Lon O. Nordeen has completely updated his 1985 chronicle of military aviation’s evolving role in warfare, now covering the major conflicts of the past four decades. He presents the historical and political background of each conflict and includes in-depth discussions of the aircraft, weapons, tactics, training, new systems, and other factors that influenced the outcome of each war. New and existing chapters have been enhanced with information based on recently declassified material—especially regarding Vietnam—and new sources in Egypt, Israel, and the former Soviet Union. As “smart” bombs have become more successful in reducing the risks for pilots and frontline troops, air-missile warfare has become the central player in military conflicts. Air Warfare in the Missile Age, Second Edition, is a valuable resource for understanding the evolution of modern air warfare.

Chaz Bowyer, arguably the most authoritative air historian of his generation, tackles the broad sweep of air operations in the European theatre in this book. Initially, the Luftwaffe attempted to dominate the skies, and very nearly succeeded. The valiant defence of the UK by the RAF in the Battle of Britain ranks among the greatest feats of arms in our country's history. The development of aircraft types and the descriptions of the actions that they and their pilots and crew fought make for great reading.

This book analyzes the way Israel has coped with nine wars of attrition from the 1950s to the recent Second Lebanon War (2006), questioning the belief that Western democracy cannot sustain prolonged wars of attrition. Challenging Israel with attrition has been compatible with the 'Arab way of war', which emphasizes staying power, and with the belief that democracies cannot tolerate wars of attrition, either economically or psychologically. Israel for its part developed a self-image of incapacity to sustain prolonged wars, committing itself to a traditional offensive approach to blitzkrieg, whenever possible. The book offers an account of nine wars of attrition that Israel was involved in over almost 60 years, from Palestinian infiltration and fedayeen activities against Israel in the early 1950s, through to the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The author uses these cases to challenge the myth that Israel cannot afford to become involved in a draining war of attrition. Focusing on central aspects typical of Western democracies engaged in wars of attrition – operational effectiveness; the societal staying power; the economic burden of the war; moral dilemmas; and conflict management problems - the book challenges the myth that Israel cannot afford to become involved in a draining war of attrition, while at the same time highlighting the fact that in its wars of attrition Israel has not always succeeded in avoiding undesired escalation. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, Israeli history, Middle Eastern politics, and security studies in general. Avi Kober is a member of the Department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel and is a Senior Research associate with the BESA Center for Strategic Studies.

Over the years, the United States Air Force takes much credit for bringing World War II to closure. The strategic bomber, eventually along with long range fighter, was put in the skies over Germany to gain air superiority and to disrupt the war making abilities of Germany and, in particular, the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe had to be neutralized before the invasion of Normandy could take place. Granted this was a necessary step. However, the Luftwaffe had already lost its fighting ability and the war through poor strategy and judgment long before the strategic bomber and the long range fighter could become factors in the war.

Colonel Wells investigates the nature of aerial warfare and the men who took part. The book analyzes aircrew selection, reaction to combat, adaptability to stress, morale, leadership and combat effectiveness, and compares the efforts of the US Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command.

A war of attrition is usually conceptualized as a bloody slogging match, epitomized by imagery of futile frontal assaults on the Western Front of the First World War. As such, many academics, politicians, and military officers currently consider attrition to be a wholly undesirable method of warfare. This first book-length study of wars of attrition challenges this viewpoint. A historical analysis of the strategic thought behind attrition demonstrates that it was often implemented to conserve casualties, not to engage in a bloody senseless assault. Moreover, attrition frequently proved an effective means of attaining a state's political aims in warfare, particularly in serving as a preliminary to decisive warfare, reducing risk of escalation, and coercing an opponent in negotiations. Malkasian analyzes the thought of commanders who implemented policies of attrition from 1789 to the present. His study includes figures central to the study of war, such as the Duke of Wellington, Carl von Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart, General William Slim, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgeway, and General William Westmoreland. While special attention is devoted to the Second World War in the Pacific and the Korean War, this study notes the utility of attrition during the Cold War, as the risk of a Third World War rendered more aggressive strategies unattractive. Increasingly, the United States finds itself facing conflicts that are not amenable to a decisive military solution in which opponents seek prolonged war that will inflict as many casualties as possible on American forces.

The Siege of Leningrad was one of the most brutal battles of the Second World War. The second largest and most populous city in the Soviet Union, Leningrad, now St. Petersburg, was one of the three priority targets of the German invasion, Operation Barbarossa. A total of 333 large military factories were concentrated in Leningrad and, accordingly, 565,000 workers lived there, producing tanks, aircraft, artillery and warships. On 10 July 1941, German tank divisions, having broken through the front south of the city of Pskov, reached the town of Luga. From there, Hitler’s forces had just over 110 miles to go to Leningrad. Meanwhile, the city was feverishly preparing for defense. Stalin’s deputies, Zhdanov and Voroshilov, planned to use the entire combat-ready population of Leningrad for that purpose. Believing that the city would soon be captured by the Germans, Stalin ordered the immediate evacuation of military factories and skilled workers from Leningrad to the East. Before the city was completely blockaded, most of the valuable equipment had been removed. However, the remaining civilian population, including about 400,000 children, were left to their fate. In early September 1941, German divisions supported by the Luftwaffe’s VIII Fliegerkorps, captured the town of Shlisselburg. Leningrad was now cut off from the rest of the Soviet Union. Hitler believed that the city would soon echo to the sound of German jackboots. Leningrad, however, did not give up. In the autumn of 1941, the Wehrmacht did not have enough forces to take the city and for three long years the main means of fighting its defenders were the Luftwaffe and long-range artillery. In September 1941, when the systematic bombing and shelling began, many thousands of families tried to leave Leningrad, but nearly all of the escape routes were cut off. Food supplies in the city sharply decreased. In this book the authors explore the full story of the German and Soviet aerial battles in the Leningrad sector during the siege. There are devastating details of the bombing of the starving population, numerous attempts by the Luftwaffe to destroy the Red Baltic Fleet, and air attacks against the ‘Road of Life’, along which vital food and ammunition were delivered to the city, and combats in the skies over Leningrad and its surroundings. Revealing what was happening in the air and on the ground, as well as in the German and Russian headquarters, the authors explain why, in spite of numerous successes, the Luftwaffe failed to help force the surrender of Leningrad.

This volume examines the military strategy and issues that Egyptian war planners faced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Of major interest is the relationship between the political and military leaders and how that affected the buildup and course of the conflict. Taking this as a starting place, the author concentrates on how Soviet military doctrinal changes presented themselves between the conclusion of the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War.

An overview of air power's history and effectiveness, by the top experts in the field