Lisa Tessman's Burdened Virtues is a deeply original and provocative work that engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, she addresses the ways in which devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities of flourishing. She describes two different forms of "moral trouble" prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them--traits that Tessman refers to as "burdened virtues." These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer's own well being. Tessman's work focuses on issues that have been missed by many feminist moral theories, and her use of the virtue ethics framework brings feminist concerns more closely into contact with mainstream ethical theory. This book will appeal to feminist theorists in philosophy and women's studies, but also more broadly, ethicists and social theorists.

What is defiance, and when does defiant behaviour impede one's ability to aim at flourishing? People who are defiant can present perplexing challenges etiologically, diagnostically, and responsively. But in order to understand accurately when defiant behaviour is good, or bad, or neither (when it emerges out of mental illness), a fresh perspective on defiance is needed. This book offers a nuanced and complex look at defiance, taking seriously issues of dysfunction while also attending to social contexts in which defiant behaviour may arise. Those living in adverse conditions such as oppression, systematic disadvantages, and disability may act defiantly for good reasons. This perspective places defiance squarely within the moral domain; thus, it should not be assumed that when professionals come across defiant behaviour, it is a sign of mental dysfunction. Potter argues that defiance sometimes is a virtue, meaning that a disposition to be ready to be defiant when the situation calls for it is part of living a life with a realistic understanding of the aim of flourishing and its limits in our everyday world. Her work also offers theoretical work on problems in knowing that can impede understanding and responsiveness to those who are, or seem to be, defiant. Clinicians, teachers, social workers, nurses, and others working in helping professions are invited to engage in different ways with defiance so as to better understand and respond to people who express that defiance. Case studies, a framework for differentiating different forms of defiance, a realistic picture of phronesis-practical reasoning-and an explanation of how to give uptake well are some of the topics covered. The voices of service users strengthen the author's claims that defiance that is grounded in phronesis is just as much a part of moral life for those living with mental disabilities as for anyone else.

"In this book, Kate Ward addresses the issue of inequality from the perspective of Christian virtue ethics. Her unique contribution is to argue that moral luck, our individual life circumstances, affects one's ability to pursue virtue. She argues that economic status functions as moral luck and impedes the ability of both the wealthy and the impoverished to pursue virtues such as prudence, justice, and temperance. The book presents social science evidence that inequality reduces empathy for others' suffering, and increases violence, fear, and the desire to punish others. For the wealthy, inequality creates "hyperagency" - abundant freedom, power, and choice beyond that enjoyed by other members of society. For the poor, scarcity of time, money, and other important goods can also impair their ability to pursue virtue. Having established the theological harm caused by inequality, Ward then makes the argument that both individual Christians and Christian communities have obligations to address the impact of inequality. As individuals, Christians should pursue what Ward calls encounter, conversion, and contentment. Encounter means genuinely reaching out to the less fortunate and spending enough time to get to know individuals as human beings. For Ward, conversion means informing oneself about the realities of poverty and inequality. Contentment means being satisfied with one's position and not striving for more material wealth. Christian communities, in Ward's view, have obligations to pursue political action, tithing, and aid, and to foster encounters in parishes and educational settings"--

"While not traditionally named as a virtue, accountability plays a vital part in healthy relationships and in a morally integrated life. The idea that one is answerable to others besides oneself-to give others what they are due-places relational accountability within a frame of justice and serves to counterbalance the prevalent emphasis on autonomy in mental health and human flourishing. Welcoming responsibility to and caring about one's impact on others is basic to making personal relationships work over time. Without accountability, resentment and withdrawal from relationships would ensue. Accountability is also critical to the trust and cooperation needed for effective work with others. Moreover, accountability serves as a critical support to the integrity and wholeness of the morally virtuous person. Actively knowing to whom and for what one is accountable is clarifying in terms of connecting one's relational responsibilities with one's identity, direction and sense of purpose"--

This book proposes an explicit recognition of criminology as a moral science: a philosophically textured appreciation of the presence and role of values in people's reasoning and motivation, set within an empirically rigorous social-scientific account. This endeavour requires input from both criminologists and philosophers, and careful dialogue between them. Criminology as a Moral Science provides such a dialogue, not least about the so-called 'fact-value distinction', but also about substantive topics such as guilt and shame. The book also provides philosophically-informed accounts of morality in practice in several criminological contexts: these include whistleblowing practices within a police service; the dilemmas of mothers about who and what to tell about a partner's imprisonment; and how persistent offenders begin to try to 'turn their lives around' to desist from crime. The issues raised go to the heart of some currently pressing topics within criminology, notably the development of 'evidence-based practice', which requires some kind of stable bridge to be built between research evidence ('facts') and proposals for policy ('evaluative recommendations').

The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen a renaissance in the study of virtue -- a topic that has prevailed in philosophical work since the time of Aristotle. Several major developments have conspired to mark this new age. Foremost among them, some argue, is the birth of virtue ethics, an approach to ethics that focuses on virtue in place of consequentialism (the view that normative properties depend only on consequences) or deontology (the study of what we have a moral duty to do). The emergence of new virtue theories also marks this new wave of work on virtue. Put simply, these are theories about what virtue is, and they include Kantian and utilitarian virtue theories. Concurrently, virtue ethics is being applied to other fields where it hasn't been used before, including bioethics and education. In addition to these developments, the study of virtue in epistemological theories has become increasingly widespread to the point that it has spawned a subfield known as 'virtue epistemology.' This volume therefore provides a representative overview of philosophical work on virtue. It is divided into seven parts: conceptualizations of virtue, historical and religious accounts, contemporary virtue ethics and theories of virtue, central concepts and issues, critical examinations, applied virtue ethics, and virtue epistemology. Forty-two chapters by distinguished scholars offer insights and directions for further research. In addition to philosophy, authors also deal with virtues in non-western philosophical traditions, religion, and psychological perspectives on virtue.

Recent decades have witnessed an enthusiastic retrieval of eudaimonism, according to which the virtuous life is the happy life. But the critique launched by Kant - that eudaimonism is egoistic and distorts the character of duty or obligation - has persisted. Should I develop the virtues because these are the traits I need in order to flourish? Is it facts about my own happiness that determine my obligations to others? In this book, Jennifer Herdt deftly sifts through these debates, showing why we should embrace 'ecstatic' or 'goodness-prior' eudaimonism while rejecting 'welfare-prior' forms of eudaimonism. Grasping the character of ecstatic eudaimonism, she argues, has major implications, overcoming the common assumption of a sharp break between pagan and Christian eudaimonism, as well as of a late medieval or Protestant repudiation of eudaimonism in favor of divine command theory. Agents cannot rightly respond to the goods they encounter unless they respond to them precisely as good, and not merely as a means to promoting their own welfare; in responding well, their agency is thereby necessarily perfected. In conversation with vital strands of contemporary moral philosophy, Herdt goes on to articulate the distinctive character of obligation as a feature of accountability relations among agents. Assuming Responsibility offers a fresh point of departure for theological and philosophical approaches to virtue ethics, moral agency, and the contested relationship between the good and the right.

Virtue ethics in its contemporary manifestation is dominated by neo Aristotelian virtue ethics primarily developed by Rosalind Hursthouse. This version of eudaimonistic virtue ethics was ground breaking, but has been subject to considerable critical attention. Christine Swanton shows that the time is ripe for new developments and alternatives. The target centred virtue ethics proposed by Swanton is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. First, it rejects the 'natural goodness' metaphysics of Neo Aristotelian virtue ethics owed to Philippa Foot in favour of a 'hermeneutic ontology' of ethics inspired by the Continental tradition and McDowell. Second, it rejects the well -known 'qualified agent' account of right action made famous by Hursthouse in favour of a target centred framework for assessing rightness of acts. Swanton develops the target centred view with discussions of Dancy's particularism, default reasons and thick concepts, codifiability, and its relation to the Doctrine of the mean. Target Centred Virtue Ethics retains the pluralism of Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (2003) but develops it further in relation to a pluralistic account of practical reason. This study develops other substantive positions including the view that target centred virtue ethics is developmental, suitably embedded in an environmental ethics of dwelling; and incorporates a concept of differentiated virtue to allow for roles, narrativity, cultural and historical location, and stage of life.

Moral education is an enduring concern for societies committed to the value of justice and the wellbeing of children. What kind of moral guidance do young people need to navigate the social world today? Which theories, perspectives, values, and ideals are best suited for the task? This volume offers educators insight into both the challenges and promises of moral education from a variety of ethical perspectives. It introduces and analyses several important developments in ethics and moral psychology and discusses how some key moral problems can be addressed in contemporary classrooms. In doing so, Moral Education in the 21st Century helps readers develop a deeper understanding of the complexities of helping young people grow into moral agents and ethical people. As such, researchers, students, and professionals in the fields of moral education, moral psychology, moral philosophy, ethics, educational theory, and philosophy of education will benefit from this volume.

Although individual parents face different issues, Sonya Charles believes most parents want their children to be good people who are happy in their adult lives. Parents and Virtues: An Analysis of Moral Development and Parental Virtue starts from the question of how parents can raise their child to be a moral and flourishing person. At first glance, readers might think this question is better left to psychologists rather than philosophers. The author proposes that Aristotle’s ethical theory (known as virtue theory) has much to say on this issue. Aristotle asks how we become moral people and how that relates to leading a good life. In other words, his motivating questions are very similar to the goals parents have for their children. The first part of this book details what the basic components of Aristotle’s theory can tell us about the project of parenting. In the second part, the focus shifts to consider some issues that present potential moral dilemmas for parents and discuss whether there are specific virtues we may want to use to guide parental actions. Parents and Virtues will be of particular value to scholars and students who work on the ethics of parenthood, virtue theory, and bioethics.