Zenon Pylyshyn is a towering figure in cognitive science; his book "Computation and Cognition" (MIT Press, 1984) is a foundational presentation of the relationship between cognition and computation. His recent work on vision and its preconceptual mechanism has been influential and controversial. In this book, leading cognitive scientists address major topics in Pylyshyn's work and discuss his contributions to the cognitive sciences. Contributors discuss vision, considering such topics as multiple-object tracking, action, molecular and cellular cognition, and inhibition of return; and foundational issues, including connectionism, modularity, the evolution of the perception of number, computation, cognitive architecture, location, and visual sensory representations of objects.

This book presents a study of digital computation in contemporary cognitive science. Digital computation is a highly ambiguous concept, as there is no common core definition for it in cognitive science. Since this concept plays a central role in cognitive theory, an adequate cognitive explanation requires an explicit account of digital computation. More specifically, it requires an account of how digital computation is implemented in physical systems. The main challenge is to deliver an account encompassing the multiple types of existing models of computation without ending up in pancomputationalism, that is, the view that every physical system is a digital computing system. This book shows that only two accounts, among the ones examined by the author, are adequate for explaining physical computation. One of them is the instructional information processing account, which is developed here for the first time. "This book provides a thorough and timely analysis of differing accounts of computation while advancing the important role that information plays in understanding computation. Fresco’s two-pronged approach will appeal to philosophically inclined computer scientists who want to better understand common theoretical claims in cognitive science.” Marty J. Wolf, Professor of Computer Science, Bemidji State University “An original and admirably clear discussion of central issues in the foundations of contemporary cognitive science.” Frances Egan, Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Two prominent thinkers argue for the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference to be concepts' sole semantic property.In cognitive science, conceptual content is frequently understood as the “meaning” of a mental representation. This position raises largely empirical questions about what concepts are, what form they take in mental processes, and how they connect to the world they are about. In Minds without Meaning, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn review some of the proposals put forward to answer these questions and find that none of them is remotely defensible.Fodor and Pylyshyn determine that all of these proposals share a commitment to a two-factor theory of conceptual content, which holds that the content of a concept consists of its sense together with its reference. Fodor and Pylyshyn argue instead that there is no conclusive case against the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference as their sole semantic property. Such a theory, if correct, would provide for the naturalistic account of content that cognitive science lacks—and badly needs. Fodor and Pylyshyn offer a sketch of how this theory might be developed into an account of perceptual reference that is broadly compatible with empirical findings and with the view that the mental processes effecting perceptual reference are largely preconceptual, modular, and encapsulated.

Cognitive science arose in the 1950s when it became apparent that a number of disciplines, including psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy, were fragmenting. Perhaps owing to the field's immediate origins in cybernetics, as well as to the foundational assumption that cognition is information processing, cognitive science initially seemed more unified than psychology. However, as a result of differing interpretations of the foundational assumption and dramatically divergent views of the meaning of the term information processing, three separate schools emerged: classical cognitive science, connectionist cognitive science, and embodied cognitive science. Examples, cases, and research findings taken from the wide range of phenomena studied by cognitive scientists effectively explain and explore the relationship among the three perspectives. Intended to introduce both graduate and senior undergraduate students to the foundations of cognitive science, Mind, Body, World addresses a number of questions currently being asked by those practicing in the field: What are the core assumptions of the three different schools? What are the relationships between these different sets of core assumptions? Is there only one cognitive science, or are there many different cognitive sciences? Giving the schools equal treatment and displaying a broad and deep understanding of the field, Dawson highlights the fundamental tensions and lines of fragmentation that exist among the schools and provides a refreshing and unifying framework for students of cognitive science.

This broad-ranging volume includes a series of articles that were originally published as a special issue of Cognition produced to celebrate the 50th volume of the journal.This broad-ranging volume includes a series of articles that were originally published as a special issue of Cognition produced to celebrate the 50th volume of the journal. Written by some of the foremost scientists studying different aspects of the mind, the articles review progress achieved over the past twenty-five years in the main areas of the discipline. They provide a unique record of what is happening today in the field of cognition, with an added historical perspective that is often absent from other volumes that seek to cover so much ground.The chapters have been arranged in sections on Neuropsychology, Thinking, and Language and Perception. These thematic areas deal with theoretical aspects ranging from the status of explanations in cognitive science, to evolutionary accounts of human cognitive faculties, to the way in which humans use these faculties to reason about, perceive, and interact with their environment and each other. There are also contributions dealing with the abilities of young infants and articles that relate behaviors to their underlying neural substrata.

Rethinking Cognitive Computation explores the hypothesis that the mind is a computer. The exploration is based on the pioneering work of Alan Turing and presents the first detailed exposition of his theory of computation intended specifically for psychologists. Turing's bold and beautiful theory provides an ideal perspective from which to evaluate current computational thinking about the mind. The book examines the strengths and weaknesses of symbol systems and connectionist theorising and proposes a new approach called ecological functionalism. Ecological functionalism is based on Turing's fundamental insights and extends them by drawing on contemporary theories of concurrent and distributed computation to cover a wide range of psychological domains. Ecological functionalism provides the basis for a powerful, unified theory of great scope which includes social as well as individual processes. The book is intended for teaching but will also be of interest to researchers in cognitive science, psychology and philosophy of mind. Andrew Wells is a lecturer in psychology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has qualifications in philosophy, psychology and computer science and has published papers on a range of psychological topics.

Providing a new conceptual scaffold for further research in biology and cognition, this book introduces the new field of Cognitive Biology: a systems biology approach showing that further progress in this field will depend on a deep recognition of developmental processes, as well as on the consideration of the developed organism as an agent able to modify and control its surrounding environment. The role of cognition, the means through which the organism is able to cope with its environment, cannot be underestimated. In particular, it is shown that this activity is grounded on a theory of information based on Bayesian probabilities. The organism is considered as a cybernetic system able to integrate a processor as a source of variety (the genetic system), a regulator of its own homeostasis (the metabolic system), and a selecting system separating the self from the non-self (the membrane in unicellular organisms). Any organism is a complex system that can survive only if it is able to maintain its internal order against the spontaneous tendency towards disruption. Therefore, it is forced to monitor and control its environment and so to establish feedback circuits resulting in co-adaptation. Cognitive and biological processes are shown to be inseparable.

Why does the world look to us as it does? Generally speaking, this question has received two types of answers in the cognitive sciences in the past fifty or so years. According to the first, the world looks to us the way it does because we construct it to look as it does. According to the second, the world looks as it does primarily because of how the world is. In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi defends a position that aligns with this second, world-centered tradition, but that also respects some of the insights of constructivism. Orlandi develops an embedded understanding of visual processing according to which, while visual percepts are representational states, the states and structures that precede the production of percepts are not representations. If we study the environmental contingencies in which vision occurs, and we properly distinguish functional states and features of the visual apparatus from representational states and features, we obtain an empirically more plausible, world-centered account. Orlandi shows that this account accords well with models of vision in perceptual psychology -- such as Natural Scene Statistics and Bayesian approaches to perception -- and outlines some of the ways in which it differs from recent 'enactive' approaches to vision. The main difference is that, although the embedded account recognizes the importance of movement for perception, it does not appeal to action to uncover the richness of visual stimulation. The upshot is that constructive models of vision ascribe mental representations too liberally, ultimately misunderstanding the notion. Orlandi offers a proposal for what mental representations are that, following insights from Brentano, James and a number of contemporary cognitive scientists, appeals to the notions of de-coupleability and absence to distinguish representations from mere tracking states.

Systems Factorial Technology: A Theory Driven Methodology for the Identification of Perceptual and Cognitive Mechanisms explores the theoretical and methodological tools used to investigate fundamental questions central to basic psychological and perceptual processes. Such processes include detection, identification, classification, recognition, and decision-making. This book collects the tools that allow researchers to deal with the pervasive model mimicry problems which exist in standard experimental and theoretical paradigms and includes novel applications to not only basic psychological questions, but also clinical diagnosis and links to neuroscience. Researchers can use this book to begin using the methodology behind SFT and to get an overview of current uses and future directions. The collected developments and applications of SFT allow us to peer inside the human mind and provide strong constraints on psychological theory. - Provides a thorough introduction to the diagnostic tools offered by SFT - Includes a tutorial on applying the method to reaction time data from a variety of different situations - Introduces novel advances for testing the significance of SFT results - Incorporates new measures that allow for the relaxation of the high accuracy criterion - Examines tools to expand the scope of SFT analyses - Applies SFT to a spectrum of different cognitive domains across different sensory modalities

This handbook is an essential, comprehensive resource for students and academics interested in topics in cognitive psychology, including perceptual issues, attention, memory, knowledge representation, language, emotional influences, judgment, problem solving, and the study of individual differences in cognition.