The Gulf War has been the only conflict in the last half-century that featured the possible use of chemical-biological weapons against U.S. forces. Vulnerability to such an attack spurred the Department of Defense to action from the first hint of trouble in August 1990 through the end of hostilities in March 1991. Nearly disbanded in 1972, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps would be the prime force in ensuring that U.S. forces could both survive and sustain combat operations under chemical-biological warfare conditions. Focussing on the work of senior Army officials, this account assesses the degree of readiness achieved by the ground war's initiation and the lessons learned since the conflict. For an appropriately trained and equipped military force, chemical weapons pose not the danger of mass destruction but the threat of mass disruption, no more deadly than smart munitions or B-52 air strikes. This book will reveal a coordinated response to train and equip U.S. forces did take place prior to the feared Iraqi chemical and biological attacks. Undocumented in any other book, it details the plans that rushed sixty Fox reconnaissance vehicles to the Gulf, the worldwide call for protective suits and masks, and the successful placement of biological agent detectors prior to the air offensive. In addition, the work addresses what really happened at Khamisiyah. Were troops exposed to chemical weapons and what is behind the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome?

Since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Gulf War veterans have expressed concerns that their postdeployment medical symptoms could have been caused by hazardous exposures or other deployment-related factors. Potential exposure to a broad range of CB and other harmful agents was not unique to Gulf operations. Hazardous exposures have been a component of all military operations in this century. Nevertheless, the Gulf War deployment focused national attention on the potential, but uncertain, relationship between the presence of CB agents in theater and symptoms reported by military personnel. Particular attention has been given to the potential long-term health effects of low-level exposures to CB agents. In the spring of 1996, Deputy Secretary of Defense John White met with the leadership of the National Academies to discuss the DoD's continuing efforts to improve protection of military personnel from adverse health effects during deployments in hostile environments. Although many lessons learned from previous assessments of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm have been reported, prospective analyses are still needed. Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces: Force Protection and Decontamination, which addresses the issues of physical protection and decontamination, is one of four initial reports that will be submitted in response to that request. Specifically, this report includes a review and evaluation of the following areas: the adequacy of current protective equipment and protective measures (as well as equipment in development) the efficacy of current and proposed methods for decontaminating personnel and equipment after exposures to CB agents current policies, doctrine, and training to protect and decontaminate personnel and equipment in future deployments (i.e., major regional conflicts [MRCs], lesser regional conflicts [LRCs], and operations other than war [OOTWs]) the impact of equipment and procedures on unit effectiveness and other human performance factors current and projected military capabilities to provide emergency response