This major new work fundamentally reassesses the operations by the Western allies to deliver war supplies to Russia via the Arctic sea route between 1941 and 1945. It explores the motives underpinning Western aid, its real impact on the Soviet war effort, and its influence on wider Allied and German strategy as the war developed. It brings to life key participants, political and military, describes the interaction of intelligence with high policy and tactics, and brings a fresh perspective to key events, including the notorious convoy PQ 17. The book disputes the long-standing view that aid to Russia was essentially discretionary, lacking military rationale and undertaken primarily to meet political objectives, with only a minor impact on Soviet war potential. It shows that aid was always grounded in strategic necessity, with the Arctic supply route a constant preoccupation of British and American leaders, absorbing perhaps twenty per cent of Royal Navy resources after 1941 and a significant share of Allied merchant shipping badly needed in other theaters. The Soviet claim, determinedly promoted through the Cold War, that aid was marginal, still influences attitudes in Vladimir Putin’s Russia and contemporary Western opinion. It even resonates through the present war in Ukraine. Andrew Boyd demonstrates that in reality, Western aid through the Arctic was a critical multiplier of Soviet military power throughout the war and perhaps even enabled Russia’s very survival in 1942; and he makes plain that the British contribution to the aid effort was greater than generally acknowledged. The book also emphasises that the Arctic conflict was not framed solely by the supply convoys, important though they were. British, German and Russian operations in a theater – defined by Adolph Hitler in early 1942 as the ‘zone of destiny’ – were shaped by other perceived opportunities and threats. For instance, Germany concentrated its fleet in Norway to forestall a potential British attack while attempting land offensives to cut Russia’s links with its northern ports. It also had vital raw materials to protect. Britain explored potential operations with Russia to dislodge Germany from the Arctic coast and sever her access to important resources. Elegantly written written and incorporating many new perspectives on the Arctic theater, this new work should find a place on the shelves of every historian, scholar and enthusiast whose interests extend to the Russian dimension of the Second World War.

Arms for Russia and the Naval War in the Arctic, 1941-1945 fundamentally reassesses the operations by the Western Allies to deliver war supplies to Russia via the Arctic sea route between 1941 and 1945. It explores the motives underpinning Western aid, its real impact on the Soviet war effort, and its influence on wider Allied and German strategy as the war developed. It brings to life key participants, political and military, describes the interaction of intelligence with high policy and tactics, and brings a fresh perspective to key events, including the notorious convoy PQ 17. It also emphasizes that the Arctic conflict was not framed solely by the supply convoys, important though they were. British, German and Russian operations in a theater - defined by Adolph Hitler in early 1942 as the "zone of destiny" - were shaped by other perceived opportunities and threats. For instance, Germany concentrated its fleet in Norway to forestall a potential British attack while attempting land offensives to cut Russia's links with its northern ports. It also had vital raw materials to protect. Britain explored potential operations with Russia to dislodge Germany from the Arctic coast and sever her access to important resources. The book disputes the long-standing view that aid to Russia was essentially discretionary, lacking military rationale and undertaken primarily to meet political objectives, with only a minor impact on Soviet war potential. It shows that aid was always grounded in strategic necessity, with the Arctic supply route a constant preoccupation of British and American leaders, absorbing perhaps twenty percent of Royal Navy resources after 1941 and a significant share of Allied merchant shipping badly needed in other theaters. The Soviet claim, determinedly promoted through the Cold War, that aid was marginal, still influences attitudes in Vladimir Putin's Russia and contemporary Western opinion. It even resonates through the present war in Ukraine. Andrew Boyd demonstrates that in reality, Western aid through the Arctic was a critical multiplier of Soviet military power throughout the war and perhaps even enabled Russia's very survival in 1942; and he makes plain that the British contribution to the aid effort was greater than generally acknowledged. Elegantly written and incorporating many new perspectives on the Arctic theater, this new work should find a place on the shelves of every historian, scholar and enthusiast whose interests extend to the Russian dimension of the Second World War.

A gripping examination of the Battle of the Barents Sea, fought in the near darkness and icy cold of the northern winter, in which the Kriegsmarine sought to sever the crucial Allied Arctic Convoy route once and for all. The Arctic convoys that passed through the cold, dangerous waters of the Barents Sea formed a vital lifeline – a strategic link in tanks, supplies and above all goodwill between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. In December 1942, under Operation Regenbogen (Rainbow), the German Kriegsmarine sought to strike a crippling blow on the Arctic convoys and finally sever this all-important sea route. In this fascinating work, renowned naval expert Angus Konstam documents the fate of the Allied Convoy JW 51B as it came under attack from some of the Kriegsmarine's most powerful surface warships – a pocket battleship, a heavy cruiser and six destroyers. Illustrated with stunning battlescene artworks, maps, 3D diagrams and photographs, it explores the David and Goliath struggle between the Allied ships defending the convoy and the powerful German force, until the arrival of the two British cruisers tipped the balance of power. The Battle of the Barents Sea, fought amid snowstorms and the darkness of the Arctic night, would prove to be a turning point in the hard-fought war in northern waters, and would test Hitler's patience with his surface fleet to the limit.

The story of Allied merchant ships and crews who braved the frigid far north to extend a lifeline to Russia, filled with “sheer heroism and brazen drama” (Literary Review). During the last four years of the Second World War, the Western Allies secured Russian defenses against Germany by supplying vital food and arms. The plight of those in Murmansk and Archangel who benefited is now well known, but few are aware of the courage, determination, and sacrifice of Allied merchant ships, which withstood unremitting U-boat attacks and aerial bombardment to maintain the lifeline to Russia. In the storms, fog, and numbing cold of the Arctic, where the sinking of a ten thousand–ton freighter was equal to a land battle in terms of destruction, the losses sustained were huge. Told from the perspective of their crews, this is the inspiring story of the long-suffering merchant ships without which Russia would almost certainly have fallen to Nazi Germany.

A comprehensive history of the Royal Navy’s naval aviation component’s campaigns during World War II. For the first time, this book tells the story of how naval air operations evolved into a vital element of the Royal Navy’s ability to fight a three-dimensional war against both the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. An integral part of RN, the Fleet Air Arm was not a large organization, with only 406 pilots and 232 front-line aircraft available for operations in September 1939. Nevertheless, its impact far outweighed its numbers—it was an RN fighter that shot down the first enemy aircraft of the war, and an RN pilot was the first British fighter “ace” with 5 or more kills. The Fleet Air Arm’s rollcall of achievements in northern waters went on to include the Norwegian Campaign, the crippling of Bismarck, the gallant sortie against Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as they passed through the Channel, air attacks on enemy E-boats in the narrow seas, air cover for the Russian convoys, air attacks that disabled Tirpitz, and strikes and minelaying operations against German shipping in the Norwegian littoral that continued until May 1945. By the end of the war in Europe the FAA had grown to 3243 pilots and 1336 aircraft. This book sets all these varied actions within their proper naval context and both technical and tactical aspects are explained with “thumbnail” descriptions of aircraft, their weapons and avionics. Cross reference with the Fleet Air Arm Roll of Honour has been made for the first time to put names to those aircrew killed in action wherever possible as a mark of respect for their determination against enemy forces on, above and below the sea surface which more often than not outnumbered them. The Fleet Air Arm and the War in Europe completes David Hobbs’s much-praised six-volume series chronicling the operational history of British naval aviation from the earliest days to the present. Praise for The Fleet Air Arm and the War in Europe “In this masterly addition to his series on the Fleet Air Arm at war, David Hobbs addresses naval air operations in the Atlantic, the North Sea, the Arctic, and the English Channel.” —Professor Andrew Lambert, Warship 2023 “With lots of action it rattles along and is a very good read.” —The Armourer Magazine, May 2022

During the Second World War over 250 Allied warships from a dozen navies were sent to the bottom by German U-boats. This ground-breaking study provides a detailed analysis of every sinking for which source material survives from both the Allied and the German sides, resulting in detailed treatment of the fate of 110 vessels, with the remainder summarised in an extensive appendix. Uniquely, each entry is built around a specialist translation of the relevant segment of the war diary (log) of the U-boat in question, taken directly from the surviving originals – remarkably, this represents the first large-scale publication of the U-boat war diaries in any language. The book offers a wealth of new information, not only with respect to the circumstances of the sinkings from both the Allied and German perspectives, but also to the technical environment in which they lived as well as the fate of the crews. The entries include background details on the vessels concerned and the men involved, with a selection of rare and carefully chosen photos from archives and collections around the world. Each entry is itself a compelling narrative, but is backed with a list of sources consulted, including documents, published works and websites. A decade in the making, this is probably the most important book on the U-boat war to be published for many a year

While the experiences of the men and ships who sailed in the Allied convoys to North Russia between August 1941 and May 1945 have been fully documented, the wider political, diplomatic and military factors which determined the campaign are less well known. The principal actors Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin each had their own agendas and expectations, influenced by advisers and competing national priorities. These inevitably gave rise to differences putting pressure in turn on the convoy program while the varying effectiveness of German counter-action was a significant and unpredictable factor. 1942 was dominated by pressure on Churchill from Roosevelt and Stalin to increase the size of convoys at a time when the Royal Navy lacked the necessary escorts. This deficiency was exacerbated by heavy merchant shipping losses and the demands of Operation TORCH. The temporary convoy suspension in 1943 followed the deployment of German heavy warships to Norway and the diversion of escorts to Operation HUSKY. A serious Anglo-Soviet rift, which led to Allied threats to discontinue the program, was only resolved by lengthy negotiations. It resumed until temporarily suspended due to the D-Day landings after which the increasing escort availability allowed operations to run uninterrupted until May 1945. This carefully researched work providing an overview of the strategic factors dominating the costly yet war-winning Arctic convoy program will be welcomed by experts and laymen alike.

By any standards Mick Stoke’s experiences in the Royal Navy during the Second World War were remarkable. Aged nineteen, he was ‘Mentioned in Despatches’ and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his courage during incessant bombing during the Siege of Tobruk. He survived multiple torpedo attacks, firstly serving on the cruiser Glasgow, which was hit twice; on the battleship Queen Elizabeth at sea and blown up by human torpedoes at Alexandria; and on HMS Hardy, struck in January 1944, while escorting Russian Arctic Convoy JW56B. In 1942, he was serving on HMS Carlisle during the fiercely fought Malta convoys and took part in the Battle of Sirte. Later that year he was awarded the MBE ‘for outstanding bravery, resource and devotion to duty during very heavy bombing’ at the port of Bone during Operation TORCH. He went on to serve at D-Day and later in the Pacific on HMS Rajah. It is a privilege to read Mick Stoke’s graphic and modest memoir. Readers will appreciate and understand how he became ‘The Most Highly Decorated Paymaster Midshipman in the Royal Navy’.

How British naval power in the Indian Ocean played a critical early role in WWII: “Commands the reader's attention. . . . a history game-changer.” —Warship, Naval Books of the Year This new work tells the compelling story of how the Royal Navy secured the strategic space from Egypt in the west to Australasia in the East through the first half of the Second World War—and explains why this contribution, made while Russia’s fate remained in the balance and before American economic power took effect, was so critical. Without it, the war would certainly have lasted longer and decisive victory might have proved impossible. After the protection of the Atlantic lifeline, this was surely the Royal Navy’s finest achievement, the linchpin of victory. The book moves authoritatively between grand strategy, intelligence, accounts of specific operations, and technical assessment of ships and weapons. It challenges established perceptions of Royal Navy capability and will change the way we think about Britain’s role and contribution in the first half of the war. The Navy of 1939 was stronger than usually suggested and British intelligence did not fail against Japan. Nor was the Royal Navy outmatched by Japan, coming very close to a British Midway off Ceylon in 1942. And it was the Admiralty, demonstrating a reckless disregard for risks, that caused the loss of Force Z in 1941. The book also lays stress on the key part played by the American relationship in Britain’s Eastern naval strategy. Superbly researched and elegantly written, it adds a hugely important dimension to our understanding of the war in the East.

Naval Warfare 1919–45 is a comprehensive history of the war at sea from the end of the Great War to the end of World War Two. Showing the bewildering nature and complexity of the war facing those charged with fighting it around the world, this book ranges far and wide: sweeping across all naval theatres and those powers performing major, as well as minor, roles within them. Armed with the latest material from an extensive set of sources, Malcolm H. Murfett has written an absorbing as well as a comprehensive reference work. He demonstrates that superior equipment and the best intelligence, ominous power and systematic planning, vast finance and suitable training are often simply not enough in themselves to guarantee the successful outcome of a particular encounter at sea. Sometimes the narrow difference between victory and defeat hinges on those infinite variables: the individual’s performance under acute pressure and sheer luck. Naval Warfare 1919–45 is an analytical and interpretive study which is an accessible and fascinating read both for students and for interested members of the general public.