The source of endless speculation and public curiosity, our scientific quest for the origins of human consciousness has expanded along with the technical capabilities of science itself and remains one of the key topics able to fire public as much as academic interest. Yet many problematic issues, identified in this important new book, remain unresolved. Focusing on a series of methodological difficulties swirling around consciousness research, the contributors to this volume suggest that ‘consciousness’ is, in fact, not a wholly viable scientific concept. Supporting this ‘eliminativist‘ stance are assessments of the current theories and methods of consciousness science in their own terms, as well as applications of good scientific practice criteria from the philosophy of science. For example, the work identifies the central problem of the misuse of qualitative difference and dissociation paradigms, often deployed to identify measures of consciousness. It also examines the difficulties that attend the wide range of experimental protocols used to operationalise consciousness—and the implications this has on the findings of integrative approaches across behavioural and neurophysiological research. The work also explores the significant mismatch between the common intuitions about the content of consciousness, that motivate much of the current science, and the actual properties of the neural processes underlying sensory and cognitive phenomena. Even as it makes the negative eliminativist case, the strong empirical grounding in this volume also allows positive characterisations to be made about the products of the current science of consciousness, facilitating a re-identification of target phenomena and valid research questions for the mind sciences.​

“A first-class intellectual adventure.” —Brian Greene, author of Until the End of Time Illuminating his groundbreaking theory of consciousness, known as the attention schema theory, Michael S. A. Graziano traces the evolution of the mind over millions of years, with examples from the natural world, to show how neurons first allowed animals to develop simple forms of attention and then to construct awareness of the external world and of the self. His theory has fascinating implications for the future: it may point the way to engineers for building consciousness artificially, and even someday taking the natural consciousness of a person and uploading it into a machine for a digital afterlife.

The source of endless speculation and public curiosity, our scientific quest for the origins of human consciousness has expanded along with the technical capabilities of science itself and remains one of the key topics able to fire public as much as academic interest. Yet many problematic issues, identified in this important new book, remain unresolved. Focusing on a series of methodological difficulties swirling around consciousness research, the contributors to this volume suggest that ‘consciousness’ is, in fact, not a wholly viable scientific concept. Supporting this ‘eliminativist‘ stance are assessments of the current theories and methods of consciousness science in their own terms, as well as applications of good scientific practice criteria from the philosophy of science. For example, the work identifies the central problem of the misuse of qualitative difference and dissociation paradigms, often deployed to identify measures of consciousness. It also examines the difficulties that attend the wide range of experimental protocols used to operationalise consciousness—and the implications this has on the findings of integrative approaches across behavioural and neurophysiological research. The work also explores the significant mismatch between the common intuitions about the content of consciousness, that motivate much of the current science, and the actual properties of the neural processes underlying sensory and cognitive phenomena. Even as it makes the negative eliminativist case, the strong empirical grounding in this volume also allows positive characterisations to be made about the products of the current science of consciousness, facilitating a re-identification of target phenomena and valid research questions for the mind sciences.​

First published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Over the last 35 years, studies focusing in young children’s knowledge about the mental world have developed into an important area. This body of social knowledge is called theory of mind, which refers to the individuals’ ability to interpret and anticipate the other individuals’ thinking, feeling, and behavior based on their interpretation of the situation. Many researchers and theorists believe that a representational theory of mind offers a basis for various critical facets of social-cognitive performance, such as teaching and learning, lying and pretending, making and keeping friends, and social learning more generally. The purpose of this volume is to share a collection of research strands on theory of mind research. It describes its historical roots and suggests improved alternatives. The focus of the volume is to provide a review and critical analysis of the literature on a contemporary domain of knowledge on young children’s Theory of Mind. For several decades scholarly research on theory of mind has been flourishing and a collection of new publication outlets have emerged such as the ones reviewed in the volume, which offers a thorough critical analysis of the research in contemporary perspectives on research in theory of mind in early childhood education. The researchers who conducted the critical analyses of the reseearch focused on understanding the mind in relation to (1) young children, (2) several assessment procedures, (3) metacognitive and neuroscientific processes, (3) emotion and educational representations, (4) interaction of social and cultural elements, and (5) inferences and future research directions. The work of these scholars can help guide those researchers who are interested in pursuing studies in early childhood theory of mind in a specific area of study.

This book takes a bold new look at ways of exploring the nature, origins, and potentials of consciousness within the context of science and religion. Alan Wallace draws careful distinctions between four elements of the scientific tradition: science itself, scientific realism, scientific materialism, and scientism. Arguing that the metaphysical doctrine of scientific materialism has taken on the role of ersatz-religion for its adherents, he traces its development from its Greek and Judeo-Christian origins, focusing on the interrelation between the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. He looks at scientists' long term resistance to the firsthand study of consciousness and details the ways in which subjectivity has been deemed taboo within the scientific community. In conclusion, Wallace draws on William James's idea for a "science of religion" that would study the nature of religious and, in particular, contemplative experience. In exploring the nature of consciousness, this groundbreaking study will help to bridge the chasm between religious belief and scientific knowledge. It is essential reading for philosophers and historians of science, scholars of religion, and anyone interested in the relationship between science and religion.

The demand for higher education worldwide is booming. Governments want well-educated citizens and knowledge workers but are scrambling for funds. The capacity of the public sector to provide increased and equitable access to higher education is seriously challenged.

This text originates from the second of two conferences discussing the concept of consciousness. In 15 sections, this book demonstrates the broad range of fields now focusing on consciousness.

Theory of Mind and Science Fiction shows how theory of mind provides an exciting 'new' way to think about science fiction and, conversely, how science fiction sheds light not only on theory of mind but also empathy, morality, and the nature of our humanity.