This is a clarification of and development upon my previous work. It includes a rework of "Concerning the weakest coherent formalization of methodological skepticism as a Bayesian updater" and "On the finitist Wolfram physics model", then there is an outline of finite content theory and mathematical notes in various areas. Digital phenomenology itself is the study of a finitist (and therefore discrete) phenomenalism. It also includes my work on predictive liquid democracy, where liquid democracy is combined with prediction markets. The system allows for local satisfaction of Condorcet's jury theorem extended to multiple alternatives. See the part about predictive liquid democracy.

Collected papers of Digital Phenomenology is a clarification of and development upon Digital Phenomenology. It includes "Concerning the weakest coherent formalization of methodological skepticism as a Bayesian updater" and "On the finitst Wolfram physics model", then there is an outline of finite content theory and mathematical notes in various areas. Digital Phenomenology itself is the study of a finitist (and therefore discrete) phenomenalism.

This is a clarification of and development upon my previous work. It includes a rework of "Concerning the weakest coherent formalization of methodological skepticism as a Bayesian updater" and "On the finitist Wolfram physics model", then there is an outline of finite content theory and mathematical notes in various areas. Digital phenomenology itself is the study of a finitist (and therefore discrete) phenomenalism. It also includes my work on predictive liquid democracy, where liquid democracy is combined with prediction markets. The system allows for local satisfaction of Condorcet's jury theorem extended to multiple alternatives. See the part about predictive liquid democracy.

The papers presented in this volume examine topics of central interest in contemporary philosophy of logic. They include reflections on the nature of logic and its relevance for philosophy today, and explore in depth developments in informal logic and the relation of informal to symbolic logic, mathematical metatheory and the limiting metatheorems, modal logic, many-valued logic, relevance and paraconsistent logic, free logics, extensional v. intensional logics, the logic of fiction, epistemic logic, formal logical and semantic paradoxes, the concept of truth, the formal theory of entailment, objectual and substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers, infinity and domain constraints, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and Skolem paradox, vagueness, modal realism v. actualism, counterfactuals and the logic of causation, applications of logic and mathematics to the physical sciences, logically possible worlds and counterpart semantics, and the legacy of Hilbert's program and logicism. The handbook is meant to be both a compendium of new work in symbolic logic and an authoritative resource for students and researchers, a book to be consulted for specific information about recent developments in logic and to be read with pleasure for its technical acumen and philosophical insights.- Written by leading logicians and philosophers- Comprehensive authoritative coverage of all major areas of contemporary research in symbolic logic- Clear, in-depth expositions of technical detail- Progressive organization from general considerations to informal to symbolic logic to nonclassical logics- Presents current work in symbolic logic within a unified framework- Accessible to students, engaging for experts and professionals- Insightful philosophical discussions of all aspects of logic- Useful bibliographies in every chapter

Digital Phenomenology is a report on the philosophical theory of everything. From the first principle, digital philosophy and post-Keynesian economics are proved. The report is technical and aimed toward philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, physicists, economists, and political scientists.

"Intuition" has perhaps been the least understood and the most abused term in philosophy. It is often the term used when one has no plausible explanation for the source of a given belief or opinion. According to some sceptics, it is understood only in terms of what it is not, and it is not any of the better understood means for acquiring knowledge. In mathematics the term has also unfortunately been used in this way. Thus, intuition is sometimes portrayed as if it were the Third Eye, something only mathematical "mystics", like Ramanujan, possess. In mathematics the notion has also been used in a host of other senses: by "intuitive" one might mean informal, or non-rigourous, or visual, or holistic, or incomplete, or perhaps even convincing in spite of lack of proof. My aim in this book is to sweep all of this aside, to argue that there is a perfectly coherent, philosophically respectable notion of mathematical intuition according to which intuition is a condition necessary for mathemati cal knowledge. I shall argue that mathematical intuition is not any special or mysterious kind of faculty, and that it is possible to make progress in the philosophical analysis of this notion. This kind of undertaking has a precedent in the philosophy of Kant. While I shall be mostly developing ideas about intuition due to Edmund Husser! there will be a kind of Kantian argument underlying the entire book.

This is a clarification of and development upon my previous work. It includes a rework of "Concerning the weakest coherent formalization of methodological skepticism as a Bayesian updater" and "On the finitist Wolfram physics model", then there is an outline of finite content theory and mathematical notes in various areas. Digital phenomenology itself is the study of a finitist (and therefore discrete) phenomenalism. It also includes my work on predictive liquid democracy, where liquid democracy is combined with prediction markets. The system allows for local satisfaction of Condorcet's jury theorem extended to multiple alternatives. See the part about predictive liquid democracy. [Elib].

Arturo Carsetti According to molecular Biology, true invariance (life) can exist only within the framework of ongoing autonomous morphogenesis and vice versa. With respect to this secret dialectics, life and cognition appear as indissolubly interlinked. In this sense, for instance, the inner articulation of conceptual spaces appears to be linked to an inner functional development based on a continuous activity of selection and “anchorage” realised on semantic grounds. It is the work of “invention” and g- eration (in invariance), linked with the “rooting” of meaning, which determines the evolution, the leaps and punctuated equilibria, the conditions related to the unfo- ing of new modalities of invariance, an invariance which is never simple repetition and which springs on each occasion through deep-level processes of renewal and recovery. The selection perpetrated by meaning reveals its autonomy aboveall in its underpinning, in an objective way, the ongoing choice of these new modalities. As such it is not, then, concerned only with the game of “possibles”, offering itself as a simple channel for pure chance, but with providing a channel for the articulation of the “ le” in the humus of a semantic (and embodied) net in order to prepare the necessary conditionsfor a continuousrenewal and recoveryof original creativity. In effect, it is this autonomy in inventing new possible modules of incompressibility whichdeterminestheactualemergenceofnew(andtrue)creativity,whichalsotakes place through the “narration” of the effected construction.

During the course of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy developed into the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world. In the last two decades, it has become increasingly influential in the rest of the world, from continental Europe to Latin America and Asia. At the same time there has been deepening interest in the origins and history of analytic philosophy, as analytic philosophers examine the foundations of their tradition and question many of the assumptions of their predecessors. This has led to greater historical self-consciousness among analytic philosophers and more scholarly work on the historical contexts in which analytic philosophy developed. This historical turn in analytic philosophy has been gathering pace since the 1990s, and the present volume is the most comprehensive collection of essays to date on the history of analytic philosophy. It contains state-of-the-art contributions from many of the leading scholars in the field, all of the contributions specially commissioned. The introductory essays discuss the nature and historiography of analytic philosophy, accompanied by a detailed chronology and bibliography. Part One elucidates the origins of analytic philosophy, with special emphasis on the work of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Part Two explains the development of analytic philosophy, from Oxford realism and logical positivism to the most recent work in analytic philosophy, and includes essays on ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy as well as on the areas usually seen as central to analytic philosophy, such as philosophy of language and mind. Part Three explores certain key themes in the history of analytic philosophy.

Diagrammatology investigates the role of diagrams for thought and knowledge. Based on the general doctrine of diagrams in Charles Peirce's mature work, Diagrammatology claims diagrams to constitute a centerpiece of epistemology. This book reflects Peirce's work on the issue in Husserl's contemporaneous doctrine of categorical intuition and charts the many unnoticed similarities between Peircean semiotics and early Husserlian phenomenology.