Based on a conference of national authorities and leading scholars in antitrust and competition law and policy, the text presents 20 essays which together provide an in-depth assessment of achievements and impasses, as well as a variety of possible ways forward.

What the authors offer is a thoroughgoing analysis clearly demonstrating that, whatever economic path developing countries pursue, imposing Western-style antitrust regimes will engender uncertainty, chill economic behaviour, and foster an unhealthy climate for business. They employ the influential error-cost methodology to appraise the performance of competition policy and to show how such a policy creates irresolvable tensions in fragile economies with weak institutions - economies characterized by informal rules of business practice, long-standing symbiotic business-state relationships, and unpredictable state action. They mount a powerful critique of the arguments of neo-institutionalists (who fail to recognize the vulnerable nature of emerging market economies) and competition `advocates' (who presume to stand ready and vigilant to enforce competition policy on state entities). --

Eleonora Poli analyses how ideas and material interests have come to determine the evolution of antitrust policies in the USA, EU, Japan and BRICS. She argues that three major economic crises together with market globalisation have changed governments' perceptions of market competition, giving rise to a neo-liberal global phase.

The widespread move towards more market-driven models of political economy combined with the expanding internationalisation of business and commerce has led to a series of proposals for global competition rules. To date these proposals have been hotly contested. A critical issue is whether some form of international rule-making is required, or whether soft law solutions are sufficient. Competition rules may be required to combat the damage done by global cartels and to diffuse the tensions created when more than one nation seeks to regulate the same conduct. Competition rules may also be required to protect the integrity of the world trading system. International rule-making, however, presents its own problems, not the least of which is a concern with protecting national sovereignty.

During the last decade the European Commission has progressively adopted what is called a and‘more economic approachand’ toward competition policy. This approach, which draws on U.S. antitrust policy, puts greater emphasis on possible welfare effects of business practices and is less concerned with competitive market structures. Under this school of thought concentration cannot be said to impede effective competition to the extent that efficiency gains outweigh market distortions. In order to stimulate the debate on this basic reorientation, in January 2009 the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law at Hamburg convened economists, legal scholars, and practitioners for an exchange of views on these and‘newand’ methodological foundations of EU competition policy and competition law. Two especially controversial elements were chosen for in-depth discussion: the prohibition of abuses of dominant positions and the review of State aid. This book reproduces fourteen papers from this conference, representing the considered views of prominent European lawyers, economists, academics, policymakers, and enforcement officials in the competition field on matters such as: the objectives of EU competition law; the current enforcement guidelines of the EU Commission regarding Article 102 TFEU and? measuring market power; abusive low pricing strategies; the economics of competition law enforcemennt; recent developments in EU State aid law; economic justifications for State aid. A critical assessment of the Commissionand’s State aid action plan by the German Monopolies Commission is appended in English. Applying law and economics theory to competition law, this book shows that the and‘more economicand’ approach is exerting a considerable impact on various sectors of competition law. The authors clearly demonstrate the progress that can be made when lawyers and economists take notice of and respect the characteristics of each otherand’s discipline. Moreover, the authors show how new insights of economic theory may be integrated into the relevant legal analysis. The book will therefore be appreciated by academics, practitioners, and officials representing both fields.

Under Article 102 TFEU, dominant firms are allowed to compete, but only to the extent their market behaviour does not constitute an abuse. Needless to say, the wording of the article neither explains what an abusive restriction of competition is nor how such a practice can be identified. Rather than developing a one-size-fits-all test applicable to all forms of market behaviour by dominant firms, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (ex; Court of First Instance) have set out a system of tests for separate categories of conduct. Drawing on the full range of the EU Courts’ relevant case law, this very useful book analyses the conditions that must be fulfilled for a broad range of business practices to be deemed abusive within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, and also identifies the criteria that must be fulfilled for a practice to be ‘objectively justified’. The potentially abusive practices studied here (as defined in the relevant case law) include the following: predatory pricing; margin squeezing; exclusivity agreements; loyalty rebates; refusals to supply to induce exclusivity; secondary line price discrimination; vexatious litigation; acquisitions of intellectual property rights (IPRs); refusals to supply necessary inputs; provision of storage equipment on the condition of exclusive use; selective above-cost price cuts; tying; technological integration; and refusal to license IPRs. The author also contrasts the Commission’s decisional practice with the case law, assesses approaches under U.S. antitrust law to similar forms of conduct, and incorporates insights from economic theory. This study greatly enhances our understanding of the distinction between abusive conduct and lawful competition. In the course of its clarification of the EU Courts’ responses to individual forms of market behaviour, an overall approach to the identification of exclusionary abuses under Article 102 TFEU begins to come into view. Apart from the important new synthesis the work offers legal scholars, there can be little doubt this book will prove a valuable asset and even an inspiration to competition lawyers.

Reverse payment settlements or “pay-for-delay agreements” between originators and generic drug manufacturers create heated debates regarding the balance between competition and intellectual property law. These settlements touch upon sensitive issues such as timely generic entry and access to affordable pharmaceuticals and also the need to preserve innovation incentives for originators and to strengthen the pipeline of life-saving pharmaceuticals. This book is one of the first to critically and comparatively analyse how such patent settlements and various other strategies employed by the pharmaceutical industry are scrutinised by both United States (US) and European courts and enforcement authorities, and to discuss the applicable legal tests and the main criteria used for their assessment. The book’s ultimate objective is to provide guidance to the pharmaceutical industry regarding the types of patent settlements, strategies and conduct which may be problematic from US antitrust and European Union (EU) competition law perspectives and to assist practitioners in structuring settlements which are both efficient and compliant. To this end, an exhaustive legal analysis of some of the most controversial issues regarding pharmaceutical patent settlements is provided, including: – the lengthy split among US Circuit Courts on the issue of pay-for-delay settlements, its resolution by the US Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavisand subsequent jurisprudence; – the decision of Lundbeck v. Commissionby the European General Court and the Servier decision of the European Commission; – the Roche/Novartisdecision of the European Court of Justice and the most important decisions by National Competition Authorities on pharma patent settlements in the EU; – an overview of other types of strategies such as product-hopping and product reformulations, no-authorised generic commitments, problematic side-deals, mechanisms affecting generic substitution; – the rejection of the “scope of the patent” test in both the US and the EU and the balancing of patent law and antitrust law considerations in the prevailing applicable tests; – the benefits of settlements and the main criteria for assessing their legitimacy under US antitrust and EU competition law. The analysis provides concrete examples of both illegitimate and legitimate settlements and strategies, emphasising on conduct that falls within a grey zone and on the circumstances and criteria under which such conduct could be deemed problematic from an antitrust perspective. This book will serve as a valuable guide for pharmaceutical companies wishing to minimise the risk of engaging in conduct that could potentially infringe US antitrust and EU competition law. It further aims to save courts and enforcement agencies and also practitioners and academics considerable time and resources by providing an exhaustive analysis of the relevant caselaw, with the ultimate goal to increase legal certainty on the most controversial aspects of patent settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.

If an EU industrial policy can be said to exist, its contours may be found in the complex and evolving concept of State aid. Because approaching any State aid issue can be fraught with multiple and sometimes conflicting interpretations, an in-depth analysis of the rationales, initiatives, and regulations that constitute the State aid system is much needed. In response to this need, this book provides a fine-grained clarifying context through which recent reforms, policy shifts, and judicial decisions concerning State aid can be understood and applied to specific situations. Focusing on the impacts of landmark cases and policy developments leading up to a deeply informed critique of the current State Aid Modernisation Programme, the authors cover such issues and topics as the following: – linkages to other established and evolving EU common policies and common strategies; – effect of EU State aid rules in the expanding geopolitical regions of EU influence; – interaction with the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement; – the problem of a ‘subsidies culture’; – how the European Commission’s notion of ‘bad’ State aid has evolved; – effect of EU policy imperatives (e.g., environmental goals) which implicitly argue for increased subsidisation; – nexus with EU tax harmonisation; – competition among undertakings versus competition among Member State policies; and – nature of the quasi-devolution of regulatory responsibilities to EU Member States. This book is a crucially important source of both theoretical enlightenment and practical wisdom that will greatly enhance confident progress through any legal matter involving EU State aid rules. It will prove of immeasurable value to practitioners, in-house counsel, policymakers, and academics for many years to come.

Global Competition Enforcement New Players, New Challenges Edited by Paulo Burnier da Silveira & William Evan Kovacic In a short span of years, the landscape of global competition has changed significantly. In particular, international cooperation in competition law enforcement has greatly strengthened the battle against abuse of dominance, cartels, anticompetitive mergers and related political corruption. This thoroughly researched book explains the current situation regarding joint investigations, identifies common problems and considers possible solutions and future developments. In addition to covering issues of competition policy, its authors look in detail at practice in both merger and conduct investigations in a variety of countries. The following aspects of the subject and more are examined in depth: the interface between antitrust and anti-corruption; the digital economy’s challenges to competition authorities; convergent aims and rules among different competition authorities; regional organizations with competition mandates; competition neutrality and state-owned enterprises; and leniency programmes. Although necessarily there is considerable information on major antitrust regimes like those of the United States and the European Union, chapters by local experts highlight lessons to be learned from the work of competition authorities in five continents including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, Peru and South Africa. The contributors include competition enforcers, regulators, academics, practitioners and leading commentators from a range of jurisdictions. Adding up to an authoritative analysis from the enforcer’s perspective, the studies presented in the book clarify the approaches and priorities of competition enforcement authorities – including those of major emerging economies – and provide expert guidance on dealing with transnational investigations. Antitrust lawyers, corporate counsel and interested academics as well as policymakers will benefit immeasurably from this book’s wealth of informative detail.

Although it is commonly assumed that consumers benefit from the application of competition law, this is not necessarily always the case. Economic efficiency is paramount; thus, competition law in Europe and antitrust law in the United States are designed primarily to protect business competitors (and in Europe to promote market integration), and it is only incidentally that such law may also serve to protect consumers. That is the essential starting point of this penetrating critique. The author explores the extent to which US antitrust law and EC competition law adequately safeguard consumer interests. Specifically, he shows how the two jurisdictions have gone about evaluating collusive practices, abusive conduct by dominant firms and merger activity, and how the policies thus formed have impacted upon the promotion of consumer interests. He argues that unless consumer interests are directly and specifically addressed in the assessment process, maximization of consumer welfare is not sufficiently achieved. Using rigorous analysis he develops legal arguments that can accomplish such goals as the following: replace the economic theory of ‘consumer welfare’ with a principle of consumer well-being; build consumer benefits into specific areas of competition policy; assess competition cases so that income distribution effects are more beneficial to consumers; and control mergers in such a way that efficiencies are passed directly to consumers. The author argues that, in the last analysis, the promotion of consumer well-being should be the sole or at least the primary goal of any antitrust regime. Lawyers and scholars interested in the application and development and reform of competition law and policy will welcome this book. They will find not only a fresh approach to interpretation and practice in their field – comparing and contrasting two major systems of competition law – but also an extremely lucid analysis of the various economic arguments used to highlight the consumer welfare enhancing or welfare reducing effects of business practices.