This volume guides the reader along a statistical journey that begins with the basic structure of Bayesian theory, and then provides details on most of the past and present advances in this field.

This highly acclaimed text, now available in paperback, provides a thorough account of key concepts and theoretical results, with particular emphasis on viewing statistical inference as a special case of decision theory. Information-theoretic concepts play a central role in the development of the theory, which provides, in particular, a detailed discussion of the problem of specification of so-called prior ignorance . The work is written from the authors s committed Bayesian perspective, but an overview of non-Bayesian theories is also provided, and each chapter contains a wide-ranging critical re-examination of controversial issues. The level of mathematics used is such that most material is accessible to readers with knowledge of advanced calculus. In particular, no knowledge of abstract measure theory is assumed, and the emphasis throughout is on statistical concepts rather than rigorous mathematics. The book will be an ideal source for all students and researchers in statistics, mathematics, decision analysis, economic and business studies, and all branches of science and engineering, who wish to further their understanding of Bayesian statistics

Bayesian methods are growing more and more popular, finding new practical applications in the fields of health sciences, engineering, environmental sciences, business and economics and social sciences, among others. This book explores the use of Bayesian analysis in the statistical estimation of the unknown phenomenon of interest. The contents demonstrate that where such methods are applicable, they offer the best possible estimate of the unknown. Beyond presenting Bayesian theory and methods of analysis, the text is illustrated with a variety of applications to real world problems.

Summary A Bayesian Theory of Games introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium concept: Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). The new equilibrium concept achieves consistencies in results among different types of games that current games theory at times fails to. BEIC requires players to make predictions on the strategies of other players starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with Bayesian statistical decision theoretic and game theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. In a BEIC, conjectures are consistent with the equilibrium or equilibriums they supported and so rationality is achieved for actions, strategies and beliefs and (statistical) decision rule. Given its ability to typically select only a unique equilibrium in games, the BEIC approach is capable of analyzing a larger set of games than current games theory, including games with noisy inaccurate observations and games with multiple sided incomplete information games. Key Features Provides a unified and consistent analysis of many categories of games. Its solution algorithm is iterative and has good computation properties. Can analyze more types of games than current existing games theory. The equilibrium concept and solution algorithm are based on Bayesian statistical decision theory. In the new equilibrium, rationality is achieved for action, strategy, belief (both prior and posterior) and decision rule. Beliefs are the results of optimization exercises of players. Uses first order uninformative conjectures and reaction functions to derive higher and higher orders of conjectures until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. Has great application value for it could solve many types of games and could model beliefs. The Author Dr Jimmy Teng currently teaches at the School of Economics of the University of Nottingham (Malaysia Campus). He is the author of many articles and two books. He received his economics PhD from the University of Toronto. He also earned a PhD in political Science and a MS in statistics from Duke University. He previously held research and teaching positions in Academia Sinica, National Taiwan University and Nanyang Technological University Readership Games theorists, decision theorists, economists, mathematicians, statisticians, operational researchers, social scientists, management researchers, public policy researchers, computer scientists Contents Preface Acknowledgments About the author Introduction Sequential games with incomplete information and noisy inaccurate observation; introduction; an inflationary game; Bayesian iterative conjectures algorithm as a Bayes decision rule; conclusions Sequential games with perfect and imperfect information; introduction; the Bayesian iterative conjecture algorithm, sub-game perfect equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium; solving sequential games of incomplete and perfect information; multiple-sided incomplete information sequential games with perfect information; conclusions Simultaneous games; introduction; complete information simultaneous games; BEIC and refinements of Nash equilibrium; simultaneous games with incomplete information; conclusions Conclusions References Index

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Both in science and in practical affairs we reason by combining facts only inconclusively supported by evidence. Building on an abstract understanding of this process of combination, this book constructs a new theory of epistemic probability. The theory draws on the work of A. P. Dempster but diverges from Depster's viewpoint by identifying his "lower probabilities" as epistemic probabilities and taking his rule for combining "upper and lower probabilities" as fundamental. The book opens with a critique of the well-known Bayesian theory of epistemic probability. It then proceeds to develop an alternative to the additive set functions and the rule of conditioning of the Bayesian theory: set functions that need only be what Choquet called "monotone of order of infinity." and Dempster's rule for combining such set functions. This rule, together with the idea of "weights of evidence," leads to both an extensive new theory and a better understanding of the Bayesian theory. The book concludes with a brief treatment of statistical inference and a discussion of the limitations of epistemic probability. Appendices contain mathematical proofs, which are relatively elementary and seldom depend on mathematics more advanced that the binomial theorem.

This is a collection of classic research papers on the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. The book is the authoritative reference in the field of evidential reasoning and an important archival reference in a wide range of areas including uncertainty reasoning in artificial intelligence and decision making in economics, engineering, and management. The book includes a foreword reflecting the development of the theory in the last forty years.

The range of Bayesian inference algorithms and their different applications has been greatly expanded since the first implementation of a Kalman filter by Stanley F. Schmidt for the Apollo program. Extended Kalman filters or particle filters are just some examples of these algorithms that have been extensively applied to logistics, medical services, search and rescue operations, or automotive safety, among others. This book takes a look at both theoretical foundations of Bayesian inference and practical implementations in different fields. It is intended as an introductory guide for the application of Bayesian inference in the fields of life sciences, engineering, and economics, as well as a source document of fundamentals for intermediate Bayesian readers.

Probabilistic models have much to offer to philosophy. We continually receive information from a variety of sources: from our senses, from witnesses, from scientific instruments. When considering whether we should believe this information, we assess whether the sources are independent, how reliable they are, and how plausible and coherent the information is. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic Bayesian account of these features of reasoning. Simple Bayesian Networks allow us to model alternative assumptions about the nature of the information sources. Measurement of the coherence of information is a controversial matter: arguably, the more coherent a set of information is, the more confident we may be that its content is true, other things being equal. The authors offer a new treatment of coherence which respects this claim and shows its relevance to scientific theory choice. Bovens and Hartmann apply this methodology to a wide range of much discussed issues regarding evidence, testimony, scientific theories, and voting. Bayesian Epistemology is an essential tool for anyone working on probabilistic methods in philosophy, and has broad implications for many other disciplines.

Provides an overview of the fundamentals of Bayesian inference and its applications within astrophysics, for graduate students and researchers.