduct of foreign relations in each of the two powers, Britain and America. The author, whose earlier study of 1965 of the British foreign-policy-making elites pioneered this approach in Britain, argues the existence and continuity over much of this century of similar groups in the United States.