"The U.S. Army before 1945 did not have and did not need a formal readiness reporting system. After World War II, however, it found itself committed to large-scale deployments in Europe and in the Pacific, commitments that with the Cold War would continue for the next 45 years. The demands of this war, along with the wars in Korea and Vietnam, made it vital that senior service leaders had accurate information on the readiness of units in the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. The methods for measuring readiness, however, soon became and then remained a matter of contention. Equally contentious was the use of data generated by readiness reporting systems, both within the service and by others outside the service. The end of the Cold War did not end these disputes. Indeed, the years between that victory and the start of the second Iraq war in 2003 were a time of heightened concern over military readiness and how to assess it."--Provided by publisher.

What happens to the US Army after the battles are over, the citizen soldiers depart, and all that remains is the Regular Army? In this pathbreaking work, Brian Linn argues that in each decade following every major conflict since the War of 1812 the postwar army has undergone a long, painful, and remarkably consistent recovery process as it struggled to build a new model force to replace the “Old Army” that entered the conflict. Departing from the Washington-centric institutional histories of the past, Linn sets his focus on soldiering in the field, distilling the lived experiences of officers and troopers who were responsible for cleaning up the messes left in the wake of war. Real Soldiering provides the first comprehensive study of the US Army’s transition from war to peace. It is both a wide-ranging history of the army’s postwar experience and a work detailing the commonalities of American soldiering over almost two centuries. Linn challenges three common historical interpretations: confusing Washington policy with implementation in the field; conflating postwar armies with prewar armies; and describing certain postwar eras as distinct and transformational. Rather, Linn examines the postwar force as a distinct entity worthy of study as a unique and important part of US Army history. He identifies the common dilemmas faced by the service in the aftermath of every war. These problems included such military priorities as defense legislation, preparing for the next war, and adapting to new missions. But they also incorporated often overlooked—but for those who lived through them more important—consistencies such as officer acquisition and career management, personnel turbulence, insufficient personnel and equipment, and many others. Real Soldiering represents over four decades of research into the US Army and is deeply informed by Linn’s experiences teaching and working with soldiers. It breaks new ground in lifting out the similarities of each postwar army while still appreciating their individual complexities. It identifies the leaders and the methods the service employed to escape the inevitable postwar drawdowns. Insightful and entertaining, provocative and empathetic, and a work of history with immediate relevance, Real Soldiering will resonate with military historians, defense analysts, and those who have proudly worn the US Army uniform.

On Sept. 14, 2001, Pres. Bush proclaimed that a national emergency existed by reason of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Under Sect. 12302 of title 10, U.S. Code, the Pres. is allowed to call up to 1 million Nat. Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. The GAO was asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following 9/11. GAO examined (1) whether the DoD followed existing operation plans when mobilizing forces; (2) the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over the mobilization process; and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. Also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces, which make up over 98% of non-retired reservists, were available. Makes recommendations.

"The U.S. Army before 1945 did not have and did not need a formal readiness reporting system. After World War II, however, it found itself committed to large-scale deployments in Europe and in the Pacific, commitments that with the Cold War would continue for the next 45 years. The demands of this war, along with the wars in Korea and Vietnam, made it vital that senior service leaders had accurate information on the readiness of units in the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. The methods for measuring readiness, however, soon became and then remained a matter of contention. Equally contentious was the use of data generated by readiness reporting systems, both within the service and by others outside the service. The end of the Cold War did not end these disputes. Indeed, the years between that victory and the start of the second Iraq war in 2003 were a time of heightened concern over military readiness and how to assess it."--Provided by publisher.

In today's environment of rapidly evolving conflicts, the Army's goal is to have units that have the combat power of heavy units but that can be transported anywhere in the world in a matter of days. To address concerns about the armored vehicle fleet's aging and the difficulties involved in transporting it as well as to equip the Army more suitably to conduct operations overseas on short notice using forces based in the United States the service created the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in 2000. A major modernization effort, the program is designed in part to develop and purchase vehicles to replace those now in the heavy forces; the new vehicles would be much lighter, thereby easing the deployment of units equipped with them. In the analysis presented in this report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the current status of the Army's fleet of armored vehicles and assessed the speed of deployment of the service's heavy forces. It also evaluated the FCS program, considering the program's costs as well as its advantages and disadvantages and comparing it with several alternative plans for modernizing the Army's heavy forces.