Can animals be persons? Scientific and philosophical consensus supplies a resounding, 'No!' In this book, Mark Rowlands disagrees. Not only can animals be persons, many of them probably are. A person is an individual in which consciousness, rationality, self-awareness and other-awareness converge, and many animals are such individuals

"Written in a lively and entertaining style, this little book, which deals with topics such as 'personhood,' animal rights, and artificial intelligence . . . makes some rather difficult philosophical points clear in an unpedantic fashion." -- M E Winston, Trenton State College

Can animals act morally? Philosophical tradition answers "no," and has apparently convincing arguments on its side. Cognitive ethology supplies a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests these arguments are wrong. This groundbreaking book assimilates both philosophical and ethological frameworks into a unified whole and argues for a qualified "yes."

NON-HUMAN ANIMALS Volume 3, Number 2, June 2014 Edited by John Berkman, Charles C. Camosy, and Celia Deane-Drummond Introduction: Catholic Moral Theology and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals John Berkman and Celia Deane-Drummond From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology: Where Catholic Moral Theology Needs to Go John Berkman Animals, Evil, and Family Meals Julie Rubio The Use of Non-Human Animals in Biomedical Research: Can Moral Theology Fill the Gap? Charles C. Camosy and Susan Kopp Evolutionary Perspectives on Inter-Morality and Inter-Species Relationships Interrogated in the Light of the Rise and Fall of Homo sapiens sapiens Celia Deane-Drummond Moral Passions: A Thomistic Interpretation of Moral Emotions in Nonhuman and Human Animals Jean Porter Speaking Theologically of Animal Rights James E. Helmer

Animal Maltreatment is the first book to provide an overview of animal maltreatment as a legal, clinical, and forensic issue. It offers guidance for mental health and legal professionals involved in the adjudication of animal maltreatment offenses, with a special focus on forensic mental health assessments in such cases.

Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of humans' moral relationships to the other animals. She defends the claim that we are obligated to treat all sentient beings as what Kant called "ends-in-themselves". Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, she offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings for whom things can be good or bad. She then turns to Kant's argument for the value of humanity to show that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends-in-ourselves, in two senses. Kant argued that as autonomous beings, we claim to be ends-in-ourselves when we claim the standing to make laws for ourselves and each other. Korsgaard argues that as beings who have a good, we also claim to be ends-in-ourselves when we take the things that are good for us to be good absolutely and so worthy of pursuit. The first claim commits us to joining with other autonomous beings in relations of moral reciprocity. The second claim commits us to treating the good of every sentient creature as something of absolute importance. Korsgaard argues that human beings are not more important than the other animals, that our moral nature does not make us superior to the other animals, and that our unique capacities do not make us better off than the other animals. She criticizes the "marginal cases" argument and advances a new view of moral standing as attaching to the atemporal subjects of lives. She criticizes Kant's own view that our duties to animals are indirect, and offers a non-utilitarian account of the relation between pleasure and the good. She also addresses a number of directly practical questions: whether we have the right to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us and fight in our wars, and keep them as pets; and how to understand the wrong that we do when we cause a species to go extinct.

An illustrated encyclopedia focusing on the arts, biographies, human biology, countries and states, government, history, mathematics, natural and physical sciences, sports and technology.

This comprehensively updated and expanded revision of the successful second edition continues to provide detailed coverage of the ever-growing range of research topics in vision. In Part I, the treatment of visual physiology has been extensively revised with an updated account of retinal processing, a new section explaining the principles of spatial and temporal filtering which underlie discussions in later chapters, and an up-to-date account of the primate visual pathway. Part II contains four largely new chapters which cover recent psychophysical evidence and computational model of early vision: edge detection, perceptual grouping, depth perception, and motion perception. The models discussed are extensively integrated with physiological evidence. All other chapters in Parts II, III, and IV have also been thoroughly updated.