Is reality logical and is logic real? What is the origin of logical intuitions? What is the role of logical structures in the operations of an intelligent mind and in communication? Is the function of logical structure regulative or constitutive or both in concept formation? This volume provides analyses of the logic-reality relationship from different approaches and perspectives. The point of convergence lies in the exploration of the connections between reality – social, natural or ideal – and logical structures employed in describing or discovering it. Moreover, the book connects logical theory with more concrete issues of rationality, normativity and understanding, thus pointing to a wide range of potential applications. The papers collected in this volume address cutting-edge topics in contemporary discussions amongst specialists. Some essays focus on the role of indispensability considerations in the justification of logical competence, and the wide range of challenges within the philosophy of mathematics. Others present advances in dynamic logical analysis such as extension of game semantics to non-logical part of vocabulary and development of models of contractive speech act.

This book is both dif?cult and rewarding, affording a new perspective on logic and reality, basically seen in terms of change and stability, being and becoming. Most importantly it exemplifies a mode of doing philosophy of science that seems a welcome departure from the traditional focus on purely analytic arguments. The author approaches ontology, metaphysics, and logic as having offered a number of ways of constructing the description of reality, and aims at deepening their relationships in a new way. Going beyond the mere abstract and formal aspects of logical analysis, he offers a new architecture of logic that sees it as applied not only to the “reasoning processes” belonging to the first disciplinary group – ontology – but also directly concerned with en- ties, events, and phenomena studied by the second one – metaphysics. It is the task of the book to elaborate such a constructive logic, both by offering a lo- cal view of the structure of the reality in general and by proffering a wealth of models able to encompass its implications for science. In turning from the merely formal to the constructive account of logic Brenner overcomes the limitation of logic to linguistic concepts so that it can be not only a logic “of” reality but also “in” that reality which is constitutively characterized by a number of fundamental dualities (observer and observed, self and not-self, internal and external, etc.

'Nobody reads Mill today,' wrote a reviewer in Time magazine a few years ago. ! One could scarcely praise Mr Melvin Maddocks, who penned that remark, for his awareness of the present state of Mill studies, for of all nineteenth century philosophers who wrote in English, it is 1. S. Mill who remains the most read today. Yet it would not be so far from the truth to say that very few people pay much serious attention nowadays to Mill's writings about logic and metaphysics (as distinct from those on ethical and social issues), despite the fact that Mill put enormous effort into their composition and through them exerted a considerable influen ce on the course of European philosophy for the rest of his century. But the only sections of A System of Logic (1843) and An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865) to which much reference is now made comprise only a small proportion of those very large books, and the prevailing assumption is that Mill's theories about logical and meta physical questions are, with few exceptions, of merely antiquarian in terest. Bertrand Russell once said that Mill's misfortune was to be born at the wrong time (Russell (1951), p. 2). It can certainly appear that Mill chose an inauspicious time to attempt a major work on logic.

In this book Jan D. Sinnott synthesizes her 20 years of research on lifespan cognitive development to describe the growth of complex (or `postformal') thought in adults. She shows specifically how adults improve mentally over a lifetime and learn to think in more complex and wiser ways. Applications of postformal thought are demonstrated in such diverse areas as - family relations - adult education - personal identity - and spirituality. Chapters examine relations between postformal thought and pertinent variables such as age, health, memory, and vocabulary. Other sections deal with issues in humanistic psychology such as - guided imagery - mind - body medicine - and creative intentionality.

This work takes up the long-standing concern that the theology of Karl Barth has little to offer to consideration of Christian reason and instead shows that Barth's work contains a theologically weighty and spiritually bracing account of the proper ordering of Christian thought.

Do human rights make sense? They have been central to post-war political life, and our picture of moral self. But this is being eroded, Holt argues, and with it the viability of human rights discourse. The pre-social individual and its mental armoury is being challenged by an increasing awareness of genealogical forces in which the self is less a lone claimant than an exponent or rebel. Using Wittgenstein's philosophy, this book considers the liberal position on human rights, along with the communitarian and pragmatic attacks, and challenges the intelligibility of each from the perspective of what it is to be a language user. Wittgenstein, Politics and Human Rights argues that moral relations are not dead; but that their life resides with the on-going relations of selves governed by universal principles.

Through explorations of Hermann Cohen’s Ethics of Pure Will, an international set of scholars opens questions both about the text itself and about the relation of ethics and the Jewish tradition. Originally published as Volume 13 (2005) of The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy.

A new 2024 translation of Heidegger's early work "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic'', originally published in 1913 under the German title "Die lehre vom urteil im psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik ". This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for Existentialist terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading. Here Heidegger defends metaphysics. He argues that transcendental logic can't be dismissed by rationalism, as this would destroy its own foundation and paralyze judgment and cognition. This work is a comprehensive exploration of the intersection between psychology and logic, focusing on the concept of judgment in the context of psychologism. It begins with a preface acknowledging influences and inspirations, followed by an introduction discussing the impact of psychological research on various fields, including logic. The paper challenges the psychological interpretation of logic and argues for a transcendental-logical view. The main body of the paper is divided into several sections, each examining different aspects and theories related to judgment in the context of psychologism. It includes critical assessments of the theories of notable philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich Maier, analyzing their approaches to judgment, its structure, and its various forms. The document explores the nature of judgment, its relation to perception, and the psychological underpinnings of logical thought. Heidegger argues for the need to make a clear distinction between psychological and transcendental methods in logic, arguing for an independent and intrinsic understanding of logic beyond psychological interpretations.

It’s the American dream—unfettered freedom to follow our ambitions, to forge our identities, to become self-made. But what if our culture of limitless self-fulfillment is actually making millions desperately ill? One of our leading interpreters of modernity and nationalism, Liah Greenfeld argues that we have overlooked the connection between egalitarian society and mental illness. Intellectually fearless, encompassing philosophy, psychology, and history, Mind, Modernity, Madness challenges the most cherished assumptions about the blessings of living in a land of the free. Modern nationalism, says Greenfeld, rests on bedrock principles of popular sovereignty, equality, and secularism. Citizens of the twenty-first century enjoy unprecedented freedom to become the authors of their personal destinies. Empowering as this is, it also places them under enormous psychic strain. They must constantly appraise their identities, manage their desires, and calibrate their place within society. For vulnerable individuals, this pressure is too much. Training her analytic eye on extensive case histories in manic depression and schizophrenia, Greenfeld contends that these illnesses are dysfunctions of selfhood caused by society’s overburdening demands for self-realization. In her rigorous diagnosis, madness is a culturally constituted malady. The culminating volume of Greenfeld’s nationalism trilogy, Mind, Modernity, Madness is a tour de force in the classic tradition of Émile Durkheim—and a bold foray into uncharted territory. Often counter-intuitive, always illuminating, Mind, Modernity, Madness presents a many-sided view of humanity, one that enriches our deepest understanding of who we are and what we aspire to be.