Since the end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, there has been growing discussion of the possibility that technological advances in the means of combat would produce ftmdamental changes in how future wars will be fought. A number of observers have suggested that the nature of war itself would be transformed. Some proponents of this view have gone so far as to predict that these changes would include great reductions in, if not the outright elimination of, the various impediments to timely and effective action in war for which the Prussian theorist and soldier Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) introduced the term "friction." Friction in war, of course, has a long historical lineage. It predates Clausewitz by centuries and has remained a stubbornly recurring factor in combat outcomes right down to the 1991 Gulf War. In looking to the future, a seminal question is whether Clausewitzian friction would succumb to the changes in leading-edge warfare that may lie ahead, or whether such impediments reflect more enduring aspects of war that technology can but marginally affect. It is this question that the present essay will examine.

McNair Paper 68. Examines the question of whether Clausewitzian friction would succumb to the changes in leading-edge warfare that may lie ahead, or whether such impediments reflect more enduring aspects of war that technology can only affect marginally. Clausewitzian friction refers to the theory by Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) that reality exerts a kind of friction on ideas and intentions in war. This term is commonly associated with the diverse difficulties and impediments to the effective use of military force.

Much of today's Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the information age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test.

Research and instrumentation in warfare since 1500 demonstrates the rise of the scientific military, the complicated interaction with military institutions, and details of how scientists and engineers developed artillery and explosives, surveying and geophysics, pilot testing and siegework, and the role of national and university laboratories.

This book offers a strategic analysis of one of the most outstanding military careers in history, identifying the most pertinent strategic lessons from the campaigns of Alexander the Great. David Lonsdale argues that since the core principles of strategy are eternal, the study and analysis of historical examples have value to the modern theorist and practitioner. Furthermore, as strategy is so complex and challenging, the remarkable career of Alexander provides the ideal opportunity to understand best practice in strategy, as he achieved outstanding and continuous success across the spectrum of warfare, in a variety of circumstances and environments. This book presents the thirteen most pertinent lessons that can be learned from his campaigns, dividing them into three categories: grand strategy, military operations, and use of force. Each of these categories provides lessons pertinent to the modern strategic environment. Ultimately, however, the book argues that the dominant factor in his success was Alexander himself, and that it was his own characteristics as a strategist that allowed him to overcome the complexities of strategy and achieve his expansive goals.

Clausewitz's On War has, at least until very recently, been regarded as the most important work of theory on its subject. But since the end of the Cold War in 1990, and even more since the 9/11 attacks on the United states in 2001, an increasing number of commentators have argued that On War has lost its analytical edge as a tool for understanding war. They have argued that Clausewitz was concerned solely with inter-state war and with properly defined armies, and that the sorts of conflicts which he discussed are therefore part of a historical pattern which dominated Europe between 1648, the end of the Thirty Years War, and 1990 itself. Some have gone further, and suggested that Clausewitz's best known aphorism, that war is a continuation of policy by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century reconsiders the principal themes in Clausewitz's writings from a contemporary perspective, and finds in them much more inspiration and insight than these generalisations allow. Embracing the perspectives of history, philosophy and political science, the book reconsiders both the text and its current implications. Traditional interpretations of On War are put into fresh light; neglected passages are re-examined; and new insights are derived from the conjunction between Clausewitz's text and today's challenges. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

This book interrogates the philosophical backdrop of Clausewitzian notions of war, and asks whether modern, network-centric militaries can still be said to serve the 'political'. In light of the emerging theories and doctrines of Network-Centric War (NCW), this book traces the philosophical backdrop against which the more common theorizations of war and its conduct take place. Tracing the historical and philosophical roots of modern war from the 17th Century through to the present day, this book reveals that far from paralyzing the project of re-problematisating war, the emergence of NCW affords us an opportunity to rethink war in new and philosophically challenging ways. This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, social theory, war studies and political theory/IR. Manabrata Guha is Assistant Professor (ISSSP) at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India.

This book analyses the American way of war within the context of Clausewitzian theory. In doing so, it draws conclusions about the origins, viability, and technical feasibility of America’s current strategic approach. The author argues that the situation in which America has found itself in Iraq is the direct result of a culturally predisposed inclination to substitute technology for strategy. This habit manifests most extremely in the form of the Network-Centric Warfare/Effects-Based Operations (NCW/EBO) construct, which by and large has failed to deliver on its many promises. This book argues that the fundamental problem with the NCW/EBO – and with US defence transformation, generally – is that it centres on technology at the expense of other dynamics, notably the human one. Taking a fresh perspective on US strategic cultural predispositions in an era of persistent military conflict, the author argues for the necessity of America’s revising its strategic paradigm in favour of a more holistic brand of strategy. This book will be of much interest to students of Clausewitz, Strategic Studies, International Security and US foreign policy.

A pathbreaking critique of the thought of military studies icon Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz and his magnum opus On War that illuminates why and how that work should be viewed as much more mature, coherent, innovative, and complete than suggested by previous accounts.