Contents: (1) Scope, Sources, and Terminology; (2) Overview of China¿s Naval Modern.; Inception; Elements of Modern. Effort; Limitations and Weaknesses; Reasons for Modern. Effort; Elements of China¿s Naval Modern.; Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles; Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles; Subs.; Aircraft Carriers; Surface Combatants; Amphibious Ships; Maritime Surveill. and Targeting Systems; Operations Away From Home Waters; Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities; Potential Oversight Issues for Congress; China as a Defense-Planning Priority; (3) Potential Navy-Related Program Implications; Highly Capable Ships and Aircraft; Pacific Fleet¿s Share of the Navy; Homeporting Pacific Fleet Ships in Forward Locations; Larger vs. Smaller Ships.

China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China's near-seas region. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy's budget. As a part of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region announced in January 2012, Department of Defense (DOD) planning is placing an increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. Observers expect that, as a result, there will be a stronger emphasis in DOD planning on U.S. naval and air forces. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding constraints on U.S. defense spending, DOD will seek to protect initiatives relating to the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. China's naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China's naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. Observers believe China's naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities for doing the following: addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or defending China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China's view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China's status as a leading regional power and major world power. Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force-a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China's near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. China may also use its navy for other purposes, such as conducting maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.

China s Maritime Power dates back thousands of years. China has one of the oldest naval traditions in the world, dating from at least the end of the Warring States period in 221 BC. Nonetheless, China has historically been a continental state with a large ground force and only a coastal navy with limited blue water capability. The rise of modern day China raises considerable regional and security concerns, besides economic and political competition towards finding a rightful place in power politics of the South Asian Region and hence needs a critical analysis. There is a need to focus future strategies to deal with such challenges, both in the medium and long term. An effort to achieve the same has been undertaken in this book. The book is sure to stimulate further discussions on China s navy and its ambitions. Foreword by Srikanth Kondapalli

The rapid modernization of the Chinese Navy is a well-documented reality of the post-Cold War world. In two decades, the People's Liberation Army Navy has evolved from a backward force composed of obsolete platforms into a reasonably modern fleet whose growth is significantly shaking the naval balance in East Asia. The rationale behind China's contemporary rise at sea remains, however, difficult to grasp and few people have tried to see how the current structure of the international system has shaped Chinese choices. This book makes sense of Chinese priorities in its naval modernization in a 'robust' offensive realist framework. Drawing on Barry Posen's works on sources of military doctrine, it argues that the orientation of Beijing's choices concerning its naval forces can essentially be explained by China's position as a potential regional hegemon. Yves-Heng Lim highlights how a rising state develops naval power to fulfil its security objectives, a theoretical perspective that goes farther than the sole Chinese case.

This book is a comprehensive study of the development of China’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It offers insights into the secretive world of nuclear submarines and ballistic missiles of the Chinese (PLA) Navy and studies how these are likely to grow in the next two decades. The volume examines the technological origins of the design and development of Chinese nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and their naval construction capabilities. It provides an analysis of the underlying Chinese nuclear doctrine, China’s maritime geographical constraints for submarine operations, and the credibility of its sea-based deterrence. It draws upon strategy, nuclear policy, technology, geography, and operational considerations to holistically predict the likely SSBN force levels of the PLA Navy for various scenarios. The book also assesses the spectrum of threats likely from the undersea domain for India and other nations in the Indo-Pacific region. A key text on an obscure but vital facet of Chinese defence studies, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers of strategic affairs, international relations and disarmament studies, peace and conflict studies, geopolitics, foreign policy, Indo-Pacific studies, and diplomacy.

How can countries decide what kind of military forces they need, if threats are uncertain and history is full of strategic surprises? This is a question that is more pertinent than ever, as countries across the Asia-Pacific are faced with the military and economic rise of China. Uncertainty is inherent in defence planning, but different types of uncertainty mean that countries need to approach decisions about military force structure in different ways. This book examines four different basic frameworks for defence planning, and demonstrates how states can make decisions coherently about the structure and posture of their defence forces despite strategic uncertainty. It draws on case studies from the United States, Australian and New Zealand, each of which developed key concepts for their particular circumstances and risk perception in Asia. Success as well as failure in developing coherent defence planning frameworks holds lessons for the United States and other countries as they consider how best to structure their military forces for the uncertain challenges of the future.

Alfred Thayer Mahan has been called America’s nineteenth-century ‘evangelist of sea power’ and the intellectual father of the modern US Navy. His theories have a timeless appeal, and Chinese analysts now routinely invoke Mahan’s writings, exhorting their nation to build a powerful navy. Economics is the prime motivation for maritime reorientation, and securing the sea lanes that convey foreign energy supplies and other commodities now ranks near or at the top of China’s list of military priorities. This book is the first systematic effort to test the interplay between Western military thought and Chinese strategic traditions vis-à-vis the nautical arena. It uncovers some universal axioms about how theories of sea power influence the behaviour of great powers and examines how Mahanian thought could shape China’s encounters on the high seas. Empirical analysis adds a new dimension to the current debate over China’s ‘rise’ and its importance for international relations. The findings also clarify the possible implications of China’s maritime rise for the United States, and illuminate how the two powers can manage their bilateral interactions on the high seas. Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century will be of much interest to students of naval history, Chinese politics and security studies.