Coalitions of consumer groups, NGOs, and trade unions have traditionally been considered politically weak compared to well-organized and resourceful financial sector groups which dominate or "capture" financial regulatory decisions. However, following the 2008 financial crisis, civil society groups have been seen to exert much more influence, with politicians successfully implementing financial reform in spite of industry opposition. Drawing on literature from social movement research and regulatory politics, this book shows how diffuse interests were represented in financial regulatory overhauls in both the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Four cases of reform in the post-crisis regulatory context are analyzed: the creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the US; the introduction of new consumer protection regulations through EU directives; the failure of attempts to introduce a financial transaction tax in the US; and the agreement of 11 EU member states to introduce such a tax. It shows how building coalitions with important elite allies outside and inside government helped traditionally weak interest groups transcend a lack of material resources to influence and shape regulatory policy. By engaging with a less well-known side of the debate, it explains how business power was curbed and diverse interests translated into financial regulatory policy.

Efforts to resolve the recent financial crisis have obscured a more deeply rooted financialization crisis that impacts not only the market economy but also the vital civic and moral traditions that support it. This book reveals the cultural influence of finance in reshaping the foundations of American civil society and proposes a return to certain "first principles" of the Republic to restore the nation’s economic vision. This book demonstrates how funding concerns and financial incentives "revalue" faith traditions, educational institutions, non-profit organizations, and even the nation’s healthcare system in ways that are eroding the diversity of American culture. These changes also undermine the ethical framework of both democratic government and the free-market system. While financial influence has diminished the value of civil society, this book proposes that revitalized intermediary institutions still offer the best path forward in restoring the financial sector and, more broadly, enriching the American competitive ethic toward development of a more virtuous economy. The book is written for an academic and professional audience, offering a blueprint for the involvement of civil society with government in providing more communally integrated oversight that could contribute to a genuine democratization of finance.

Drawing on interviews with Civil Society organizations and in conjunction with an examination of EU Civil Society Policy and the legal and institutional environment in Turkey this book examines EU policies on Turkish Civil Society organizations and highlights the significant constraints and limited impacts of these policies.

The globalisation of financial markets has attracted much academic and policymaking commentary in recent years, especially with the growing number of banking and financial crises and the current credit crisis that has threatened the stability of the global financial system. This major new Research Handbook sets out to address some of the fundamental issues in financial regulation from a comparative and international perspective and to identify some of the main research themes and approaches that combine economic, legal and institutional analysis of financial markets. Specially commissioned contributions represent diverse viewpoints on the financial regulation debate and cover a number of new and controversial topics not yet adequately addressed in the literature. Specifically, these include; financial innovation particularly in the context of the credit risk transfer market, securitization and the systemic importance of the over-the-counter trading markets; the institutional structure of international financial regulation; and risk management and corporate governance of financial institutions. This Handbook will provide a unique and fully up-to-date resource for all those with an interest in this critical issue including academic researchers in finance and regulation, practitioners working in the industry and those involved with regulation and policy.

Financial regulation has entered into a new era, as many foundational economic theories and policies supporting the existing infrastructure have been and are being questioned following the financial crisis. Goodhart et al’s seminal monograph "Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now?" (Routledge:1998) took stock of the extent of financial innovation and the maturity of the financial services industry at that time, and mapped out a new regulatory roadmap. This book offers a timely exploration of the "Why, How and Where Now" of financial regulation in the aftermath of the crisis in order to map out the future trajectory of financial regulation in an age where financial stability is being emphasised as a key regulatory objective. The book is split into four sections: the objectives and regulatory landscape of financial regulation; the regulatory regime for investor protection; the regulatory regime for financial institutional safety and soundness; and macro-prudential regulation. The discussion ranges from theoretical and policy perspectives to comprehensive and critical consideration of financial regulation in the specifics. The focus of the book is on the substantive regulation of the UK and the EU, as critical examination is made of the unravelling and the future of financial regulation with comparative insights offered where relevant especially from the US. Running throughout the book is consideration of the relationship between financial regulation, financial stability and the responsibility of various actors in governance. This book offers an important contribution to continuing reflections on the role of financial regulation, market discipline and corporate responsibility in the financial sector, and upon the roles of regulatory authorities, markets and firms in ensuring the financial health and security of all in the future.

Macroprudential policy (MPP) has been one of the major initiatives in the post-2008 crisis restructuring of financial regulation. Under the macroprudential mandate, the regulator monitors and judiciously controls systemic risk in the financial system, in an attempt to minimise the probability and severity of a future financial crisis. The book reveals why MPP authorities are rightfully at the centre of a highly sensitive policy debate, as MPP necessitates the allocation of significant regulatory power to technocrats, while the highly technical nature of MPP makes policy evaluation challenging. Specific issues examined include: the importance of financial stability as a public policy goal; the political economy issues stemming from the delegation of MPP to an independent authority; and the definition of accountability in the context of MPP. Focusing on a case study on the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England, the macroprudential authority in the UK, the book develops the normative grounds to justify the need for accountability in the conduct of MPP, while also formulating the necessary institutional framework to ensure the accountability of MPP authorities.

This book critically examines the theoretical foundations and legal framework for macroprudential policy, its tools and governance in the UK, the US, and the EU. It goes deeper into a normative discussion of the legitimacy of macroprudential policy in these jurisdictions, where the mandate for maintaining financial stability has been delegated to independent authorities. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 reopened debates regarding legitimacy of the independent regulatory state, given its democratic deficit. The response to a perceived legitimacy gap has been to increase political oversight in financial policymaking and regulation. The book posits that the real problem is not a lack of democracy, but rather a lack of social justice. Across the globe, there is growing dissatisfaction with a financial system and regulatory process that appear depersonalised and perpetuate inequalities. Citizens are calling for more socially just systems of governance and the future success of financial policymakers and regulators will hinge on this. Given the marked distributional effects that have been noted in some macroprudential policy tools, the book questions whether macroprudential policy should be solely based on highly rationalised and strongly quantitative reasons. By proposing that macroprudential policymakers should have a social justice mandate alongside their financial stability mandate, as well as legal mechanisms for operationalising the added authority, the book contributes to the growing discourse on the role of social justice in public policy.

Financial regulation can fail when it is needed the most. The dynamics of asset price bubbles weaken financial regulation just as financial markets begin to overheat and the risk of crisis spikes. At the same time, the failure of financial regulations adds further fuel to a bubble. This book examines the interaction of bubbles and financial regulation. It explores the ways in which bubbles lead to the failure of financial regulation by outlining five dynamics, which it collectively labels the "Regulatory Instability Hypothesis." . The book concludes by outlining approaches to make financial regulation more resilient to these dynamics that undermine law.

The early twenty-first century has seen a conspicuous absence of formal international law concerning money and finance. This book argues that this lack of formal international regulation was a significant contributing factor to the global financial crisis that began in 2007. It focuses on this lack of global substantive principles and 'hard law' rules in the field of financial regulation and monetary affairs, and analyses the emerging framework within international law that aims to govern financial institutions and markets. The global financial crisis has demonstrated the essential need for financial and monetary regulatory reform, and for the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for the settlement of financial disputes and for the regulation of cross-border financial institutions. This book therefore presents the foundations of solutions that could fill these critical gaps in international financial law. It addresses cross-border issues, financial regulation, and provides detailed analyses of monetary policies and regulation. This book is an updated collection of papers first published in the Special Edition of the Journal of International Economic Law on 'The Quest for International Law in Financial Regulation and Monetary Affairs' (Volume 12, Number 3, September 2010), which also show that the regulatory hands-off approach was not replicated in other areas of international economic law. International trade regulation witnessed an increased number of international rules and the reinforcement of a rule-oriented, if not rule-based, approach. Judicial dispute settlement and retaliation, exclusively based upon international ruling and authorization, was reinforced. Given the importance of trade regulation and WTO law, which has an established institutional and legal framework, the book therefore provides a much-needed comparative approach.

The UK and Multi-level Financial Regulation examines the role of the United Kingdom (UK) in shaping post-crisis financial regulatory reform, and assesses the implications of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union (EU). It develops a domestic political economy approach to examine how the interaction of three domestic groups - elected officials, financial regulators, and the financial industry - shaped UK preferences, strategy, and influence in international and EU-level regulatory negotiations. The framework is applied to five case studies: bank capital and liquidity requirements; bank recovery and resolution rules; bank structural reforms; hedge fund regulation; and the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives. It concludes by reflecting on the future of UK financial regulation after Brexit. The book argues that UK regulators pursued more stringent regulation when they had strong political support to resist financial industry lobbying. UK regulators promoted international harmonisation of rules when this protected the competitiveness of industry or enabled cross-border externalities to be managed more effectively; but were often more resistant to new EU rules when these threatened UK interests. Consequently, the UK was more successful at shaping international standards by leveraging its market power, regulatory capacity, and alliance building (with the US). But it often met with greater political resistance at the EU level, forcing it to use legal challenges to block reform or secure exemptions. The book concludes that political and regulatory pressure was pivotal in defining the UK's 'hard' Brexit position, and so the future UK-EU relationship in finance will most likely be based on a framework of regulatory equivalence.