This book brings together the often separated histories of diplomacy, defence, economics and empire in a provocative reinterpretation of British 'decline'. It also offers a broader reflection on the nature of international power and the mechanisms of policymaking. For this Second Edition, David Reynolds has added a new chapters and extends his lively and incisive analysis to the beginning of the new millennium.

Germany, spring 1945. Hitler is dead and his armies crushed. Across the conquered Reich, cities lie devastated by Allied saturation bombing; their traumatised populations, exhausted and embittered by defeat, face a future of acute privation and hardship. Such was the broken state of the nation in which a British civilian and military force arrived in the spring and summer of 1945. Their zone of occupation was the northern and northwestern part of Germany, the country's former industrial heartland. Their task? To build democracy from the ruins of Hitler's Reich, and, having defeated Nazism on the battlefield, to 'win the peace' by eradicating Nazism from German hearts and minds. As well as offering a vivid narrative of the British occupation in political and military terms, from the Potsdam Conference to the Berlin Airlift, Don't Let's Be Beastly to the Germans explores the day-to-day experiences of the ordinary Britons who worked for the Control Commission for Germany between 1945 and 1949. Some reconstructed bridges and schools, supervised the destruction of military matériel and brought fugitive Nazis to justice; while others became entangled in black marketeering, corruption and sexual scandal. In time, they would find themselves on the front line of the Cold War, as irreconcilable tensions divided Europe between East and West.

Private papers, diaries and government and Foreign Office records are used within this book to produce an analysis of the attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union, assessing the influence such attitudes had upon British foreign policy between May 1937 and August 1939.

When the British Labour party announced the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in January 1968, the United States faced a potential power vacuum in the area. The incoming Nixon administration, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and China, and the war in Vietnam, had no intention of replacing the British in the Gulf.

How does one of the world's greatest powers preserve its status and influence when international conditions are unfavourable and its resources do not match its commitments? This was Britain's burden in the 1970s and 1980s when the international order was transformed. Much became unsettled and Britain had to adapt policy to suit new needs and opportunities. Michael J. Turner elucidates the efforts that were made to maximise Britain's role on those matters and in those parts of the world that were of special importance to British strategy, prosperity and security. He examines key decisions and their consequences and places British policy-making in an international context, suggesting that British leaders were more successful in preserving power and prestige on the world stage than has sometimes been appreciated.

Based on a detailed analysis of archives and high level interviews this book looks at the role of beliefs, culture and identity in the making of British nuclear policy from 1945 through to the present day. This book also examines Britain's nuclear experience by moving away from traditional interpretations of why states develop and maintain nuclear weapons by adopting a more contemporary approach to political theory. Traditional mainstream explanations tend to stress the importance of factors such as the 'maximization of power', the pursuit of 'national security interests' and the role of 'structure' in a largely anarchic international system. This book does not dismiss these approaches, but argues that British experience suggests that focusing on 'beliefs', 'culture' and 'identity', provides a more useful insight and distinctive interpretation into the process of British nuclear decision making than the more traditional approaches.

When Harold Macmillan became prime minister in 1957, Britain had reached a critical point in its contemporary history. There was still evidence of Britain's status as a great power, yet the previous year's humiliation at Suez had undermined its credibility. By taking key areas of overseas policy - summitry, the Middle East, defence, Empire, and Europe - this volume looks at Macmillan's attempts to establish a new foreign policy agenda after Suez. Based on research in public and private archives in Britain, America and Germany, Harold Macmillan and Britain's World Role offers a critical reappraisal of British foreign policy between 1957 and 1963, addressing how successfully Macmillan answered his own key question: 'Why should the UK stay in the big game?'

Drawing on primary sources from both sides of the Atlantic, Britain and the Bomb explores how economic, political, and strategic considerations have shaped British nuclear diplomacy. The book concentrates on Prime Minister Harold Wilson's first two terms of office, 1964-1970, which represent a critical period in international nuclear history. Wilson's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and his support for continued investment in the British nuclear weapons program, despite serious economic and political challenges, established precedents that still influence policymakers today. The continued independence of Britain's nuclear force, and the enduring absence of a German or European deterrent, certainly owes a debt to Wilson's handling of nuclear diplomacy more than four decades ago. Beyond highlighting the importance of this period, the book explains how and why British nuclear diplomacy evolved during Wilson's leadership. Cabinet discussions, financial crises, and international tensions encouraged a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of strategic independence and the creation of a non-proliferation treaty. Gill shows us that British nuclear diplomacy was a series of compromises, an intricate blend of political, economic, and strategic considerations.

The first modern history of the 1975 European referendum, ranging across 1970s Britain to assess why voters said 'Yes to Europe'.

Roger Makins, British Ambassador to Washington 1953-1956, was one of the most prominent and powerful diplomats of his time. His career was unusual for a Foreign Office official, in that such a large part of it took place in Washington and London, and was centered on Anglo-American relationships. This book describes his life, times and the important players he dealt with on both sides of the Atlantic. It sheds light on how the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and America developed, and shows how great an impact a civil servant can have on policy.