This study examines the nature of the defense at the operational level of war by analyzing the Battle of the Bulge in Dec. 1944 using the concepts of blitzkrieg and "web" defense. The monograph begins by discussing the influence of defensive theory on the operational concepts of blitzkrieg and "web" defense. The German concept of blitzkrieg incorporates Clausewitz’s theory of the offense by emphasizing surprise, speed, and concentration at the decisive point. The counter to the blitzkrieg offense is found in COL F.O. Miksche’s concept of "web" defense. The Battle of the Bulge provides an excellent example of a "web" defense pitted against a blitzkrieg offense. The German blitzkrieg in the Ardennes in 1944 failed for many reasons: 1) Army Group B did not concentrate its strength against the most vulnerable section of the Allied line; 2) The rugged Ardennes terrain could be easily defended against attacks by mechanized forces; 3) Key American commanders (Eisenhower, Gerow, and Middleton) quickly recognized the value of holding several key road junctions (St. Vith, Malmedy, Bastogne, Marche, and Rochefort) which dominated movement through the Ardennes; 4) The Allies held the shoulders of the German penetration; 5) The Allies quickly concentrated armored and motorized units to blunt the German penetration; and 6) Army Group B lacked operational reserves and adequate logistic support. The analysis of the Ardennes shows that the defense is indeed the stronger form of war and that a "web" defense can be employed effectively against a blitzkrieg offense...The Allies effectively used a "web" defense to counter these threats. If NATO is to defeat a Soviet attack without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, it must adopt a viable operational defensive concept. "Web" defense is such a concept.

This study examines the nature of the defense at the operational level of war by analyzing the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 using the concepts of blitzkrieg and web defense. The monograph begins by discussing the influence of defensive theory on the operational concepts of blitzkrieg and web defense. The German concept of blitzkrieg incorporates Clausewitz's theory of the offense by emphasizing suprise, speed, and concentration at the decisive point. The counter to the blitzkrieg offense is found in COL F.O. Miksche's concept of web defense. This concept incorporates Clausewitz's theory of the defense by emphasizing the advantages of terrain, time, and counterattack. The Battle of the Bulge provides an excellent example of a web defense pitted against a blitzkrieg offense. The Ardennes provides an excellent example of many important German operational concepts which are very similar to Soviet offensive concepts. The use of COL Otto Skorzeny's 150th Panzer Brigade is very similar to the anticipated Soviet employment of Spetsnaz units into NATO's rear area. German panzer divisions were employed in a role similar to Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG). The Allies effectively used a web defense to counter these threats. If NATO is to defeat a Soviet attack without resorting to the use fo nuclear weapons, it must adopt a viable operational defensive concept. Web defense is such a concept.

A new assessment of the Battle of the Bulge, the largest and bloodiest battle fought by U.S. forces in World War II, offers a balanced perspective that considers both the German and American viewpoints and discusses the failings of intelligence; Hitler's strategic grasp; effects of weather and influence of terrain; and differences in weaponry, understanding of aerial warfare, and doctrine.

In the winter of 1944–1945, Hitler sought to divide Allied forces in the heavily forested Ardennes region of Luxembourg and Belgium. He deployed more than 400,000 troops in one of the last major German offensives of the war, which became known as the Battle of the Bulge, in a desperate attempt to regain the strategic initiative in the West. Hitler’s effort failed for a variety of reasons, but many historians assert that Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.’s Third Army was ultimately responsible for securing Allied victory. Although Patton has assumed a larger-than-life reputation for his leadership in the years since World War II, scholars have paid little attention to his generalship in the Ardennes following the relief of Bastogne. In Advance and Destroy, Captain John Nelson Rickard explores the commander’s operational performance during the entire Ardennes campaign, through his “estimate of the situation,” the U.S. Army’s doctrinal approach to problem-solving. Patton’s day-by-day situational understanding of the Battle of the Bulge, as revealed through ULTRA intelligence and the influence of the other Allied generals on his decision-making, gives readers an in-depth, critical analysis of Patton’s overall effectiveness, measured in terms of mission accomplishment, his ability to gain and hold ground, and a cost-benefit analysis of his operations relative to the lives of his soldiers. The work not only debunks myths about one of America’s most controversial generals but provides new insights into his renowned military skill and colorful personality.

Smallholder farmers and pastoralists fulfil an invaluable yet undervalued role in conserving biodiversity. They act as guardians of locally adapted livestock breeds that can make use of even marginal environments under tough climatic conditions and therefore are a crucial resource for food security. But in addition, by sustaining animals on natural vegetation and as part of local ecosystems, these communities also make a significant contribution to the conservation of wild biodiversity and of cultural landscapes. This publication provides a glimpse into the often intricate knowledge systems that pastoralists and smallholder farmers have developed for the management of their breeds in specific production systems and it also describes the multitude of threats and challenges these often marginalized communities have to cope with.

Operations research grew out of the application of the scientific method to certain problems of war during World War II. This book tells the story of how operations research became an important activity in the Eighth Air Force. It emphasizes the people involved in these historical events, rather than the technical matters with which they dealt.

In December 1944, just as World War II appeared to be winding down, Hitler shocked the world with a powerful German counteroffensive that cracked the center of the American front. The attack came through the Ardennes, the hilly and forested area in eastern Belgium and Luxembourg that the Allies had considered a “quiet” sector. Instead, for the second time in the war, the Germans used it as a stealthy avenue of approach for their panzers. Much of U.S. First Army was overrun, and thousands of prisoners were taken as the Germans forged a 50-mile “bulge” into the Allied front. But in one small town, Bastogne, American paratroopers, together with remnants of tank units, offered dogged resistance. Meanwhile the rest of Eisenhower’s “broad front” strategy came to a halt as Patton, from the south, and Hodges, from the north, converged on the enemy incursion. Yet it would take an epic, six-week-long winter battle, the bloodiest in the history of the U.S. Army, before the Germans were finally pushed back. Christer Bergström has interviewed veterans, gone through huge amounts of archive material, and performed on-the-spot research in the area. The result is a large amount of previously unpublished material and new findings, including reevaluations of tank and personnel casualties and the most accurate picture yet of what really transpired. The Ardennes Offensive has often been described from the American point of view; however, this balanced book devotes equal attention to the perspectives of both sides. With nearly 400 photos, numerous maps, and 32 superb color profiles of combat vehicles and aircraft, it provides perhaps the most comprehensive look at the battle yet published.